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Edited by Sol Picciotto
The international tax system needs a paradigm shift. The rules devised 
over 80 years ago treat the different parts of  a multinational enterprise 
as if  they were independent entities, although they also give national tax 
authorities powers to adjust the accounts of  these entities. This creates 
a perverse incentive for multinationals to create ever more complex 
groups in order to minimise taxes, exploiting the various definitions of  
the residence of  legal persons and the source of  income. While states 
may attempt to combat these strategies, they also compete to offer tax 
incentives, many of  which facilitate such techniques to undermine other 
countries’ taxes. 
Several alternative approaches have been identified, which start from 
the economic reality that multinationals operate as unitary firms. These 
include residence-based worldwide taxation, under which the ultimate 
home country of  a multinational taxes its worldwide profits but with a 
credit for equivalent foreign taxes paid; a destination-based cash flow 
tax, which attributes the tax base to the country of  ultimate sales to 
third parties; and unitary taxation with formulary apportionment, which 
apportions the firm’s consolidated profits according to factors reflecting 
its real presence in each country.
This volume outlines the nature of  the problem and discusses attempts to 
resolve it, including the recent G20/OECD project on base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS). It then explores unitary taxation with formulary 
apportionment. The contributions discuss how to move towards such a 
system starting from the current rules; the role of  accounting in defining 
the consolidated tax base; lessons from the experience of  existing 
formulary systems, especially in the USA; evidence from quantitative 
studies of  tax base misalignment under current rules and the possible 
effects of  different apportionment formulas; specific issues in the finance 
and extractive industries sectors; and the prospects for regional adoption.
Sol Picciotto is Emeritus Professor of  Lancaster University (UK), 
coordinator of  the BEPS Monitoring Group, and a Senior Fellow of  
the ICTD.
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Introduction
This collection of  papers aims to contribute to the ferment of  debate 
about the international tax system and its reform. They result from 
work by an international network of  researchers supported by the 
International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). This research 
programme was conducted in parallel with the project on base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) carried out through the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the G20, and 
papers resulting from our work have been published in parallel with 
the reports from that project. This collection aims to summarise those 
outputs, and discuss how they relate to the continuing reform process.
The G20/OECD project was clearly very different from an academic 
research programme. The BEPS project had the extremely ambitious 
aim of  achieving consensus among a very large group of  governmental 
tax authorities on reforms that could achieve a major reorientation 
of  international tax rules – within a very tight timescale of  some 30 
months. Given these constraints the final package was clearly a major 
achievement, and is a tribute to the determination and dedication of  the 
officials involved. 
The BEPS outputs aim to strengthen the system, and give better 
tools to tax authorities if  they have the capacity and will to use them. 
Overall, however, the proposals are a patch-up of  existing rules, making 
them even more complex and dependent on technical expertise to 
administer, and do not tackle the more fundamental flaws of  the system 
in a coherent way. Nevertheless, this is an important first step on a 
longer road. The G20 project itself  is continuing, both to supervise and 
coordinate implementation, and to work on some key issues that were 
not dealt with in its main phase. Indeed, the BEPS project’s outputs have 
not resolved fundamental problems of  how to apportion multinational 
enterprise (MNE) profits, especially in the digitalised economy. We hope 
that our research will help to inform these policy debates.
The continuing BEPS project agenda requires closer examination of  
the fundamental question posed by taxation of  MNEs: the criteria for 
apportioning the tax base among the various countries where such 
firms have business activities. The G20 mandate for the BEPS project 
requested that international tax rules should be reformed to ensure that 
MNEs would be taxed ‘where economic activities occur and value is 
created’ (G20 2013: 4). This implies that MNEs should be treated in 
accordance with the business reality that they operate as single firms. 
Although the final BEPS project proposals did not accept this explicitly, 
in some respects they did move in that direction. However, the proposals 
2 
remained unclear and complex on the crucial question of  criteria for 
allocating profits. Hence, although they open up a new road for the 
international tax system, the direction of  travel is uncertain.
This book explores the issues raised for international tax rules 
of  explicitly adopting a unitary approach to MNEs. This would 
undoubtedly entail a paradigm shift, involving a wrench to the mindset 
of  many international tax professionals. Yet, as outlined in the first 
chapter, both the history and the current reforms of  international tax 
rules are marked by a tension between the unitary and independent 
entity perspectives. Chapter 2 begins by outlining several alternative 
approaches that have been proposed, which entail treating MNEs as 
unitary firms. The rest of  that chapter analyses the issues raised by 
the approach explored in the research presented in this book, unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment, and hence introduces the 
remaining chapters. 
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The Current Context and a 
Little History
Sol Picciotto
Summary This chapter sets out the background and context for the work 
presented in this book. It first briefly explains why reform of international 
corporate taxation is particularly important for developing countries. 
It outlines the flaws in the current system and the impetus created for 
reforms, and then discusses the political economy of the international 
tax treaty system, and of its reform. Finally, it provides an evaluation of 
the results of the G20/OECD project on base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS), focusing essentially on the extent to which they moved towards a 
unitary approach, and the problems created by their continued adherence 
to the independent entity principle.
The importance of the issue
Although opinions differ about the desirability of  corporate income 
taxation as an abstract economic question, restoring its effective 
application to the largest and most powerful global firms is, in practice, 
an important goal of  public policy. This is especially the case for 
developing countries, for several reasons. 
First is the effect on government revenue. The percentage of  government 
revenue derived from corporate income tax (CIT) varies, but it is fiscally 
significant in virtually all countries. Low-income countries, in particular, 
are generally more dependent on CIT, which on average accounts for 
16 per cent of  their revenue – compared to 8 per cent for high-income 
countries (Crivelli, de Mooij and Keen 2015). In most developing 
countries the formal economy is dominated by foreign-owned firms, 
while much domestic economic activity occurs informally with few, if  
any, books and records maintained. This makes it harder for governments 
to raise revenue from individual income taxes and consumption taxes. 
For these countries, corporate taxation, and especially taxation of  the 
profits of  foreign-owned companies, represents a substantial portion of  
the potentially-available revenue base. These countries cannot afford 
to sacrifice large proportions of  their corporate tax bases, and the 
perpetuation of  international tax avoidance, now referred to as base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), therefore poses a significant national 
hardship for them.
Chapter 1
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Secondly, restoring the integrity of  corporate taxation is also important 
for its indirect impact on revenue, as corporate tax avoidance undermines 
public confidence in the legitimacy of  taxation more generally. This 
has become particularly evident in developed countries due to the fiscal 
crises and resulting damage to faith in public institutions following 
the financial crash of  2008-9. These concerns greatly contributed to 
the political impetus leading to the BEPS project. Public confidence 
in the fairness of  taxation, and of  CIT in particular, has been greatly 
shaken by the significant evidence of  considerable revenue losses due to 
international avoidance, especially from countries with comparatively 
higher CIT rates. An analysis by Clausing, based on the comprehensive 
data available for US-based multinational enterprise (MNE) corporate 
groups, suggests significant and increasing losses from such avoidance 
for the US government, reaching between $77 billion and $111 billion 
annually by 2012. Her more speculative extension of  these calculations 
to MNEs based in other countries suggests losses for all such countries 
(including the US) of  perhaps $280 billion (Clausing 2015). Estimates 
by International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists, using a different 
approach, suggest that the long-run losses for advanced economies are in 
the order of  0.6 per cent of  their GDP, but proportionately three times 
greater in developing countries – reaching almost 2 per cent of  GDP 
(Crivelli et al. 2015). 
Developing countries also have a very different perspective on taxing 
MNEs than developed countries. Firstly, they are mainly capital-
importing countries, and hence host countries for MNEs. Tax treaties 
essentially restrict rights to tax income at source, in the interests of  
encouraging reciprocal international capital flows. For countries that are 
capital importers they impose asymmetrical obligations, to the point that 
they have been described as a poisoned chalice for developing countries 
(Brooks and Krever 2015; Hearson and Kangave 2016). 
Yet, for the past half-century the formulation of  international tax rules 
has been dominated by the developed countries of  the OECD, with the 
UN Committee of  Tax Experts playing only a secondary role (Picciotto 
2013). The BEPS project partly bridged this gap, because it was taken 
up by the G20. Hence participation was extended to include the eight 
non-OECD G20 countries,1 and subsequently a further 14 developing 
countries were also invited to join.2 In February 2016 an Inclusive 
Framework was established: this allows any country to join in the 
continuing BEPS agenda as Associates, turning the OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs into a global tax body for some purposes. Nevertheless, 
the OECD countries set the scope of  the project, which explicitly 
excluded any reconsideration of  the allocation of  taxing rights between 
residence and source countries. In practice the issue was hard to avoid, 
especially as many OECD countries have experienced the difficulty of  
taxing foreign-based internet companies and service providers. Inevitably, 
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the BEPS discussions and negotiations were dominated by the concerns 
of  the large countries that are home to MNEs, and this can be seen in 
the outcomes. 
Thirdly, developing countries need tax rules that as far as possible can 
be administered easily, without the need for specialist and highly-trained 
staff applying subjective judgements. Recognising that some of  the 
BEPS proposals would be difficult for developing countries to apply, the 
G20 Development Working Group was tasked with the development 
of  toolkits on key aspects. This work has now been given to a Platform 
for Collaboration on Tax, which will coordinate the work of  the 
international organisations in this field. Yet it is legitimate to ask whether, 
rather than tools to adapt rules that have been formulated by richer 
countries, which they themselves have found hard to apply, it would not 
be better to investigate simpler and clearer rules that might be more 
suitable for all. This has also been the focus of  ICTD research, some of  
which will be discussed further below.3
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that many of  the techniques 
of  international tax avoidance entail making use of  the tax haven 
and offshore finance and secrecy system. These same facilities are 
also used for a much wider range of  activities, including capital flight 
and concealing the proceeds of  corruption and crime, which are also 
especially damaging for developing countries (High Level Panel 2015). 
The estimates that have been made by various parties of  the magnitude 
of  illicit flows through this system clearly far exceed the sums involved in 
corporate tax avoidance, and the bulk of  those flows do not involve direct 
losses of  government revenue. Nevertheless, there are links between 
corporate tax avoidance and the more general illicit flows, particularly as 
both take advantage of  the same facilities and techniques. Furthermore, 
it can be said that the growth of  a culture of  increasingly aggressive tax 
planning, and its toleration as a valid business strategy, have also affected 
the boundaries of  acceptable behaviour in other areas of  regulation. If  
international tax reform could remove the incentive for MNEs to use the 
offshore system, it would clearly be a significant step towards ending the 
wider damaging effects of  this system.
Flaws in the system, and the impetus for reform
The role of  international tax avoidance in the creation and continuation 
of  the tax haven and offshore secrecy system can be traced to a 
fundamental flaw in the international tax rules, designed almost a 
century ago. These rules were primarily aimed at international portfolio 
investment, the dominant form at that time. Hence, they gave the 
primary rights to tax business profits (so-called ‘active’ income) to the 
country where the business was located, while returns on investment 
(interest, dividends, etc, referred to as ‘passive’ income) should be taxed 
in the country of  residence of  the investor. 
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It was already understood, however, that foreign direct investment 
by MNEs posed special problems, since it was hard to determine 
the appropriate level of  profits of  the various affiliates (branches or 
subsidiaries) of  a multinational corporate group. A study for the League of  
Nations in 1932-3 showed that countries used different methods (League of  
Nations 1932-33). Some countries (notably Spain) started from the global 
profits of  the MNE as a whole, and apportioned profits to the local entity 
by applying coefficients appropriate to each business. Most started from 
each entity’s own accounts (especially if  it was a separately incorporated 
subsidiary), although they generally had powers to adjust those accounts. 
A common approach was to check that the profits taxed in each country 
were similar to those of  independent firms in the same line of  business 
(referred to as empirical methods). Consequently, special provisions were 
agreed in 1935; these were incorporated into the model tax convention, 
and eventually into bilateral treaties. These gave tax authorities powers to 
adjust the accounts of  related entities, to prevent diversion of  profits. In the 
case of  a branch, they allowed an apportionment to it of  an appropriate 
fraction of  the company’s total profit, and this provision remains today in 
many treaties, especially of  developing countries.4
The tax treaty provisions were, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, 
they gave tax authorities powers to adjust the accounts of  related 
enterprises, or of  the permanent establishment (PE) of  a foreign 
corporation, based on the understanding that they are related parties 
under unified control. On the other hand, the principle to be applied was 
that the income should reflect what might be expected if  the entities were 
independent. Consequently, the system as it has developed historically 
has included both ‘unitary’ and ‘independent entity’ elements. It has 
remained ambivalent between the two. Since that time, the methods 
that have been developed for allocating the income of  multinational 
corporate groups have in practice been hybrids of  the independent entity 
and the unitary approaches.5
Unfortunately, especially in the period of  rapid growth of  MNEs from 
the 1960s, many firms began to take advantage of  this independent 
entity principle to reduce their overall tax liabilities, by creating 
intermediary entities in convenient jurisdictions. Applying the treaty 
principle literally, each entity should be considered as if  it were 
independent. Intermediary entities, which might exist only on paper, 
could own assets or perform functions for which operating affiliates 
would pay royalties, interest or fees. Since these are deductible from 
profits, they reduce taxation of  the business profits at source. Yet these 
payments could remain untaxed by channelling them through conduit 
entities to take advantage of  treaty benefits, and on to base affiliates in 
zero-tax countries. Such techniques enabled MNEs to defer taxation on 
retained earnings, which was a major factor in financing the expansion 
of  especially US-based MNEs. 
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Today, most MNEs typically consist of  hundreds of  affiliates, forming 
complex corporate groups. The shift to the knowledge economy and 
digitalisation has also facilitated the restructuring of  MNE operations 
around global value chains, which can be tax-driven. This enables the 
fragmentation of  different business functions (research, design, assembly, 
marketing, distribution), as well as management and back-office activities. 
The independent entity principle enables MNEs to attribute only routine 
levels of  profit to entities in high-tax countries, while using payments for 
intangibles, finance and fees to channel substantial revenue to low-taxed 
affiliates. Countries now compete to offer tax advantages to attract the 
location of  entities that perform such high value-adding functions.
The measures adopted by tax authorities to counteract these strategies 
have continued to remain ambivalent. Some provisions override 
the fiction of  separate entity, such as rules allowing taxation of  the 
undistributed income of  a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) as part 
of  the tax base of  its parent.6 Others, particularly the rules on transfer 
pricing, have increasingly emphasised the independent entity principle, 
while aiming to decide an appropriate allocation of  profit by allowing the 
adjustment of  prices of  transactions between related entities. 
Since the 1980s, many independent commentators have advocated a 
reform of  international tax rules based on treating MNEs as unitary 
firms.7 However, European MNEs strongly objected in the 1970s 
when US states, notably California, began to apply their formulary 
apportionment approach on a worldwide basis.8 They received high-level 
political support, and US federal legislation was enacted to substantially 
restrict state application of  formulary apportionment to within the US 
(Picciotto 1992). In parallel, the introduction of  a new approach to 
transfer pricing by the US at federal level caused conflict at the OECD. 
This was eventually resolved by agreement to introduce new transfer 
pricing methods using economic analysis to determine appropriate levels 
of  profit, including the Profit Split Method (Durst and Culbertson 2003). 
Since then, the discreet cloak of  ambiguity has remained in place. 
As corporate tax strategies have become more sophisticated, the counter-
measures have become increasingly inadequate. Governments are 
clearly at a great disadvantage compared to MNEs, both in terms of  
resources, and of  their ability and incentive to coordinate. The problem 
of  inadequate resources, especially of  expertise, is obviously particularly 
great for poorer countries, but the large OECD countries have also faced 
increasing administrative strains (Aaron and Slemrod 2004). Kenya, for 
example, has recently benefited from capacity-building from the OECD, 
establishing a transfer pricing unit of  some 20 staff – the same number 
of  people are employed to advise on transfer pricing in one single private 
sector firm in Nairobi, KPMG.
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As regards coordination, MNEs have an even greater advantage, 
since they are centrally directed, although from their perspective they 
feel threatened by the diversity of  national regimes and the potential 
for conflicts between them. Indeed, such conflicts have increased in 
recent years, as more countries have strengthened their enforcement of  
international tax rules, especially on transfer pricing. Many developing 
countries have introduced such rules only in the past decade or less, and 
are now activating them. Large developing countries such as Brazil, 
China and India have adopted approaches that diverge from those of  
leading OECD countries, causing friction and conflict.9 Coordination 
between governments through the network of  bilateral tax treaties based 
on the model conventions is flexible, but also slow and clumsy. The tax 
treaty system was described, perhaps generously, as a ‘flawed miracle’ by 
Reuven Avi-Yonah in 1996 (Avi-Yonah 1996: 1304). 
The flaws have created an increasing political impetus for stronger 
coordinated action. This was first taken up by the G7 leaders in 
1996, resulting in an initiative through the OECD on Harmful Tax 
Competition (OECD 1998). This was initially aimed at both the classic 
low- or zero-tax havens and the increasing number of  states offering 
preferential tax regimes, such as Ireland (which at that time offered ten-
year tax holidays to inward investors). However, the OECD initiative was 
weakened following a change of  the US administration, and it refocused 
on a programme for improving tax information exchange through 
bilateral treaties.10
A decade and two international financial crises later, the political pressure 
had become stronger. The G8 leaders at their summit in 2013 agreed to 
establish a new global standard of  multilateral and automatic exchange 
of  tax information, as well as transparency of  beneficial ownership. In 
the meantime, the retirement of  Jeffrey Owens from the OECD’s Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration in 2012 provided the opportunity for a 
new initiative on international tax rules. His successor, Pascal St Amans, 
quickly started an initially low-key project under the highly technical title 
of  base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). This brought together issues 
that the OECD had already identified, including some on which work 
had been done. The growing fiscal crises resulting from the financial 
crash further heightened the political urgency, as well as requiring a 
broadening of  the political base from the G8 to the G20. The Action 
Plan on BEPS published by the OECD in July 2013 (OECD 2013) was 
formally adopted by the G20 leaders, who gave it a strong political 
mandate, in the St Petersburg Declaration of  September 2013 (G20 2013).
The politics and technocracy of the BEPS process 
It is important to bear in mind that international tax rules deal with 
the allocation between states of  their rights to tax.11 This does not mean 
that states will necessarily exercise those rights to actually impose tax. 
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Indeed, international tax policy has been dominated by the concern 
of  governments to encourage investment from abroad, and hence to 
offer tax exemptions or incentives to foreign-owned business. In this 
respect there can be some divergence between officials in the revenue 
departments, who are responsible for collecting tax, and those from other 
branches of  government, whose concern is to encourage investment – 
such as ministries of  finance, departments responsible for promotion 
of  business investment, or those dealing with specific sectors such as 
mining. Responsibility for tax treaties and their negotiation is a specialism 
distinct from tax administration, and usually comes more directly under 
the Ministry of  Finance than the tax administration. Certainly, since 
the 1950s both the drafting and negotiation of  tax treaties have been 
aimed at preventing double taxation, in order to encourage investment. 
In developing countries in particular, tax treaties are often signed by 
governments as a political gesture, with little or no involvement of  the 
tax authority.12
The BEPS project signals a major redirection of  perspective. It 
resulted from the perception by some officials that international tax 
rules should also aim to prevent ‘double non-taxation’. This was also 
fuelled by academic articles highlighting the issue of  corporate income 
that is not taxed anywhere, described as stateless (Kleinbard 2011a) or 
homeless (Wells and Lowell 2011). Dealing with double non-taxation 
entails stronger coordination of  tax rules and their enforcement, in 
order to close the loopholes that can be exploited for tax avoidance. 
A good example is the issue of  ‘hybrid mismatches’. These occur 
when a company takes advantage of  differences between two treaty 
partners in their classification of  an entity (e.g. whether it is a company 
or a partnership), or of  a financial instrument (whether it is equity or 
debt). This can enable the firm to take a deduction from gross profits 
in the source country for a payment that is nevertheless untaxed in the 
destination country.13 The BEPS Action 2 report recommends that 
source countries should generally deny deductions for such payments, 
or, if  they do not do so, the destination country should treat them as 
taxable income. 
This entails a different view of  tax sovereignty than has hitherto 
prevailed, since it means that the source country’s decision on whether to 
allow a deduction should depend on the tax treatment by the destination 
country. From a strict tax sovereignty perspective, if  the source country 
has agreed a treaty that gives the right to tax a payment to the destination 
country, the latter also has the right to exempt it from tax. Although the 
issue of  hybrids can be explained relatively easily, the technical details 
are esoteric, and the solutions that have been proposed involve managing 
complex interactions through elaborate and sophisticated rules.14 
Developing countries have taken the view that this issue is not a priority 
for them. More broadly, there may be some reluctance to move towards 
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a reformulation of  international tax rules to end double non-taxation if  
this is seen as restricting source country taxing rights, which is a strong 
concern for developing countries. Sovereignty is still seen by some, 
especially from developing countries, as including retaining the right 
not to tax foreign investors.15 Conversely, the home countries of  MNEs 
continue to defend their rights of  residence taxation, while providing 
generous exemptions for foreign-source income.
The political mandate for the BEPS project was expressed in broad and 
simple terms. It called for a reform of  international tax rules to ensure 
that firms could be taxed ‘where economic activities occur and value 
is created’ (OECD 2013: 4). However, it also insisted that ‘changes to 
international tax rules must be designed to address the gaps between 
different countries’ tax systems, while still respecting the sovereignty 
of  each country to design its own rules’ (G20 2013: 4). These aims 
are contradictory. As the example of  hybrids shows, closing loopholes 
involving differences between national laws entails closer coordination 
of  both law and policy. The conflict is exacerbated when a government 
decides that its tax system must be competitive in order to be business-
friendly. This generally signals a willingness to tax corporate profits 
more lightly, either by offering incentives or by lowering the tax rate. 
Stronger international tax coordination would inevitably restrict national 
government’s powers to grant many such preferences.
This broad but contradictory mandate from the G20 was entrusted 
to the tax specialists based at the OECD, who after over two years’ 
exhausting work produced a final package of  detailed technical 
recommendations.16 As outlined in the next section, these could give 
greatly strengthened powers to revenue authorities, depending on the 
willingness of  governments to introduce the necessary legislation, and 
the determination and ability of  tax authorities to enforce those powers. 
However, they fail to provide clear principles, especially for defining 
where value is created. Instead, this is left to be dealt with by applying 
complex methods for making transfer price adjustments based on 
analysing each company’s business model. 
This outcome can be readily understood if  we consider the nature of  
the negotiating process, and the concerns of  the various parties involved. 
Governments sought reforms that could give tax authorities stronger 
powers to deal with avoidance, while retaining the scope for politicians 
to design their own rules. A more effective solution, which would entail 
explicit abandonment of  the independent entity principle and treating 
MNEs as unitary firms, would largely deprive them of  this power to 
tweak national tax rules to try to attract investment by MNEs. 
The officials directly involved in the process, especially the transfer 
pricing specialists, generally understand (at least implicitly) that the rules 
rest on a basic conceptual flaw, resulting in the need for decisions on a 
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case-by-case basis. For them, this ad hoc approach is necessary because 
it is not possible to reach agreement on general principles for allocating 
profits based on where economic activities occur and value is created. 
Those from developed countries, such as the USA, consider that in 
today’s economy value mainly derives from the innovation and research 
that produce advanced technology and other intangibles, and that this is 
mostly done in, or directed from, the home countries of  MNEs. Those 
from G20 developing countries with large markets, such as China and 
India, argue that the market also creates value (as Alfred Marshall said, 
supply and demand are like scissor blades, both are needed for cutting). 
But technical specialists consider that it is not their role to resolve 
these questions in a principled or overt manner, by agreeing factors 
and weightings for allocating profits. They also consider that political 
agreement on such criteria would be impossible. Instead, the BEPS 
reports have produced considerable elaboration of  the transfer pricing 
rules (see next section).
Thus, instead of  resolving the central issue by a principled agreement, 
the problems have been deferred to be decided on an ad hoc basis. The 
main beneficiaries are the specialists, particularly in transfer pricing, 
which has grown to be an enormous field of  professional practice in the 
past 30 years.17 Their considerable investments in intellectual capital 
make it hard for most of  them to envisage or accept a new approach, 
and the increased complexity will further enhance the value of  their 
expertise. It will also create an even higher entry barrier for newcomers, 
particularly from the many developing countries that have introduced 
transfer pricing regulations only in the last five to ten years. Many 
aspiring professionals will no doubt relish this challenge, but if  the 
rewards for some individuals are high, so is the social cost of  devoting 
scarce skills to operating a defective system.
This consensus in the epistemic community of  international practitioners 
has created an obstacle to informed public debate on the issue. This has 
been described as ‘cognitive regulatory capture’ by Langbein (2010), 
borrowing the term from Willem Buiter in his critique of  similar links 
between central bank policies and the banking community (Buiter 2008). 
In principle, the main hope for pressure for a new approach should come 
from MNEs themselves. They now face the possibility of  strengthened 
enforcement, including by an increasing number of  middle-income and 
even poorer developing countries; the ad hoc and subjective nature of  
many of  the rules to be applied will inevitably generate conflicts. Indeed, 
in addition to conflicts caused by the divergent approaches adopted by 
Brazil, China and India already mentioned, there has already been a 
rising tide of  disagreements among OECD countries.18
Hence, business representatives have pressed for stronger dispute 
resolution procedures, and the report under BEPS Action 14 proposes 
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measures, especially to strengthen the independence of  officials 
responsible for settling conflicts. Further, some 20 countries have 
also committed to agreeing to compulsory binding arbitration, long 
demanded by MNEs. However, these procedures are remote from any 
concept of  independent adjudication: they are conducted entirely in 
secret, nothing is published even about the existence of  a dispute, and 
only the raw data of  numbers of  cases by country has been collated 
by the OECD. This extraordinary level of  opacity suggests that the 
participants could not justify the decisions to a wider public. The 
suspicion is that the issues are dealt with essentially by bargaining, which 
the participants naturally wish to conduct in private. Those involved 
place great faith in their ability to reach agreement based on a common 
understanding, but this confidence is belied by the growth in conflicts and 
the increasing time taken to resolve them, even among OECD countries. 
Some MNE representatives can now be heard to say, especially in private, 
that a unitary approach would be preferable, but with the proviso that 
it must provide certainty in the profit allocation. These voices may grow 
louder, although only if  strengthened enforcement leads to a significant 
closing down of  the scope for minimisation of  tax, as well as an increase 
in inconsistent decisions and conflicts. 
Appraisal of the BEPS project outputs
The BEPS project outputs have not resolved the tensions between the 
unitary and independent entity elements in the system, but in many ways 
have sharpened them. The initial BEPS Action Plan stated that ‘there 
is consensus among governments that moving to a system of  formulary 
apportionment of  profits is not a viable way forward’ (OECD 2013: 
14). On the other hand, the general objective of  the Action Plan was 
to achieve reforms that would align rights to tax more closely with real 
economic activity, to ensure that MNEs could be taxed ‘where economic 
activities take place and value is created’ (G20 2013: 4). This implies a 
shift towards acceptance of  the unitary principle. However, the rejection 
of  formulary apportionment seems to have been used as a reason for 
refusing to resolve the tensions between the independent entity and 
unitary principles.19 As a result these tensions continue to underlie the 
proposals, undermining the coherence and potential effectiveness of  
the package. 
This section will give a general overview of  the BEPS final reports, 
especially to show how those proposals that entail a move towards a 
unitary approach could produce improvements, while those that continue 
to emphasise independent entity will create further difficulties.
Hesitant moves towards a unitary approach
A number of  the proposals in the final BEPS package do entail a shift 
towards treating MNEs as unitary firms, although this is not made 
explicit. The major achievement is the formulation of  agreed templates 
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for country-by-country reports (CbCRs) and for transfer pricing 
documentation. These will, for the first time, provide all interested tax 
authorities with a clear overview of  MNEs as a whole, as well as details 
of  the relationships between the different parts. The scheme takes effect 
as a chapter of  the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 2010), which 
are applied in practice even by countries that are not OECD members. 
Hence, although its detailed provisions are only ‘soft law’, it establishes 
a global standard that countries can adopt and implement in binding 
local law. OECD countries have moved quickly to do so, and developing 
countries should follow suit.
CbCRs will be required only for the largest MNEs (turnover higher 
than €1 billion), at least until the scheme is reviewed in 2020. They 
are supposed to be delivered to the home country tax authorities, 
and shared with others subject to confidentiality and appropriate use 
protections. These arrangements create unnecessary obstacles, especially 
for developing countries. Publication would be a far easier and better 
solution, and may be the eventual outcome.20 Availability of  the reports 
will allow tax authorities to evaluate MNEs as unitary firms, but the 
scheme insists that they should be used only for risk evaluation, and not 
as a basis for formulary apportionment. In contrast to the CbCR, the 
master file for transfer pricing documentation should be delivered to all 
relevant tax authorities directly, together with a specific country local 
file. Also, these can be required from any firm with a taxable presence 
in more than one country, and will provide significant detail facilitating 
audit. All countries should ensure they have legislation in place that 
enables their tax authority to obtain this information. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the BEPS negotiators found it easier to propose 
unitary approaches to apportionment of  costs than of  profits. Companies 
themselves favour apportionment of  joint and overhead costs, to ensure 
that such costs can be deducted somewhere. The BEPS proposals 
included adoption of  a simplified method for pooling and allocating 
central service costs within a corporate group.21 However, many tax 
administrations are reluctant to allow deductions for such charges, 
rightly considering that they can be used to undermine the tax base 
in source countries. Hence, the proposals on this point are limited to 
low value-adding services, and further work will be done on defining a 
threshold. The initial proposal envisaged that a profit element should be 
included, trying to uphold the fiction that this is not an apportionment 
method. Although this has been weakened in the final report, it still 
suggests a 5 per cent mark-up, as if  this were a contract between 
independent entities. 
An important departure from the independent entity principle came 
in the proposals on limitation of  interest deductions. The initial draft 
suggested a limit based on apportioning the group’s consolidated 
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net costs of  interest paid to third parties by the MNE as a whole, in 
proportion to each affiliate’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation (EBITDA). This was explicitly presented as not an 
arm’s length rule.22 However, the final report recommends a fixed cap of  
between 10-30 per cent of  EBITDA, although combined with a group 
ratio rule, at the taxpayer’s option. 
The recommendation of  a one-size-fits-all fixed cap runs against all the 
evidence. Data put forward by business groups themselves showed that 
there are wide variations in the debt ratio between economic sectors 
and even different firms. A survey for the period 2009-2013 showed that 
55-61 per cent of  non-financial MNEs had interest expense below 10 per 
cent of  EBITDA, and 78-83 per cent had a ratio below 30 per cent.23 A 
fixed cap of  30 per cent is evidently far too high – yet this seems to be the 
option chosen by OECD states, anxious not to disadvantage their MNEs.
Strong rules on limiting interest deductions could go a long way to 
ending BEPS. The group ratio rule, based on an apportionment 
approach, would be a considerable improvement on methods still used by 
many, especially developing, countries, such as thin capitalisation rules. 
It would still involve some significant problems, especially the definition 
of  interest. Also, the BEPS project had insufficient time to consider how 
to limit other types of  deduction that erode the source tax base. A more 
comprehensive approach is suggested by Michael Durst, who has put 
forward a modified version of  the Transactional Net Margin Method 
(Durst 2016), which is outlined in Chapter 3.
Ensuring taxation of  a group’s worldwide profits could be achieved by 
stronger rules on CFCs, which also would treat a corporate group as a 
unitary firm. This will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section. 
However, the final BEPS report contains only recommendations for 
building blocks. It adopts a cautious approach, remaining ambivalent 
about whether the main aim is to preserve the tax claims of  the parent’s 
home country or those of  source jurisdictions, and emphasising the need 
to balance ensuring taxation with preserving competitiveness. This is 
reflected, in particular, by the report’s recommendation that CFC rules 
should apply only to subsidiaries that are subject to an effective tax rate 
‘meaningfully lower’ than that in the parent’s country. Unfortunately, 
adoption of  such weak CFC rules will continue to encourage competition 
between countries to reduce corporate taxes, and to motivate MNEs to 
shift profits. 
Some measures, although relatively minor, are proposed to combat 
exploitation of  the separate entity principle by fragmenting functions 
and assigning them to different entities in a group. Tax advisers have 
for some years been devising schemes for corporate restructuring of  
supply chain management to reduce liability to tax and other forms of  
regulation. Such structures have enabled a company such as Amazon 
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to book sales to an affiliate in Luxembourg that has paid low taxes, 
while separate affiliates in each country dealing with parcel delivery 
and customer relations declared low levels of  profit attributable to those 
activities. Similarly, Google books its sales of  advertising to an affiliate 
in Ireland, while it has staff employed by another subsidiary in London 
dealing with marketing, as well as research (Bergin 2013; Public Accounts 
Committee 2016). 
The current rules on taxable presence require a PE, a fixed physical 
presence, for six or twelve months. However, the rules in the OECD 
model treaty exclude from that definition activities such as warehousing 
if  they are merely preparatory or auxiliary to sales. The proposed 
changes would remove this exemption if  they ‘constitute complementary 
functions that are part of  a cohesive business operation’ carried out by 
the MNE through other entities in that country (OECD 2015a Action 
7: 39). Yet, activities such as warehousing would still be considered to 
be separate from sales. Deeming that it constitutes a PE still leaves open 
the question of  what profit should be attributable to it.24 Contracts could 
continue to be booked outside the country, unless the enterprise has an 
entity or agent there which ‘habitually plays a principal role leading 
to the conclusion’ of  the contracts (OECD 2015a Action 7: 16). It is 
not clear whether this would affect companies such as Google, since 
the marketing activities could be organised so that they do not directly 
involve conclusion of  contracts. Indeed, this seems to have been the 
conclusion of  the investigation of  Google in the UK, which resulted in a 
settlement that has been sharply criticised (Public Accounts Committee 
2016). Even if  the sales contracts were considered to be concluded 
locally,25 that activity would be regarded as separate from operating the 
search engine, and the activity of  managing sales may be regarded as 
attracting low levels of  profit.
The need for more radical changes
A wider approach was opened up by the work of  the Task Force on the 
Digital Economy (TFDE) under Action 1. This could be potentially 
far-reaching, especially as the TFDE rightly concluded that digitalisation 
has affected all economic activities to different degrees, so it would be 
inappropriate to apply different rules to a digital sector ring-fenced from 
the whole economy. In particular, digitalisation is transforming many 
service sectors, making it even easier to shift the tax base away from the 
place of  performance, which has long concerned developing countries. 
However, no conclusion was reached on Action 1, and a further five 
years was requested for the work of  TFDE to continue. In the meantime, 
all countries are facing major problems posed by taxation not only of  
internet giants such as Google, but many MNEs, especially in key services 
sectors, which can use digital technologies to minimise their CIT liability.
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The report on Action 1 of  the BEPS project recognises that digitalisation 
means that MNEs have come ‘closer to the economist’s conception of  a 
single firm operating in a co-ordinated fashion to maximise opportunities 
in a global economy’ (OECD 2015a Action 1: para. 232). Furthermore, 
it shows that digitalisation undermines the concepts of  residence and 
source on which traditional international tax rules are based, due to two 
main factors (para. 273). First, firms may make extensive sales of  goods 
and services in a country without the need for any significant physical 
presence there. Professionals such as lawyers or business advisers can visit 
clients just for short periods while providing services for much longer, 
while the delivery of  many goods and services can be organised through 
the internet, though they may be sourced or supported locally. This 
renders the traditional physical concept of  a PE obsolete. Yet the OECD 
consideration in 1999-2005 of  the implications of  electronic commerce 
rejected any significant changes to the PE definition.26
Secondly, and more importantly, despite needing a minimal physical 
presence, firms can now have much closer relations with customers and 
users. Companies reap enormous value through the systematic collection 
of  data about and from users. Supply relationships are no longer one-
way, and users can also contribute considerable value, including content 
such as comments and reviews. Paradoxically, therefore, firms are more 
closely bound to their customers, but may not need a significant physical 
presence in countries where they sell.
The report identifies some far-reaching possible reforms to deal with 
these challenges, but which will require continuing work over the next 
five years. First would be a new taxable nexus based on ‘significant 
economic presence’. This could result in a greater allocation of  the 
taxable base to the country of  sales – for example, if  operating a local 
website were accepted as an activity taking place in the country. The 
implications of  this are even more extensive. It would attribute profits 
to the entity in the country where the sales take place, although the 
costs may be borne mainly by affiliates located elsewhere. This makes 
it essential to adopt a unitary approach, or as the report says it entails a 
‘substantial rewrite of  the rules for attribution of  profits’ (para. 286). The 
report canvasses several possibilities, including fractional apportionment, 
deemed profit methods, a withholding tax on digital transactions, and an 
equalisation levy.27
Digitalisation has also greatly facilitated the fragmentation and 
restructuring of  MNE operations around global value chains, as 
mentioned above. This has also led to a recognition of  the potential 
role of  the Profit Split Method. Although accepted by the OECD since 
1995 as within the arm’s length principle, this method clearly entails 
apportionment of  the aggregate profits of  related entities. However, 
it is regarded by many as unsatisfactory in practice, unsurprisingly 
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since no work has been done since 1995 to regularise and systematise 
the approach. Work was begun on it during the BEPS project but not 
completed, so the final report on the transfer pricing Actions 8-10 
includes a chapter outlining the scope of  further work on the Profit Split 
Method, which is expected to take two years. It will cover consideration 
of  the circumstances in which the method is appropriate, specifically 
including the problems of  developing countries in finding suitable 
comparables, at the request of  the G20’s Development Working Group. 
Although the Profit Split Method essentially involves an apportionment 
methodology, it seems that the intention is still to begin from transactions, 
and to limit the scope of  applicability of  the approach.
Attribution of profits: transfer pricing and functional analysis
The greatest reluctance to abandon the independent entity principle 
is seen when it comes to the allocation of  profits. Three of  the 15 
BEPS Actions deal with transfer pricing, and the reports on these have 
resulted in a substantial rewriting of  the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(TPGs), extending them from around 370 to nearly 500 pages. The 
TPGs are important because they are applied in practice in countries 
around the world, and not only by OECD members.28 Despite the 
extensive rewriting of  the TPGs, they still stress that the starting point 
should be the various entities in the MNE group and the transactions 
between them. 
There is nevertheless a significant reorientation of  the rules, with a new 
emphasis on accurately delineating the true nature of  these transactions, 
based on an analysis of  the facts and circumstances of  each business. 
This ‘requires a broad-based understanding of  the industry sector 
in which the MNE group operates... including its business strategies, 
markets, products, its supply chain, and the key functions performed, 
material assets used, and important risks assumed’.29 On the basis 
of  such an analysis, a tax authority may recharacterise, or in some 
circumstances even disregard, the ostensible terms of  the related party 
transactions. Once recharacterised, the pricing of  the transactions should 
be evaluated by applying the accepted transfer pricing methods, as far 
as possible by reference to suitable comparable transactions between 
independent firms. 
The difficulties posed by this procedure should be readily apparent. Tax 
authorities must carry out individual audits of  firms, analysing the firm’s 
group structure and business model, which requires specialist knowledge 
of  each industry. The F-A-R (functions-assets-risk) analysis in the revised 
TPGs is now elaborated in greater detail, especially as regards the 
functions relating to intangibles, and to risks. A key intention is to ensure 
that an affiliate that is used simply as a ‘cash box’, either for owning and 
receiving income from intangibles, or for group financing, should receive 
only a minimal return, based on the assumption that it assumes no risks.
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The logic behind functional analysis is to try to identify the specific 
functions performed by different affiliates. In practice this is difficult 
or impossible when it comes to knowledge and risk, both of  which are 
spread through the firm as a whole. This understanding flows from the 
basic theory of  the firm, and is also borne out in practice. For example, 
a submission by BASF, the German-based chemicals firm, explained: 
‘Quality management and controls relating to the risks, functions and 
assets employed are to a wide extent part of  corporate procedures 
which are generally valid group-wide and are fully integrated in the 
business processes. The research and development process is managed 
by electronic systems which track the allocation of  projects to specific 
research centres, the adherence to budgets, the sign-off processes and 
the registration of  IP rights. “Control” is therefore to a large extent 
built in to group-wide guidelines and operating systems, and can 
therefore be performed anywhere as such systems enable a decentralised, 
collaborative organisation’.30
Indeed, MNEs pride themselves on being both global and local, able 
to benefit from their coordination of  activities worldwide, while their 
central management teams may be relatively small.
The revised TPGs place significant emphasis on control functions. In 
relation to intangibles, they identify the specially important functions 
as ‘design and control’, ‘direction of  and establishing priority’, and 
‘management and control’ (revised TPGs para. 6.56). Similarly, for 
identifying the location of  risk the key test is the ‘capability and authority 
to control’ (para. 1.67). 
This control test for the location of  key functions clearly favours countries 
of  residence. It is likely that countries where the corporate headquarters, 
chief  financial officer, or main research centre are located will assert 
that the control over functions such as finance and research is exercised 
there, even if  the firm operates in a decentralised way. Hence, an MNE 
could employ large numbers of  people in research and development 
activities in affiliates around the world, which could be treated as having 
only routine research functions, to which relatively low profits would 
be attributable.31 At the same time, the aim to end tax avoidance by 
attribution of  profits to cash-box affiliates may have limited success. 
A company could relocate a few senior people to carry out control 
functions in a country that offers low effective tax rates for such activities. 
Indeed countries are already competing to attract research hubs, by 
offering low tax rates on structures such as the ‘patent box’, and trying 
to attract corporate headquarters and holding companies by offering 
generous treatment of  foreign-source income. 
Some revisions have also been made that could strengthen the claims of  
source countries when conducting this type of  functional analysis. This 
is a response to pressure from non-OECD G20 countries, especially 
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China and India. These revisions deal with ‘location advantages’, and 
‘assembled workforce’ (revised TPGs Chapter 1, sections D.6 and D.7). 
However, these provisions are worded very carefully and cautiously. It 
remains to be seen whether the UN Manual on Transfer Pricing, the 2010 
version of  which included discussion of  these factors especially in the 
sections from China and India in Chapter 10, will be revised to bring it 
into line with the OECD TPGs. 
Following the functional analysis, an appropriate price must be identified 
for the (recharacterised) transaction. Although the TPGs in principle 
state that the most appropriate method can be used, it is generally 
assumed that there should first be a search for suitable comparables – 
that is, market prices between independent entities. The normal practice 
is to use databases that are available commercially (though at significant 
cost). These usually contain data collected from filings of  company 
accounts, so generally do not include details of  transactions, only of  
company profits by industry sector. So although the methodology stresses 
the need to start from transaction prices, in practice the focus is on the 
level of  profit. 
Data from company filings is, in any case, not available for most 
developing countries – where there is coverage, experience shows that it 
is hard or impossible to identify suitable comparables. This is especially 
likely for small economies that may have few significant independent 
local firms, but transfer pricing specialists in large countries also 
confirm this.32 To deal with this, specialists have developed econometric 
techniques to use data from elsewhere, adjusting for differences in 
economic conditions. However, these produce only a range of  possible 
prices, often quite wide (Gonnet, Starkov, Pletz and Maitra 2014). 
Indeed, although all the five accepted transfer price methods are 
described as transactional, only the Comparable Uncontrolled Price 
method (CUP) directly involves comparing and adjusting transaction 
prices. The Resale Price Method (RPM) begins from prices of  sales to 
unrelated parties, but reduced by an appropriate gross margin to arrive 
at a price level used to estimate profits. The Cost Plus Method (CPM) 
also uses an appropriate margin, but as a mark-up on operating costs. 
In both cases these calculations are supposed to involve adjustments to 
the original transfer prices, but clearly the focus is on the profit. Two 
methods were added in 1995 to these traditional ones, focusing more 
explicitly on profit, but still described as transactional profit methods. 
The Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) is a refinement of  Cost 
Plus, but is based on the net profit (rather than gross margin), which is 
calculated in relation to a suitable base, such as costs, sales or assets. 
It has become increasingly clear that these methods are inadequate, 
because they attribute at most a routine profit to operating affiliates. 
They are described as one-sided methods, since they focus only on the 
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local affiliate, and compare its profits with those of  firms conducting 
activities that could be said to be similar. This ignores the business reality 
of  the advantages of  scale and scope, and the synergy resulting from the 
integrated operations of  MNEs. The problem is most evident in relation 
to intangibles, which benefit the firm as a whole, but can be treated as 
assets, ownership of  which can be transferred to an affiliate in a low-tax 
country.33
In response, a fifth transfer pricing method was included in the 1995 
TPGs, the Profit Split Method (PSM). This explicitly abandons the focus 
on transaction prices since it apportions the combined profits, although 
only those from a series of  transactions (hence it is still described as a 
transactional profit method, like the TNMM). The TPGs recognise 
the strength of  this method especially in relation to ‘highly integrated 
operations’, particularly where both parties make ‘unique and valuable 
contributions’ (para. 2.109), or to achieve ‘a division of  the profits from 
economies of  scale or other joint efficiencies’ (para. 2.113). The PSM 
poses technical problems, mainly to deal with the differences between the 
accounts of  the entities whose profits are to be combined. It also requires 
identification of  suitable criteria or ‘allocation keys’ for apportioning the 
profits. These questions are also central to formulary apportionment. 
However, work on the PSM was not completed in the first phase of  
the BEPS project, and this is one of  the key issues which remains 
outstanding.
This very brief  account of  the principles and procedures for transfer 
pricing audits shows their complex and technical nature. It is clearly far 
easier for large MNEs than for tax authorities to employ consultants 
skilled in these techniques. If  these advisers produce suitable analyses 
backed by appropriate documentation, it is hard to mount a challenge to 
the transfer pricing arrangements they design that would be upheld by a 
court.34 There is some evidence that when a country creates a specialist 
section and strengthens transfer pricing audits, additional tax revenue 
can result. It is easy to understand that companies are likely to react 
to the initial threat of  enhanced audits by making adjustments to their 
accounts to pay some more tax. The question, however, is whether such 
gains will be sustainable. 
More seriously, it is evident that the elaborate and subjective nature of  
the evaluations involved creates considerable potential for conflict, both 
between tax authorities and firms, and between different tax authorities. 
Concern about the likelihood of  increased conflicts led to pressure to 
strengthen the dispute settlement procedure, as discussed at the end 
of  the previous section. It seems far preferable to try to devise rules 
that would be simpler and easier to administer, than to rely on dispute 
resolution procedures to remedy the defects of  these contentious and 
subjective regulations.
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Conclusions on the BEPS project
Overall, the BEPS project outputs could provide stronger powers to 
national tax administrations. However, they also involve considerably 
increased complexity of  the rules to be applied. They include some 
significant moves towards treating MNEs as unitary firms, but mainly for 
apportionment of  costs. The allocation of  profits depends on the transfer 
pricing rules, which still start from the independent entity principle 
and transactional analysis. This requires subjective and discretionary 
evaluations, requiring significant resources of  skilled staff. 
Evidently the tax experts engaged in the BEPS project could not agree on 
clear criteria or principles to decide how to allocate profits based on how 
value is created. Hence, this has been left for case-by-case determination, 
based on functional analysis. At the same time, this continues to 
incentivise MNEs to create complex structures by splitting up functions. 
Nevertheless this key issue will receive further attention, both in the work 
on the Profit Split Method and on the digitalised economy. As already 
mentioned, these issues involve consideration of  the MNE as a unitary 
firm. The next chapter will outline and analyse some of  the options that 
have been put forward for moving towards a unitary approach.
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Notes
1. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Turkey.
2. Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Croatia, Georgia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Tunisia and Vietnam. 
3. See the programme on Revenue Enhancement for Developing 
Economies (REDE). 
4. This provision allowing formulary apportionment still remains in the 
article on attribution of profits to a permanent establishment (PE) in the 
UN model, and in many actual treaties (Avi-Yonah and Pouga Tinhaga 
2014). 
5. As pointed out in IMF (2014).
6. First introduced in the US by the Kennedy administration in 1962, but 
due to strong opposition from both US MNEs and foreign governments 
it was limited to CFCs with a specified level of passive income, and 
located in a low-tax country (Picciotto 1992). Some OECD countries 
later introduced similar measures, but their effect has been limited due 
to the conditions applied, which are also relatively easily circumvented. 
The UK effectively abandoned its CFC rules in 2012, adopting a 
territorial basis. The modest reforms recommended in the BEPS 
proposals are discussed below.
7. See particularly Langbein (1986), and for an account and analysis 
Picciotto (2013). Although unitary taxation is still regarded as anathema 
among many international tax practitioners, there is a broad consensus 
among independent academic commentators on this view; for a 
representative recent sample see Clausing and Avi-Yonah (2007), Vann 
(2010), Kleinbard (2011b), Fuest, Spengel, Finke, Heckemayer and 
Nusser (2013) and Devereux and Vella (2014). While these academics 
agree on the nature of the disease, they differ on the most appropriate 
cure (some of the options are discussed in Chapter 2). On the other 
hand, the practitioners involved in the BEPS project preferred to 
evade an overt diagnosis, in favour of seeking consensus on remedial 
treatments. 
8. See Chapter 2. An important reason for the protests was that formulary 
apportionment taxes MNEs on a fraction of their worldwide profits; 
European firms setting up in California were making low returns there 
on their large initial investments, which they would find it hard to write 
off against their profits elsewhere.
9. KPMG’s Global Transfer Pricing Review, published every two years or 
so, provides information on many countries; for a survey covering Latin 
America and the Caribbean see CIAT (2013). Accounts of the distinctive 
approaches of Brazil, China and India were provided in Chapter 10 of 
the UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing (UN 2013). Brazil’s fixed 
margin method aims at ease of administration, but is regarded by OECD 
countries as diverging from their norms (see Schoueri 2015 for a 
discussion). China and India have applied the concept of ‘location specific 
advantages’ in ways that also have not been accepted by the OECD. 
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In 2013 conflicts between the competent authorities (responsible for 
resolving international tax disputes) of India and the US were publicised; 
the US official complained that his Indian counterpart approached cases 
from a policy perspective rather than applying the rules, and suspended 
negotiation of bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (Parillo and Trivedi 
2013). The Indian official was soon replaced, and the US moved to 
normalise relations (Parillo 2013). India’s Central Board of Direct Taxes 
in January 2015 announced the signature of a Framework Agreement 
with the US, and a year later reported that over 100 out of some 200 
outstanding cases had been resolved (Government Press Release, 
available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=135867).
10. This was aimed at tax evasion by individuals behind the cloak of bank 
secrecy. OECD countries began a programme of negotiation of 
Tax Information Exchange Agreements, mainly with tax havens, and 
providing for supply of information on request. Critics such as the Tax 
Justice Network pointed to the inadequacy of this programme, and 
called for a comprehensive multilateral system of automatic exchange, 
which was eventually accepted as the goal by the G8 and G20 in 2013. 
The OECD established a global Common Reporting Standard, approved 
by the G20 in 2014.
11. Hence they establish jurisdictional rules that create what Reuven Avi-
Yonah has described as the international law of tax (Avi-Yonah 2004).
12. Some commentators still continue to emphasise this perspective, 
e.g. Lang and Owens (2014); others argue that prevention of double 
taxation can adequately be ensured through domestic law, while 
retaining policy flexibility; the lock-in provided by tax treaties might at 
best be justified as a commitment device to reassure foreign investors, 
but the evidence on the effect of tax treaties on investment is at best 
mixed (Brooks and Krever 2015; and, for a case study, Hearson and 
Kangave 2016). 
13. Indeed, structures are available that enable deduction of the same 
interest twice, or ‘double dipping’; these techniques are not new, see 
Picciotto (1992) Chapter 8.3.b, especially p. 205.
14. The final BEPS Action 2 report deals with only the most egregious 
arrangements, yet runs to some 450 pages (150 of text and 300 of 
examples). It remains to be seen how many countries will follow the 
recommendations, and how. 
15. This was seen in the discussion in the UN Tax Committee in 2014 of a 
proposal to include a new provision in its model treaty, along the lines of 
Article 23A.4 adopted by the OECD in 2010, to limit tax exemption in 
the country of residence if it would result in double non-taxation. The 
proposal was accepted only subject to inclusion in the Commentary of 
wording explaining the opposition of some members (UN Committee 
of Experts in International Tax Matters, Report on 10th Session, doc. 
E/2014/45-E/C.18/2014/6, paras. 57-8). This resulted from a note 
of objection submitted by the member from India, who argued that 
‘developing countries sometimes intentionally enter into treaties 
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including provisions that allow double non-taxation in order to secure 
their developmental interests’ (UN document E/C.18/2014/CRP.16: 3).
16. Available at www.oecd.org/tax/beps-reports.htm. 
17. For a more detailed discussion of the relationships between 
technicisation and complexity, see Picciotto (2015).
18. Shown in the OECD data on recourse to the mutual agreement 
procedure for resolving such conflicts, available at  
www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/oecd-releases-2014-map-statistics.htm. 
19. This has been pointed out by other commentators. For example, Prof. 
Michael Devereux, commenting on the aims of the BEPS Action Plan 
to ‘better align rights to tax with economic activity’, said: ‘I see this as 
a new principle, this is saying let’s tax where there is economic activity 
or relevant substance. I think if the OECD had gone back and said 
we need to review these principles and maybe replace them with a 
new principle which is this, I would have applauded and said this is just 
what we needed to do. But actually that doesn’t seem to be what’s 
happening, what actually seems to be happening is that we are keeping 
all the old principles and overlaying a new principle on top, which is 
actually inconsistent with the existing principles, and what do we end up 
with? Well, we end up with so many different principles we don’t know 
whether we are coming or going.’ (Presentation at the conference of 
the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation on Tax Competition 
and BEPS, June 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=PLV
TrhuQDwA&list=PLtXf43N26ZidJfK8KN-ffHkfYfFsidivv&index=1). 
Prof. Edward Kleinbard commented on the BEPS Project: ‘I wish 
them the best, but I think that they’ve made their lives very hard for 
themselves by insisting on the arm’s length principle as an untouchable 
sort of axiom’ (interview for a blog on the Tax Foundation, 15 May 
2015, http://taxfoundation.org/blog/making-sense-profit-shifting-
edward-kleinbard).
20. Momentum for public CbCR is growing – especially in the EU, where 
it has been proposed as a corporate disclosure rather than as a tax 
measure. The strict confidentiality that has been insisted upon for 
these reports will also greatly hinder research both on the extent of 
the success of the BEPS project, and the design of improvements, as 
discussed in Chapter 7 below.
21. Through revisions to chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(TPGs), in the BEPS Report on Actions 8-10.
22. Discussion draft on Action 4, December 2014, paras. 21-24. 
23. See data in the survey done by PwC for the Business and Industry 
Advisory Group (BIAC) of the OECD: Comments received on Public 
Discussion Draft BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, Part 1, p.136, available at  
www.oecd.org/tax/public-comments-action-4-interest-deductions-
other-financial-payments.htm. The analysis was of public companies in 
Standard & Poor’s GlobalVantage database, with over 20,000 entries.
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24. The proposed revision to para. 22 of the Commentary to Article 5 
states: ‘Where, for example, an enterprise of State R maintains in State S 
a very large warehouse in which a significant number of employees 
work for the main purpose of storing and delivering goods owned by 
the enterprise that the enterprise sells online to customers in State 
S, paragraph 4 [the exemption] will not apply to that warehouse 
since the storage and delivery activities that are performed through 
that warehouse, which represents an important asset and requires a 
number of employees, constitute an essential part of the enterprise’s 
sale/distribution business and do not have, therefore, a preparatory or 
auxiliary character’. The issue of attribution of profits to such a PE was 
left for further work, which entails revisiting the so-called Authorised 
OECD Approach to Article 7.
25. The Google settlement was soon followed by an announcement by 
Facebook that from April 2016 it would begin to book some of its 
advertising contracts in the UK – those of large clients with account 
managers. However, commentators pointed out that this would not 
result in a major increase in the tax payable.
26. See Annex A of the BEPS Action 1 report.
27. Such a measure was introduced by India in 2016.
28. The OECD considers that its member states are committed to applying 
the TPGs, including revisions once adopted, and the OECD Council 
approved the BEPS reports presented in October 2015. In some 
states they are given statutory status to be used as guidance for tax 
treaty interpretation, e.g. the UK. Some non-OECD countries, including 
Nigeria and Tanzania, also have statutory provisions giving the TPGs 
such status, although along with the UN Manual on Transfer Pricing 
(UN 2013). Some national courts have relied on the TPGs even 
without statutory support: e.g. in Unilever Kenya Ltd (2005), Judge 
Alnashir Visram rejected transfer price adjustments made by the Kenya 
Revenue Authority on the grounds that they were contrary to the 
OECD Guidelines, although the Kenyan legislation at that time made 
no reference to them. Other countries (e.g. India, US) implement the 
TPGs through their own rules. Corporate tax advisers generally rely on 
the TPGs to justify their practices, so tax authorities generally need to 
do so as well. Although in most countries the taxpayer in principle has 
the burden of justifying its accounts, in practice if a structure and pricing 
scheme have been devised and documented by specialist advisers, the 
tax authority faces a difficult task in challenging them.
29. New para. 1.34 in Chapter 1 Section D of the TPGs.
30. In its submission to the Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Intangibles, September 2013, www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/basf-intangibles.pdf.
31. BASF, in its evidence cited in the previous footnote, stated that it has 
‘numerous research hubs, located primarily in Germany, USA, China 
and India’. 
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32. A rare occasion when this was frankly recognised occurred during 
the consultations in the BEPS process on special measures (19 
March 2015), when the Chinese delegate (Xiaoyue Wang, deputy 
director-general in the International Taxation Department) boldly 
stated that ‘the arm’s length principle does not work’, because in her 
experience true comparables cannot be found (see www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hjuhPtmTx64&feature=youtu.be).
33. The revised chapter VI of the TPGs now states that one-sided methods 
are generally not reliable for valuing intangibles (para. 6.142).
34. In late 2014, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) hired specialist 
consultants at a cost of $2 million to assist the IRS audit team in the 
examination of the transfer pricing arrangements of Microsoft (Gupta 
2014). In the UK, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) increased its 
transfer pricing specialists from 65 to 81 between 2012 and 2016; 
its 6-year investigation of Google’s tax affairs involved between 
10 and 30 specialists at any one time, and eventually resulted in a 
settlement agreeing an additional payment of £130 million covering 
the period 2005-15 (£18 million for interest, and including a change 
in the treatment of share-based compensation: see Public Accounts 
Committee (2016), paras. 4-6).
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Unitary Alternatives and Formulary 
Appointment
Sol Picciotto
Summary This chapter begins by outlining several proposals that, in 
different ways, would apply a unitary approach to multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). The remainder of this chapter focuses more particularly on one 
variant: unitary taxation with formulary apportionment, in the light of the 
work presented in this collection. It first analyses the issues involved in 
defining the tax base to be apportioned, then evaluates the evidence about 
the possible effects of formulary apportionment on national tax revenue, 
and sketches the possibilities and prospects for adoption of such a system 
regionally, ending with a brief conclusion. 
Options for adopting a unitary approach 
The term ‘unitary taxation’ is often treated as synonymous with 
formulary apportionment, which is confusing. Several alternative 
approaches are available that involve treating transnational corporate 
groups as unitary firms. Indeed, as already discussed above, the existing 
rules already include unitary elements. Hence, some of  these approaches 
could be compatible with current rules. This section will briefly outline 
and evaluate some of  the unitary taxation methods that do not involve 
formulary apportionment.
Residence-based worldwide taxation (RBWT)
One is for the adoption of  residence-based worldwide taxation (RBWT). 
This would apply home country tax directly on a current basis on the 
consolidated worldwide profits of  a corporate group, but with a full credit 
for foreign taxes paid.1 This would in effect treat all foreign affiliates on a 
full-inclusion basis as controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). 
RBWT gives the residual right to tax to the firm’s home country, but the 
initial right to the source country. Hence, it can be seen as strengthening 
source country taxation by removing the incentive for the MNE to 
shift profits, since any reduction of  source taxation would lead to an 
equivalent increase of  tax in the home country. It also removes the 
temptation for the source country to offer tax advantages to attract 
inward investment, for the same reason. However, this can also be 
seen as an infringement of  source country tax rights, if  those rights are 
understood as including a right not to tax. This goes to the heart of  the 
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issue of  the nature of  tax sovereignty raised by the aim of  ending double 
non-taxation, discussed in Chapter 1.
Such provisions could, from a legal perspective, be formulated and 
implemented unilaterally, without the need for agreement between 
states, and probably also without alterations to tax treaty rules. Indeed, 
strengthening of  CFC rules was Action 3 in the base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) project but, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
final proposals were very weak. In practice, however, unilateral adoption 
of  strong CFC rules is difficult, especially for a country with a high 
corporate tax rate. Since MNEs headquartered there would be subject 
to that high rate on their worldwide profits, it would create an incentive 
for them to relocate or ‘invert’. This could be counteracted legally, 
through appropriate residence rules. However, as many have argued, 
corporate residence is increasingly hard to define. Place of  incorporation 
is obviously ineffective, and place of  central management may also 
be prone to avoidance since it involves identifying where key central 
management decisions are taken. 
Fleming, Peroni and Shay opt for a test of  shareholder residency with 
a 50 per cent threshold, and a rebuttable presumption for place of  
incorporation (Fleming et al. 2014). This is based on their view that the 
incidence of  the tax is essentially on shareholders. They counter criticism 
that determining shareholder residency is impractical, by claiming that 
it is technologically possible and such information should be increasingly 
available ‘in a post-FATCA world’.2 They also argue that RBWT is 
superior to the formulary apportionment variety of  unitary taxation, 
on the grounds that the latter is a territorial system, and hence would 
affect – they say distort – investment decisions. They concede that, unlike 
traditional territorial systems, formulary apportionment would not create 
incentives for artificial profit shifting, but argue that applying the three-
factor apportionment formula based on labour, assets and sales would 
encourage firms to shift assets and employment to low-tax countries. This 
concern may weigh especially heavily for the US, where the loss of  jobs 
due to outbound investment has left scars. This is discussed in more detail 
in the next section, in the context of  the issues affecting the selection of  
formula factors in a formulary apportionment system.
Adoption by the US could be feasible as part of  a wider reform of  
corporate taxation, including reducing its current high marginal 
corporate tax rate of  35 per cent. It is now widely accepted that this is 
an unacceptable disadvantage compared to, for example, the UK with a 
rate of  20 per cent (soon to be 18 per cent), or Ireland at 12.5 per cent. 
Recognising this, blueprints that have been put forward for reasserting 
US taxation on a worldwide basis have been coupled with moving to a 
lower tax rate, which could be politically popular. Although the BEPS 
proposals were formulated so as not to require significant changes to 
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current US tax statutes, a broader US tax reform is clearly necessary to 
break up the logjam restricting a more effective and long-term solution. 
However, this depends on the US domestic political conjuncture, since 
it raises distributional issues of  the relationship between corporate and 
individual taxation, and indeed about the overall level of  taxation. 
A shift towards RBWT would also be facilitated if  a more coordinated 
approach could be developed, despite the failure to do so in the BEPS 
project. Notably, the action plan published by the European Commission 
in June 2015 suggested that EU member states should reform CFC 
rules jointly (European Commission 2015). Adoption of  RBWT by 
both the US and the EU could make the approach effective, although 
there should be some coordination, which would be hard to achieve. 
The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
are now also the home of  large MNEs, and could be potential adopters 
of  RBWT. However, in the present climate there seems little appetite 
for such coordination. The draft directive published by the European 
Commission in January 2016 as part of  its anti-tax avoidance package 
proposed measures to apply some of  the BEPS proposals. These included 
common CFC rules, but aimed only at defined types of  passive income, 
and confined to entities in non-European countries with very low tax 
rates (a threshold of  40 per cent of  the home country rate). 
A destination-based corporate tax
Another approach is the concept of  a Destination-based Cash Flow 
Tax (DBCFT). This has been advocated especially by some economists 
(Auerbach and Devereux 2013), although others have criticised it 
(Cui 2015). A pure DBCFT is not a tax on profits, but akin to a Value 
Added Tax (VAT), except that full and immediate deduction is allowed 
both of  labour costs and other cash expenses including investments. 
Applied on a destination basis it could therefore be regarded as trade 
distorting, and hence conflict with world trade rules (Cui 2015).
Nevertheless, from the perspective of  international tax rules this 
approach has the merit that it is in effect a unitary approach, since 
internal transfers within a corporate group are ignored, and the tax base 
is both defined and apportioned in terms of  sales to third parties (Avi-
Yonah 2015). Allocating the corporate tax base according to the location 
of  final consumers may have economic attractions. Notably, corporations 
could make investment and employment decisions without being affected 
by the varying tax rates of  the jurisdictions where the investments would 
be made or workers are employed. On the other hand, it raises concerns 
about the distributional effects on tax revenue for countries with small 
consumer markets. 
It also raises considerable practical problems. First, it requires 
identification of  the location of  customers, which is difficult in the era 
of  electronic commerce. However, some solutions are being developed 
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in relation to the shift of  VAT to a destination basis, by both the EU 
and the OECD. The report on BEPS Action 1 suggests the possibility of  
taxing sales transactions, enforced through intermediaries such as banks. 
This would require foreign firms to register and maintain identifiable 
accounts, payments into which would be taxed. This mechanism could 
be used either for a sales transaction tax, or as a withholding tax on sales 
credited against a corporate income tax liability.3 A stronger objection is 
that a high proportion of  exports consist of  sales of  intermediate goods 
to businesses, and not finished products to final consumers. This could 
encourage the location of  assembly industries in countries with low 
corporate income tax (CIT) rates, to reduce the cost of  inputs.
Another major problem is that, since its tax base is entirely on sales, the 
DBCFT brings into sharp relief  the problem that taxing rights could 
be allocated to countries where a company has little or no physical 
presence. To deal with this, Devereux and de la Feria suggest a clearing 
house system, modelled on the one-stop-shop being trialled in the EU, to 
enable the VAT to move to a destination basis. This is clearly more than 
just a practical issue. It would entail considerable cooperation among 
states, in effect a joint system of  collection and enforcement of  corporate 
taxes, with a netting-out procedure, including an element for the costs of  
collection (Devereux and de la Feria 2014). In view of  the experience to 
date of  attempting to reach agreement between states, this seems to be 
an extremely ambitious undertaking.
Other alternatives
A more pragmatic way forward could be to sacrifice some purity for 
achieving simplicity in allocating the consolidated tax base of  a unitary 
enterprise. This may be especially important for developing countries, 
which would experience considerable difficulty in applying complex 
methods requiring considerable skill and judgment. It is for these reasons 
that Brazil adopted its distinctive system based on legislatively fixed 
margins, which seems to have been successful – at least in ensuring ease 
of  administration. By removing the need for subjective evaluation by tax 
officials, it greatly reduces administrative costs, removes the temptation 
for corruption, and virtually eliminates litigation. However, setting profit 
margins by broad industry sector is a very broad-brush approach. It 
has also been considered by the OECD countries as contrary to the 
arm’s length principle, although Schoueri has put forward proposals for 
bringing it into line by allowing companies a genuine opportunity to 
propose a more appropriate margin (Schoueri 2015).
With such aims in mind, Michael Durst puts forward a proposal for a 
modified version of  the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) 
(Durst 2016). This would avoid the need for a detailed audit based on 
functional analysis and attempting to identify comparable independent 
firms, by simply establishing a benchmark for the local affiliate’s 
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profitability. This would require the local affiliate to earn a profit margin 
in proportion to that of  the corporate group as a whole. The benchmark 
he suggests is 25 per cent of  the group’s earnings before tax (Durst 2016), 
based on experience of  attempting to apply the TNMM to a wide range 
of  distributors, manufacturers and service providers. The fraction is 
chosen to arrive at a profit allocation that could be acceptable to both 
the revenue authority and the taxpayer. It would generally prevent the 
very low requirements of  income that under current practice tend to be 
ascribed to ‘risk-stripped’ subsidiaries in the course of  BEPS planning. 
The suggested method would require a minimum level of  income, 
consistent with group-wide profitability, even after payment of  interest, 
thereby limiting base erosion through the use of  related-party loans, as 
well as other deductions of  payments to related parties. Such a provision 
could be applied as a ‘safe harbour’, although to be effective it should 
not be optional for taxpayers. It is evidently not a fully satisfactory or 
principled approach, but is put forward as a pragmatic solution, aimed 
mainly to provide developing countries with a method that is easy to 
administer and could adequately protect their tax base.
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment
Despite the promise of  a unitary approach in controlling BEPS, it 
is plain that countries, and international organisations advising and 
assisting them, would need to address a number of  important and as 
yet unresolved technical challenges, especially if  a full system of  unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment is to be applied effectively in 
the international sphere. Such a system would require: (i) combined 
reporting, based on a template for both worldwide consolidated accounts 
and country-by-country data on revenue, physical assets, employees and 
sales; (ii) the selection of  appropriate factors for apportioning the profits; 
and (iii) a conflict resolution procedure. In this section and the next we 
will discuss the issues involved in the first two of  these, drawing on and 
referring to the papers resulting from this research programme.
The aim of  a combined report is to establish the appropriate tax base 
of  the corporate group concerned, and provide the data necessary for 
apportioning that base among the relevant countries in which it has a 
taxable business presence. The first issue here is the delimitation of  the 
relevant tax base, and next is the method for its definition. 
The taxable nexus: unitary business or unitary enterprise?
Two approaches to this issue can be discerned (Siu, Nalukwago, 
Surahmak and Valadão 2014; Hellerstein 2014). The first is that of  
the US state system, which focuses on the business activities. This 
has two corollaries. It means that the income to be apportioned is 
only that which derives from the so-called unitary business, and also 
that a state may claim to tax an apportioned share of  such business 
earned by a corporation even if  it has no affiliate or branch in the 
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state. The limitation of  the tax base to the unitary business, which 
entails an activity-by-activity definition of  the tax base, derives from 
US constitutional considerations. The resulting need to delineate the 
boundaries of  what constitutes each unitary business in which the 
taxpayer engages has greatly complicated practice in the US. 
It would seem far more promising administratively to apply formulary 
apportionment to the entire combined income of  a commonly 
controlled group that performs business in the taxing state (combined 
income apportionment). This avoids the often tricky debates over 
what constitutes a unitary business, which have bedevilled the US state 
system. The distinction between combined income and activity-by-
activity apportionment is addressed in Durst’s evaluation of  formulary 
apportionment. He argues in favour of  a combined income principle, 
while conceding that it could not be applied under current tax treaty 
rules (Durst 2015a). The chapter by Sadiq supports this for the finance 
sector, and also discusses the ownership and control criteria for definition 
of  the group, which may cause problems in the finance sector if  they are 
too narrow (Sadiq 2014).
However, it would also seem necessary to treat full inclusion as a 
presumption, and provide tax authorities with anti-avoidance powers 
to exclude activities that may have been brought within a corporate 
group to seek a tax advantage, by ‘gaming’ the apportionment formulas 
applicable. The whole-income approach also runs counter to the 
principles of  attribution of  profits to a permanent establishment (PE) 
developed by OECD countries, culminating in the authorised OECD 
approach adopted in 2010 by a majority of  OECD countries. However, 
this has been generally rejected by developing countries, and has so far 
been incorporated into only a few actual treaties. Indeed, the issue of  
attribution of  profits to a PE has been reopened by the changes to the PE 
definition agreed in BEPS Action 7, and remains to be resolved in further 
work. These tax treaty questions are discussed in the chapter by Avi-
Yonah and Pouga Tinhaga.
The enterprise whole-income approach to tax base delineation also 
points to the need to reconsider the current definition of  PE for 
establishing a taxable nexus. This is clearly now urgent, and indeed has 
been recognised in the BEPS project in the final report under Action 1 
on the tax consequences of  the digital economy, discussed above. One 
of  the options it identifies is a new criterion for taxable nexus based on 
significant economic presence. However, as the report points out, current 
rules on attribution of  income would not be appropriate for a wider 
concept of  a PE. Moving towards a modernised concept of  PE for the 
new economy would be much easier under a unitary approach, which 
would either apportion joint costs proportionately against gross income, 
or simply apportion net income. 
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Calculation of the tax base: tax and accounting rules
Probably the greatest technical challenge of  formulary apportionment 
is posed by the divergence between financial and tax accounting. A 
company’s books and records, and the accounts based on them, are 
necessarily the starting point. However, as shown in the paper by Murphy 
and Sikka (2015), tax authorities around the world generally require 
financial accounts to be restated for tax purposes. As Murphy and Sikka 
explain, this divergence has become greater in recent years, as financial 
accounting standards have increasingly focused on the needs of  financial 
markets, and hence are primarily concerned with forecasting of  future 
cash flows. This results, notably, in asset valuations based on market 
prices rather than actual historical costs, and recognition of  unrealised 
rather than received income. On the other hand, MNEs already prepare 
group accounts based on financial reporting standards, including criteria 
for defining the group based on control, and rules for consolidation. 
There has also been considerable international convergence of  financial 
reporting, especially through the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, although Murphy and Sikka point out that some significant 
national differences remain, both in the formal rules and in local culture 
and practices. Perhaps for this reason, as they demonstrate, the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) does not begin from the 
consolidated financial accounts of  the relevant group of  companies, 
but from the individual national accounts of  the various affiliates of  the 
group, which are then required to be adjusted to the tax standards stated 
in the CCCTB, and only then aggregated.
However, the natural starting point for an international system of  
combined income unitary taxation should be the group’s global 
consolidated accounts. These would need to be converted to tax 
accounting standards, since few tax administrations would be willing 
to accept financial accounts as a tax base. Conversion to national tax 
accounting rules of  a variety of  countries would involve complications, 
but Michael Durst suggests that this would mainly entail an exercise of  
programming the accounting databases already used by MNEs (Durst 
2015a). In practical terms, even with a high degree of  difference among 
countries’ tax accounting rules, available technology should permit the 
accomplishment of  the necessary accounting conversions, especially if  
statutes allow taxpayers reasonable scope for approximation in converting 
book into taxable income.
However, it would be preferable if  there could be international 
convergence or harmonisation of  tax base definitions. The analysis 
of  Murphy and Sikka suggests that the standards developed for the 
EU’s CCCTB show that an acceptable consensus can relatively easily 
be reached on a substantial proportion of  the relevant book and tax 
accounting standards, using a transaction-based approach to the 
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recognition of  revenue and deductible costs, and recognising only 
realised profits, with its associated capital maintenance concept of  
maintaining financial capital. Significant differences remain, of  course, 
essentially in relation to allowances for capital expenditure and certain 
investments such as research and development. They suggest that these 
could simply be left to individual states. The corollary, they point out, is 
that the apportionment formula should not include assets, which in any 
case involve difficult valuation issues. 
The choice of an apportionment formula
The basic underpinning of  a unitary approach is the understanding 
that the profits generated by an integrated firm result from the synergy 
of  its activities as whole. Hence, this approach does not attempt to 
attribute particular parts of  the profit to specific affiliates or entities within 
it. Instead, the aim is to apportion the profits, on the basis of  factors 
which reflect the firm’s real activity in each country. This ensures a 
direct link between a company’s actual business presence in a country 
and its contribution through taxes towards the collective services and 
infrastructure that facilitate that business.
Historically, especially in the US, state apportionment formulas have 
applied three factors: employee payroll costs, sales and physical assets, 
equally weighted under the ‘Massachusetts’ formula. For the CCCTB a 
similar three-factor formula has been proposed, but with the employee 
factor equally weighted between payroll costs and headcount. 
It is often argued that it would be impossible to reach political agreement 
on the apportionment formula, and that without such agreement there 
would be an unacceptable level of  double taxation. A second argument 
is that unitary taxation would not end tax competition between states, or 
tax planning by companies, but shift them onto new ground. However, 
these overlook the point that, in choosing a suitable formula, states would 
need to take into account interacting factors: not only the tax revenue it 
would produce, but also the effects on inward investment. 
The formula and tax competition for investment
Countries will, of  course, evaluate the likely effect on their ability to 
attract foreign direct investment of  both the formula they apply and 
their corporate tax rate, and firms would obviously consider these same 
factors in their location decisions. Hence, a state would need to balance 
the effects of  the formula on tax revenue with those on investment. 
The incentive effects on both national tax policies and corporate 
strategies could therefore be mutually supportive, and potentially 
benign. In particular, firms would have an incentive to shift labour-
intensive activities away from countries that emphasise labour in the 
apportionment factors. As a corollary, countries would have to consider 
the effect of  emphasising the labour factor not only on tax revenue, but 
also on investment. Indeed, in practice US states have perceived the 
 35
Chapter 2 | Unitary Alternatives and Formulary Apportionment
inclusion of  employee compensation and property factors as discouraging 
companies from locating employment and physical plant in their 
jurisdictions, and have moved towards a higher weighting for sales.
Unlike the situation under current international tax rules, these decisions 
would concern real and not paper activities. This has important 
implications. It means that this revenue-investment trade-off would 
create a basis for convergence or agreement between states in the choice 
of  apportionment factors, and that this choice is not a zero-sum game. 
States with a labour-intensive economy would not necessarily choose a 
high labour weighting in the apportionment formula, for fear of  driving 
away investment, and discouraging investment to improve productivity. 
Hence, even in the absence of  agreement on the apportionment formula, 
double taxation is unlikely to result. Indeed, there is perhaps a bigger 
danger of  double non-taxation, unless states can learn from experience 
and agree to coordinate.
This can be seen from the experience in the United States. There, as 
shown in Clausing’s paper, whereas 80 per cent of  states used an equal-
weighted three-factor formula in 1986, this had fallen to 17 per cent by 
2012 (Clausing 2014). States instead moved to increase the weight on 
the sales factor, with 30 per cent of  states in 2012 going so far as to use 
a single-sales factor formula. The reasoning has been that this would 
encourage investment for production, and hence increase employment 
in the state. Clausing shows that, although increasing the sales factor 
may attract investment in the short run, it ceases to have a significant 
effect over a longer period, presumably as competitor states adopt similar 
policies. It will be interesting to observe whether this experience will stop, 
or perhaps even reverse, the trend towards the sales factor. 
More serious is the trend to an overall reduction of  tax revenue. 
Adoption of  a single sales factor could mean that the tax base may be 
apportioned to states where the company has no taxable presence, simply 
exporting to independent customers. However, states have dealt with this 
problem in two ways, discussed by Siu et al. (2014). First, a state adopting 
the sales weighting can couple it with a ‘throw-back’ rule under which, 
if  profits are not taxable in the destination state, the sales are attributed 
to the source state. Around half  of  US states which moved to a sales-
only factor adopted a throw-back rule, and the proposed CCCTB also 
included one. Secondly, US states have adopted wider taxable presence 
rules, although federal legislation and court decisions require a more 
significant presence than simply solicitation of  sales. 
Adoption of  a wider taxable presence standard in international tax 
would indeed be desirable, especially in response to the digitalisation of  
economic activity, as pointed out above. The taxable nexus criteria could 
be extended beyond the physical requirements for a PE in current tax 
rules, by adoption of  a concept of  Significant Economic Presence, as 
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suggested in the BEPS Action 1 report. This could include, for example, 
selling through a website in the local language, using local agents for 
activities such as order fulfilment, and selling locally-sourced products or 
services. This should ensure that virtually all the profits of  MNEs would 
be taxable somewhere, without extending the net too widely to include 
the many small and medium enterprises with foreign sales from a purely 
home base. Wherever they have significant sales, MNEs generally require 
some business presence, such as local assembly, sourcing of  inputs, 
distribution, packaging, marketing, and other close engagement with 
customers. 
Nevertheless, a drift toward sales-only formulas may constitute a 
problem under formulary apportionment, especially since much foreign 
investment in developing countries involves production or extraction 
for export without significant local sales. Nevertheless, even sales-based 
apportionment could provide developing countries much better revenue 
results than current arm’s length transfer pricing rules. It should also be 
borne in mind that developing countries too are significant importers of  
goods, and especially services, from multinationals, often with little or 
no local value added, so that such activities contribute little or nothing 
to the tax base under current rules. Thus, the net effect of  a sales basis 
for apportionment for them would depend on the balance of  exports to 
imports by MNEs, taking account also of  whether MNEs responsible 
for imports have a taxable presence in the country. These countries 
should apply the destination basis also to sales of  service, provided the 
services supplier has a significant business presence. Developing countries 
have been disadvantaged by the shift towards a service economy, due 
to the difficulty of  taxing profits of  foreign service suppliers under 
current tax rules, even though such a claim to tax can be justified by the 
importance for services of  close relations with clients. On the other hand, 
they would be justified in applying a source basis for sales of  minerals 
and hydrocarbons, since these are anyway heavily taxed at and after 
processing in the countries of  consumption.
Another advantage is that emphasising the sales factor removes the 
temptation for states to reduce corporate tax rates. As Clausing (2014) 
shows, US state tax rates have remained stable even as there has been 
a shift towards the sales factor in apportionment. Thus, any reduction 
in the tax base resulting from a shift towards the sales factor could 
be compensated for by increasing the tax rate. Finally, formulary 
apportionment based solely on sales by destination would be similar to 
the DBCFT discussed above, although it would apply to profits. 
Effects of the formula on tax revenue
Probably the main political obstacle to adoption of  unitary taxation is 
that states fear the possible effects on redistribution of  the tax base. This 
fear is probably all the more potent because the effects are very difficult 
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or impossible to quantify with any accuracy. Firstly, such analyses are 
likely to be static, since it would be hard or impossible for a model to 
take account of  the possible dynamic effects on investment, which were 
discussed in the last sub-section. Secondly, there are significant problems 
of  lack of  data, especially relating to developing countries. The paper 
by Cobham and Loretz (2014) shows the severe limitations in this 
respect of  the main large commercially-available dataset of  corporate 
accounts (Orbis from Bureau van Dijk). The data is collated from filings 
of  corporate financial accounts, so not only is there no data at all from 
most developing countries, Cobham and Loretz were obliged to use 
turnover as a proxy for the sales apportionment factor instead of  sales by 
destination.4 Hence, as is generally the case, quantitative findings must be 
used with great care, and in conjunction with qualitative analyses. 
A primary consideration is the likely effect on the overall corporate tax 
base. Firstly, using consolidated accounts as the starting point would 
mean some overall reduction in the tax base, since this would allow 
international offsetting of  losses.5 This indeed is a significant attraction 
for MNEs, seen, for example, in the support from many of  them for the 
CCCTB proposal. The paper by Cobham and Loretz (2014) estimates 
this reduction at 12 per cent overall, with some significant differences 
between countries. As they point out, international loss-offsetting would 
reduce the disincentive to make risky investments in new countries. The 
numbers should be treated with caution, particularly as they are based 
on financial accounts, and as discussed above the recognition of  profits is 
very different under tax rules. Nevertheless, there would undoubtedly be 
such an effect. 
This will, of  course, be counterbalanced by the main intended effect 
of  unitary taxation, which is to counteract the artificial attribution of  
profits to low-tax countries. Cobham and Loretz show that this also has 
a significant impact on the overall tax base, under any apportionment 
formula, as more profits are attributed to countries with higher tax 
rates. They estimate that, overall, under almost any formula there would 
be a slightly positive effect on overall tax revenue, cancelling out the 
overall reduction from international offsetting of  losses. The exception 
is their finding that apportionment based on number of  employees 
redistributed revenue to lower-income countries that also had lower tax 
rates (in their sample, in eastern Europe). This had the effect of  slightly 
lowering overall revenue. However, this assumes that those countries 
would maintain the same tax preferences and rates as at present, which 
is unlikely to be the case. Importantly, also, their data covers countries 
with preferential tax regimes, such as Ireland, Luxembourg and The 
Netherlands, but not the outright tax havens: notably, their sample 
includes only 186 affiliates in Caribbean countries. The overall impact 
of  formulary apportionment in reducing BEPS is highly likely to result 
in a very significant increase in the overall tax base. Although the report 
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on BEPS Action 11 found the losses from BEPS hard to measure, it gave 
estimates of  between 4-10 per cent of  the global CIT tax base – that 
is, between $100 billion and $240 billion. This would generate higher 
overall corporate tax revenue, which could be used to reduce tax rates.
Aside from the expected and intended redistribution of  artificially-
booked profits, different apportionment factors would, unsurprisingly, 
result in some redistribution between countries. The calculations by 
Cobham and Loretz suggest that the physical assets factor would tend 
to benefit low-income countries, and the turnover factor high-income 
countries; in the case of  employment, a factor based on number of  
employees would benefit low-income countries, but this would be much 
less on the basis of  payroll costs (to the extent that data is available). 
This clearly supports a balanced formula using both production factors 
(assets and employees) and consumption factors (sales by destination), 
along the lines of  the traditional US formula. This was adapted in 
the proposed CCCTB to split the employment factor 50:50 between 
employee numbers and payroll costs, which seems appropriate to use 
internationally in view of  large differences in wage levels. Another 
means of  adjusting for wage disparities is to compare payroll data using 
purchasing power parity.
Some suggest that the physical asset factor should be dropped, since it is 
now much less relevant; also, as pointed out above, it may be difficult to 
quantify accurately. This would suggest a two-factor formula, balancing 
sales by destination and employees (equally weighted by headcount and 
payroll costs). The argument that intangible assets should be included 
misunderstands the fundamental argument for a unitary approach. 
As already stressed, this rejects the view that profits can be attributed 
to particular assets or activities, but treats them as generated by the 
operations of  the firm as a whole, and apportions them according to its 
real presence in each country. The high value added by, for example, 
research and development teams, should be reflected in the employee 
factor, and apportioned to where the people are physically based. 
Attributing the profits to the intangible assets is both inappropriate and a 
recipe for BEPS.
Finally, the possibility that different competitive concerns might lead 
countries to adopt different formulas should not be seen as a prohibitive 
concern. Diverging apportionment formulas should pose no greater 
problem for international investors than, for example, differences among 
countries in tax rates or in depreciation allowances, provided that the 
investor knows each country’s formula in advance and is able to calculate 
its effective tax rate in each country (Durst 2015a). Today, under arm’s-
length pricing rules, the investor has no reliable means of  predicting 
its effective rates. Under apportionment formulas set in advance, 
however, the investor will have greater certainty than is available under 
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arm’s length rules, even if  different countries’ formulas differ. It would 
nevertheless obviously be desirable if  formulas could be aligned.
Could formulary apportionment be adopted regionally? 
Federal or confederal states, most notably the United States, Canada 
and Switzerland, have been using formulary apportionment for the 
division of  income among jurisdictions for many years (Siu et al. 2014). 
In addition, a proposal for a regional system, the CCCTB, has been 
under development within the European Union for over a decade. 
These systems, however, are limited in their effect: they govern only 
apportionment of  income within the particular federal union, or parts 
of  it, that have adopted them, but they do not govern apportionment 
of  income between the federal unions and other tax jurisdictions around 
the world. Indeed, since the conflicts which arose in the 1980s over 
the application of  formulary apportionment by US states, especially 
California, on a worldwide basis (Picciotto 1992), US states have been 
obliged to offer a ‘water’s edge’ basis of  assessment, limited to the USA. 
Not surprisingly, the EU’s CCCTB is also scrupulous in insisting that 
the normal separate entity/arm’s length principle should apply outside 
the group of  states that might adopt a CCCTB. The existing regional 
systems, therefore, while providing important lessons concerning the 
best technical rules for structuring unitary tax systems, cannot be seen as 
providing direct models for unitary taxation either for an international 
tax regime, or indeed for other regions.
Several considerations suggest that regional adoptions of  unitary 
taxation, for use within regional groups as well as between those groups 
and countries elsewhere in the world, may be especially useful for groups 
of  developing countries. Firstly, because developing countries depend 
relatively more heavily on international corporate tax revenue than 
wealthier countries, developing countries have the greatest incentive to 
ensure that international tax rules provide effective protection against 
base erosion. Secondly, regional adoption can permit pooling of  
resources to meet the compliance and enforcement demands posed by 
unitary taxation, perhaps by creating centralised tax inspection resources. 
Thirdly, regional adoption could help to mitigate pressures of  tax 
competition among neighbouring countries, which in the absence of  a 
common, regional approach might tend excessively toward a sales basis 
for apportionment, as has occurred among the US states.
The survey in the paper by Siu et al. (2014) suggests that regional 
groupings vary widely in their approach to harmonisation of  direct 
taxation of  corporate profits. While this is not on any agenda in Latin 
America or Asia, the East African Community (EAC) seems to be 
much more willing to move in this direction. This is perhaps due to 
the previous regional experience of  the East African Federation, which 
disintegrated to a great extent because of  the tensions caused by the 
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unequal benefits resulting from providing foreign-owned firms with 
access to the regional market. Also, unlike even the EU, direct tax 
harmonisation is included among the mechanisms envisaged for building 
the EAC. Devising a possible regional system here seems a fruitful avenue 
for practical investigation.
Some point to the slow progress by the EU on the CCCTB as evidence 
of  the insuperable difficulties of  adopting unitary taxation. This must be 
evaluated in relative terms. Even in areas that are less contentious than 
direct taxation, such as harmonisation of  product standards and regulation 
of  services, progress has often been slow, and marked by shifts to new 
approaches. In the tax field also, harmonisation of  the Value Added 
Tax, accepted as necessary for a single market, has been fraught with 
difficulties, and is only now moving to a destination basis, finally accepted 
as more suitable for an integrated market. In this perspective the CCCTB 
can be said to have made remarkable progress, especially since the fiscal 
crisis. Indeed, following completion of  the OECD’s BEPS project, the 
Action Plan published by the European Commission in June 2015 once 
again identifies the CCCTB as the only holistic solution, and proposes 
a relaunching of  the proposal. It also envisages parallel work on joint 
implementation of  the BEPS project proposals, significantly including the 
possibility of  common CFC rules.6 This would be important, since the tax 
base to be apportioned internally among participants in a CCCTB would 
be defined by application of  its external international tax rules. 
Hence, progress on the CCCTB and on BEPS are not opposed, but 
complementary. Some may indeed argue that a CCCTB is insufficiently 
ambitious, and that a truly integrated regional grouping (probably 
consisting only of  core EU states) should move to a single corporate 
income tax. Here we have confined ourselves to examining the 
experience of  existing systems, and the proposals that have emerged from 
such experiences.
Conclusions
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is clearly not a panacea. 
It certainly entails technical challenges and faces political difficulties. Our 
claim is simply that adoption of  this approach is the only way to establish 
an effective internationally-coordinated system for taxation of  MNEs. 
We have outlined above the flaws that lead to the dysfunctionality of  
the present system, and the reasons for thinking that a unitary approach 
would be superior. It is surprising that despite widespread support for 
these views, there has been very little serious research on the issue: to the 
contrary, even suggestions that it should be seriously studied have met 
with hostility. We hope that the projects in this programme have begun 
to fill this gap, and may persuade both policymakers and researchers of  
the need for more serious evaluation of  alternatives to the long-troubled 
arm’s length paradigm. 
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Such research should, of  course, be practically grounded, and run 
alongside the reform efforts stimulated by the BEPS project, as well 
as debates about other alternatives that are also based on the unitary 
principle (discussed above). Of  these, we see an overlap and interaction 
between RBWT and formulary apportionment, despite the assertion 
by some proponents of  the former that they are opposed, since they 
castigate formulary apportionment as a territorial system. RBWT would 
perhaps require less technical preparation, since it could build on existing 
concepts in CFC regimes or national consolidation regimes. However, the 
key factors now seem to be political. Although RBWT would seem easier 
to introduce unilaterally, in practice any country seriously considering 
the option would be placed under great pressure by threats of  corporate 
relocations or inversions. Such threats could be deflected by strong 
anti-inversion rules, preferably accompanied by concerted action. Such 
coordination might be possible especially between the US and the EU, 
which might consider common full-inclusion CFC rules in conjunction 
with the introduction of  a CCCTB. However, this is speculative.
Developing countries will need substantial guidance in developing 
adequately functioning systems to replace their current regimes. 
Intergovernmental organisations with the necessary resources should 
strongly consider initiating a serious, extended and open-minded 
exploration of  the technical challenges of  implementing systems of  
unitary taxation based on formulary apportionment, perhaps initially 
among regional groups of  developing countries that see a particularly 
strong need to protect their corporate tax bases for the foreseeable future.
Serious efforts towards the implementation of  formulary rules should 
nevertheless be paralleled by the introduction, particularly in developing 
countries, of  more limited measures to inhibit base erosion, such as 
some of  the measures recommended by the OECD’s work on BEPS. 
Historical experience, however, suggests a substantial likelihood that 
measures short of  formulary apportionment will fail over time to curtail 
base erosion effectively. These countries should carefully consider the 
possibility that a formulary approach can provide protection to fiscal 
systems that cannot be achieved by other available means. What is 
needed is a comprehensive, open-minded and expert review of  the 
potential that explicitly formulary rules might contribute to a sound 
system of  international taxation, especially for the benefit of  developing 
countries that must continue to rely relatively heavily on revenue from 
corporate taxation. 
Finally, we should remember that, as important as reform of  
international taxation may be, such reforms have much wider 
ramifications. The tax avoidance techniques generated by the flaws in 
the system as it developed historically have been major factors in the 
creation of  the offshore system of  tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions. 
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Although its use by MNEs appears for the most part to be legal, the same 
techniques and facilities have come to be used or abused for a wider 
variety of  much more dubious, illegal and dangerous practices. These 
range from avoidance of  other types of  regulation, from shipping safety 
standards and banking regulation to facilitation of  money laundering 
and terrorist financing. Removing the incentives for our largest and 
most important corporations to use plainly illogical tax avoidance 
arrangements would be an enormous step towards restoring integrity to 
the international system for regulating trade and investment.
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Notes
1. This has been advocated by a number of US-based commentators, see 
especially Kleinbard (2011a), Kadet (2013), Fleming, Peroni and Shay 
(2014) and Avi-Yonah (2016).
2. FATCA refers to the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 2010, 
which requires US taxpayers to report any foreign bank accounts, and 
foreign financial institutions doing business in the US to report accounts 
held by taxpayers or foreign entities in which US taxpayers hold a 
substantial ownership interest. The BEPS Action 3 report on CFC rules 
discusses how to define a CFC, suggesting a combination of legal and 
economic control tests; but it does not address the question of how to 
define the ultimate parent. 
3. For a contrary view, see Cui (2015) (who, however, does not seem to 
have taken account of these proposals).
4. The same problem was faced by the illustrative calculations attempted 
by the IMF (IMF 2014); the text emphasises the big difference in the 
redistributional effects if payroll costs are used as against headcount for 
the labour factor, but perhaps even more significant is the redistribution 
away from ‘conduit’ countries under any apportionment formula. 
5. Under the independent entity principle losses incurred by one affiliate, 
for example in the early years of a green-field investment, could not 
normally be off-set against profits in another jurisdiction. 
6. A proposed Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive was published on 28 January 
2016 (COM(2016) 26 final). However, as mentioned in above, its 
proposed CFC rules are very weak.
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A Practical Approach to a Transition to 
Formulary Apportionment1
Michael C. Durst
Introduction
A formulary system divides some of  the income of  a business group 
among tax jurisdictions according to the relative volume of  the group’s 
observable income-producing activities within those jurisdictions. 
Under formulary apportionment the income of  a group is measured 
on an aggregate international basis, and is then divided among the 
different group members according to measures of  their relative levels 
of  economic activity, such as perhaps their relative level of  sales. 
The formulary approach would substitute for the current practice of  
attempting to measure each entity’s income on a separate accounting, or 
arm’s length, basis, an exercise which requires attempts to estimate arm’s 
length prices for the many transactions that typically occur among the 
different members of  contemporary multinational groups.
The formulary principle may be implemented in many different ways. 
Versions of  it are employed to allocate taxing rights over companies 
between the states of  the United States and the provinces of  Canada 
(see Chapter 10). Any variant of  formulary apportionment involves a 
degree of  arbitrariness in the allocation of  corporate income between 
the company and the tax collectors, and between different taxing 
jurisdictions. The core reason for considering a formulary approach 
is prevention of  tax avoidance. Currently the complexity of  arm’s 
length pricing has permitted many multinational groups to shift 
substantial amounts of  taxable income, through what the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has labelled 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), to zero- and low-tax countries 
where the multinationals conduct few if  any business activities. Under 
a formulary system this would not be possible, as income could be 
apportioned only according to real and observable economic activities. 
Apart from considerations of  tax avoidance, a formulary system could 
remove a good deal of  subjectivity from the workings of  the international 
tax rules, thereby providing greater economic certainty to taxpayers and 
governments. Under the arm’s length transfer pricing rules now in use 
around the world, income is apportioned according to multinational 
groups’ own estimates – which are subject to review upon examination 
by tax authorities – of  the levels of  income that would be earned by 
Chapter 3
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the different affiliates of  commonly-controlled business groups if  those 
affiliates were not commonly controlled, but instead operated in the 
manner of  independent companies transacting with one another at arm’s 
length. In practice, under arm’s length transfer pricing rules groups 
estimate the proper division of  income among their affiliates based on 
often-elaborate analyses by professional economists, according to the 
economists’ perceptions of  the different income-producing activities 
performed, assets owned, and business risks borne by the groups’ 
affiliates in the countries in which the affiliates operate.
For about 40 years, critics of  the arm’s length approach have argued that 
it allows multinational taxpayers excessive flexibility to use networks of  
contracts made among group members to shift income from countries 
in which the groups conduct the bulk of  their business activities to other 
affiliates established in zero- or low-tax countries, which often have few 
employees or sales, and little, if  any, plant and equipment. The contracts 
used to effect these shifts of  income include licences for the use of  
intellectual property held by the zero- or low-tax affiliates, agreements 
for the lending of  money, and various kinds of  arrangements under 
which the low- or zero-tax affiliates are treated as bearing, in return for 
payment, group-wide business risks such as the risk of  holding inventory 
located around the world. 
I have previously published a multi-part analysis of  the potential 
promises and limitations of  the formulary system.2 As I was conducting 
my study, the OECD, in coordination with the G20 group of  countries, 
was beginning its extended and still ongoing study of  BEPS, the 
shifting of  income by multinational companies to zero- and low-tax 
countries. The G20 leaders gave a political impetus to the work of  the 
OECD in apparent response to a series of  studies by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and reports in newspapers and other media, that 
claimed income shifting had achieved very large proportions, and that 
substantial amounts of  corporate tax revenue were apparently being 
removed annually from the tax jurisdiction of  countries around the world 
in which multinational groups actually earn their incomes.
Base erosion and profit shifting removes corporate tax revenue from 
countries at all levels of  economic development. The media reports 
that seem most directly to have triggered the OECD BEPS study 
focused on the transfer of  revenue from Western European countries, 
and particularly the United Kingdom.3 Nevertheless, as several reports 
by NGOs have suggested,4 the practical consequences of  base erosion 
seem to be greatest for the lower-income developing countries. The 
wealthier countries of  the world typically can collect government revenue 
relatively efficiently from domestic sources, like personal income taxes 
and consumption taxes. The domestic economies of  lower-income 
developing countries, however, often contain large informal sectors in 
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which business is conducted at a very small scale with minimal books 
and records maintained. The lower-income countries therefore have a 
relatively greater financial stake than wealthier countries in successful 
action to control BEPS, at least until such time as they can better develop 
their domestic tax base.
Recognising the special importance to developing countries of  efforts 
to control base erosion, in July and August 2014 the OECD issued a 
two-part Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of  BEPS 
in Low Income Countries (OECD 2014a, 2014b). The IMF, building on 
the OECD BEPS effort, also released a study on the same topic, which 
the IMF describes as ‘tax spillovers’ of  international tax rules as they 
affect developing countries (IMF 2014). The OECD and IMF reports 
provide a useful framework for considering both the potential benefits 
and limitations of  formulary apportionment as a point of  reference 
for designing international tax policies for the benefit of  lower-income 
developing countries.
This chapter first introduces the issue, and summarises the potential 
benefits of  and obstacles to formulary apportionment as a viable tax 
policy instrument for developing countries; it then considers possible 
alternatives to the current dominant methods for allocating the income 
of  multinationals. The final section puts forward a practical proposal for 
a modified version of  the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), 
which could provide a simpler methodology than the full-blown 
transactional analysis required by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
and could be especially suitable for developing countries.
The OECD and IMF analyses
Perhaps the most striking element of  the OECD’s work on BEPS is 
the manner in which it articulates the root of  the problem: the extent 
to which current tax laws permit members of  multinational corporate 
groups to assign income to zero- or low-tax countries in which they 
conduct few if  any business activities. In the words of  an OECD 
report on BEPS and developing countries, base erosion results from 
‘arrangements that achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away 
from the jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take 
place’ (OECD 2014a: 8). The key to curtailing BEPS, therefore, in the 
words of  another recent report from the G20 Group, is ‘to put an end 
to the divorce between the location of  profits and the location of  real 
activities’ (G20 2013: 4).
The language used by the OECD and G20 to describe the source of  the 
BEPS problem evokes the central principle of  formulary apportionment: 
income should be attributed for tax purposes to the locations where 
business activities are performed. Because formulary apportionment can 
apportion income only to places where real business activity takes place, 
and in quantitative proportion to the extent of  that activity, formulary 
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apportionment would, if  applied to a taxpayer’s income from all 
sources, eliminate BEPS completely. That is, under a fully-implemented 
formulary system, income could not simply be apportioned to countries 
where little, if  any, economic activity is performed. At least in theory, 
therefore, formulary apportionment represents the most straightforward 
remedy for the BEPS problem.
The articulation by the OECD and G20 of  the principle that the 
geographic distribution of  taxable income should correspond to the 
locations of  a taxpayer’s activities helps to move the policy debate away 
from what, historically, has been a rather pointless ideological debate 
between proponents of  arm’s length and formulary approaches. In light 
of  the OECD/G20 analysis, there is no reason to think that the arm’s-
length and formulary approaches to the international division of  taxable 
income rest on incompatible conceptual grounds.
The idea that the apportionment of  income should follow the geographic 
locations of  a taxpayer’s activities can indeed be seen as an apt statement 
of  the arm’s length principle, if  the heart of  that principle is seen as a 
rule of  tax neutrality between the members of  commonly-controlled 
corporate groups, and independent companies that must transact with 
one another at arm’s length. Under long-standing principles of  nexus in 
international tax law, legal entities are subject to tax in those jurisdictions 
where they are physically present and conduct their activities. It is 
impossible under this principle for a single independent legal entity to 
arrange for its income to be subject to tax in countries other than those 
where income-generating activities occur. This result can be achieved 
only by members of  commonly-controlled corporate groups through 
the use of  the kind of  related-party contracts that stand at the heart of  
income-shifting transactions.
In short, by recommending an international tax system in which income 
is apportioned according to the geographic distribution of  a taxpayer’s 
business activities, the OECD is seeking to move international tax laws 
into greater conformity with the arm’s length standard. Moreover, at 
least in theory (an important caveat), formulary apportionment appears 
to offer a straightforward means of  implementing the system the OECD 
wishes to bring about.
Despite the conceptual appeal of  formulary apportionment in addressing 
BEPS, both the OECD and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
ruled out devoting substantial resources in the short term to an analysis 
of  formulary apportionment as a replacement for the arm’s length 
principle. Both organisations attribute this decision to the presence of  
unanswered questions about the administrative feasibility of  international 
formulary apportionment, as well as a formulary system’s possible 
adverse effects on the share of  the global tax base apportioned to 
developing countries.
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The OECD explains its conclusion as follows: ‘[A]doption of  alternative 
transfer pricing methods like formulary apportionment would require 
development of  a consensus on a number of  key issues (which countries 
do not believe to be attainable in the short or medium term) and could 
also raise systemic problems which could result in even more damaging 
problems for countries’ revenues. Accordingly, it is believed that it will be 
most productive to focus on addressing specific issues arising under the 
current arm’s length system at the present time’ (OECD 2014c).
The IMF, for its part, explains: ‘Whatever its merits in principle, 
prospects for adoption of  international [formulary apportionment] seem 
remote. A substantial legal and institutional infrastructure has been built 
around current arrangements, so that movement towards international 
[formulary apportionment] would likely involve considerable disruption. 
That might change if  a major capital exporter were to move in that 
direction. But there is little immediate sign of  that – with significant 
resistance within the EU, for instance, to the CCCTB [a pending 
European Union proposal for formulary apportionment to be applied 
regionally]’ (IMF 2014: 41).
Rather than suggesting a formulary approach to combat BEPS, both 
the OECD and IMF recommend a combination of  targeted anti-tax-
avoidance measures that would involve, among other items:
 l some modification of  current arm’s length transfer pricing rules; 
 l tightened rules to disallow deduction of  interest expenses, especially 
when paid to related parties; and
 l strengthened controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, by which the 
home countries of  multinational groups limit the amount of  income 
that the groups are permitted to accumulate through their global 
operations in zero- or low-tax subsidiaries.
In addition, the IMF notes that some elements of  formulary apportionment 
might prove useful in efforts to modify current arm’s length pricing rules, 
with the particular goal of  simplifying their application in the developing 
country setting. In particular, the IMF suggests that some kinds of  hybrid 
transfer pricing methods, perhaps including ‘formulary profit split’ methods, 
might be of  practical benefit to developing countries (IMF 2014: 41-42). 
In my view, the OECD and IMF are prudent in refraining, at least at 
present, from encouraging substantial efforts to design and implement 
full-fledged formulary apportionment rules. As explored in my recently-
published analysis (Durst 2015b), significant technical and policy issues 
must be resolved before formulary apportionment can be implemented 
for international use. These questions cannot be resolved within the time 
frame in which BEPS should be curtailed, so focusing on other possible 
means of  curtailing BEPS in the short term seems sensible.
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Moreover, in addition to technical problems, international formulary 
apportionment faces a large political obstacle. For years, business groups 
and legislators around the world have strenuously opposed replacing 
current transfer pricing rules with a formulary system, and there is no 
indication that this opposition is weakening. The political unpopularity 
of  formulary apportionment probably arises at least in part from its most 
important potential benefit: a complete elimination of  opportunities 
for BEPS. Businesses have a direct financial interest in discouraging 
formulary apportionment and in channelling political debate instead 
towards partial measures that, unlike formulary apportionment, can 
form the basis of  political compromise. Similarly, legislators – who 
have often displayed ambivalent attitudes towards corporate income 
taxation, especially in the international sphere – are likely to be more 
comfortable debating partial measures than the all-or-nothing remedy 
for BEPS that formulary apportionment represents. This tendency may 
well be present not only among legislators and other policymakers in 
the wealthier countries that are home to most of  the multinationals that 
would see their tax burdens increase if  BEPS were to be eliminated. In 
addition, legislators and other policymakers in developing countries may 
be reluctant to entertain reforms that would entirely eliminate BEPS, out 
of  fear that doing so could increase the after-tax costs of  international 
business generally, and discourage inbound investment to their country. 
In short, whatever its technical promise or limitations, international 
formulary apportionment, in part because of  its potentially high degree 
of  effectiveness in eliminating profit shifting, is a hard political sell 
in developing countries, as well as the wealthier countries in which 
multinational groups tend to be based. 
This situation could change over the long or even medium term. It 
is possible, for example, that some developing countries will perceive 
their need for additional corporate tax revenue to justify assembling a 
coalition to develop and adopt a formulary system. It is also possible 
that trends in tax reform around the world will lead to a global system in 
which statutory tax rates are significantly reduced and BEPS is no longer 
permitted to a significant extent, perhaps through global adoption of  
strengthened CFC rules. In that situation governments and businesses 
might both find formulary apportionment attractive for its predictability 
and administrative advantages. However neither of  these situations 
appears likely to materialise in the immediate future.
Currently, therefore, the most useful application of  technical insight into 
formulary apportionment, particularly from the standpoint of  developing 
countries with their disproportionate dependence on corporate tax 
revenue, is to look for ideas that might be useful in designing incremental 
measures against base erosion, including hybrid transfer pricing methods 
as suggested by the IMF. The remainder of  this chapter seeks to promote 
this goal, first by summarising the primary conclusions concerning the 
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promise and limitations of  a formulary approach from my recently-
published analysis, and then by suggesting an alternative method that 
could be introduced in the short term, especially by developing countries.
Perceived technical barriers to formulary apportionment
Historically debates over the feasibility of  international formulary 
apportionment have focused primarily on four topics:
 l the possibility that it would lead to double taxation, especially if  
different countries adopt inconsistent formulas; 
 l difficulties associated with the sales factor in apportionment formulas, 
including both difficulties of  tracking sales made in electronic 
commerce, and possible unfavourable treatment of  developing 
countries if  a formula weights the sales factor especially heavily as has 
occurred in apportionment among US states; 
 l the perceived incompatibility of  formulary apportionment with some 
elements of  bilateral tax treaties; and
 l the arguable need for countries to adopt a common tax base to which 
countries’ apportionment formulas would be applied.
Concerns regarding double taxation
Opponents of  formulary apportionment have often raised the 
concern that different countries would adopt differing apportionment 
formulas, just as the different US states have adopted a variety of  
different apportionment formulas for the purpose of  domestic income 
apportionment within the US. This, critics contend, would cause double 
taxation and raise a barrier to cross-border investment. 
Based on my recently-completed research, however, I am convinced – 
perhaps counter-intuitively – that replacing arm’s length transfer pricing 
rules with formulary apportionment would, in fact, reduce instances of  
economically-damaging double taxation, even if  different countries adopt 
inconsistent apportionment formulas.5 This is because under current 
arm’s length transfer pricing rules double taxation is unpredictable. 
Given the subjectivity of  the current rules, tax authorities from two 
different countries often make overlapping claims to tax income from 
a taxpayer’s cross-border investment, so that the taxpayer will end up 
paying total tax at an unexpectedly high overall effective rate. Moreover, 
at the time a taxpayer must decide whether to make a particular cross-
border investment, the taxpayer generally has no way of  predicting the 
extent to which the tax authorities will make overlapping claims – a fact 
that infuses these decisions with additional risk.
A taxpayer facing the risk of  what might turn out to be unacceptable 
levels of  taxation will be less likely to make an investment than a 
taxpayer that is better able to predict the total effective rate at which the 
investment will be taxed. Currently, therefore, the unpredictability of  the 
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application in practice of  today’s arm’s length transfer pricing rules may 
significantly inhibit international investment.6
Under a formulary system, even if  the two countries in which a taxpayer 
is considering investing apply inconsistent formulas, the investor 
generally will be able to predict, in advance of  the investment decision, 
the effective rates at which each country will impose its tax. If  the total 
effective rate is acceptable, the investor will proceed with the investment; 
if  it is not, the taxpayer might seek more tax-friendly countries in which 
to invest. Most of  the uncertainty generated by the arm’s length system 
will, however, be removed – a factor that should encourage cross-border 
investment generally. It should also be borne in mind that countries 
would have strong incentives to adapt their rules, especially the formula, 
to encourage rather than deter such investment. 
In short, it is not double taxation per se that raises barriers to 
international investment, but rather unpredictable double taxation. 
Formulary apportionment affords taxpayers greater certainty about 
the total effective tax rate than is available under arm’s length transfer 
pricing rules. Accordingly, and perhaps surprisingly, formulary 
apportionment is better suited to addressing economic damage from 
double taxation than arm’s length transfer pricing rules.
Problems with the sales factor
Over the past several decades US states have increasingly adopted 
single-factor apportionment formulas based on the destination of  sales.7 
The apparent reason for this movement has been tax competition. State 
governments have been concerned that apportioning income in part 
on other measures of  economic activity, such as payroll or location of  
physical plant, discourages investment in employment or construction 
in the state. There is every reason to expect that under an international 
formulary apportionment system national governments would gravitate 
towards a sales-only apportionment formula, as the US states have done. 
This prospect raises two different concerns:
 l In an era of  digital commerce, it may be difficult to identify the 
destination of  sales of  various goods and services with sufficient 
reliability to support sales-based apportionment.
 l Sales-based apportionment might generate undesirable results for 
some countries, especially developing countries in which much income 
is generated by capital- or labour-intensive activities, ranging from 
mineral extraction to providing outsourced business services.
The difficulty of  determining the destination of  sales in today’s 
digitalised marketplace arises under both arm’s length and formulary 
systems. Both systems require determining the locations in which goods 
and services are ultimately consumed or otherwise used. Challenges 
arise mainly from three sources: (i) problems in tracing the identity of  
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customers in electronic commerce; (ii) current permanent establishment 
rules, which generally do not treat the mere destination of  sales as a 
basis for taxable nexus; and (iii) the ease with which taxpayers can route 
sales destined for high-tax countries through intermediaries in zero- or 
low-tax countries, thereby obscuring the locations in which products or 
services are actually consumed or used. The potential remedies for these 
difficulties generally are the same under both arm’s length and formulary 
systems. They are: (i) modifying nexus rules to allow sales-destination 
countries to assert claims to income arising from the sales; and (ii) 
evidentiary tests to reduce revenue losses from excessive attribution of  
sales to intermediaries in zero- or low-tax jurisdictions.
In the final instalment of  my recently-completed study of  formulary 
apportionment (Durst 2014a), I suggest an approach that might be used 
under formulary apportionment to address the problem of  sales through 
zero- and low-tax intermediaries. Essentially the suggestion is that tax 
authorities generally accept without detailed examination attribution of  
sales to most jurisdictions, but where sales are attributed to zero- or low-tax 
countries taxpayers would be required to present clear evidence that the 
goods and services sold were actually used or consumed in those countries. 
This proposed solution is certainly not perfect. It could, however, lead 
to a tolerable level of  compliance under a formulary system; indeed it 
might lead to fewer difficulties with respect to intermediary sales under a 
formulary system than currently are posed under arm’s length rules.
The additional concern, that apportionment based heavily on a sales 
factor might inappropriately reduce developing countries’ share of  the 
global tax base, is important to consider. The operations of  multinational 
businesses in developing countries tend to focus especially heavily on 
large inputs of  plant and equipment as in mineral extraction, or high 
personnel inputs as in the provision of  outsourced services. Often, 
moreover, products manufactured in developing countries are exported, 
so they do not generate sales in the country for purposes of  formulary 
apportionment. Other things being equal, therefore, apportionment 
based only or primarily on sales would appear to reduce developing 
countries’ share of  the global tax pie. 
The concern that sales-based apportionment will operate adversely with 
respect to developing countries, however, rests on the implicit assumption 
that countries’ tax rates must remain fixed at their current levels. If  tax 
rates are held fixed, then an apportionment formula based only on sales 
would indeed be likely to generate lower tax revenue for many developing 
countries than a formula including as a factor either the value of  physical 
plant or an indicator of  local employment, or perhaps both. A country 
is not, however, required to maintain its tax rates at a constant level, so 
a country that stands to lose revenue as a result of  a move to sales-based 
apportionment could make up the shortfall by increasing its rates. 
 53
Chapter 3 | A Practical Approach to a Transition to Formulary Apportionment
Arguably, to apportion a corporate income tax on sales would cause 
the tax to resemble more closely a consumption tax, and therefore 
could place the economic burden of  the tax more heavily on consumers 
than a corporate tax apportioned according to other factors. Although 
determining the ultimate incidence of  different forms of  tax raises 
complex questions, this concern may be valid. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that developing countries have a pressing need for more 
revenue than they are currently collecting; to the extent the needed 
revenue cannot be raised from corporate income tax, it will need to be 
raised from other sources, unavoidably including consumption taxes. 
Therefore if  sales-based apportionment constitutes the only realistic 
means of  collecting higher corporate tax revenue, a move to sales-based 
apportionment may represent the most consumer-friendly policy despite 
the likelihood that some of  the tax’s incidence will fall on consumers.
Tax treaty issues
If  formulary apportionment is to be implementable without the need 
for prohibitively complex accounting segmentations among taxpayers’ 
different activities, individual national tax authorities should be permitted 
to apply their apportionment formulas to a comprehensive measure of  
the global combined income of  each multinational group that has a 
member subject to tax within the country.8 The alternative would be to 
follow the practice that has arisen in the US, where nexus rules based 
on the US Constitution permit states to apply their apportionment 
formulas to only a portion of  the taxpayer’s nationwide combined 
income, namely the portion that arises from those particular business 
lines that have factual nexus with the particular state.9 For similar 
reasons investment income is not included in the combined income 
subject to apportionment, but is instead allocated to the taxpayer’s home 
jurisdiction. The result is that formulary apportionment in the US often 
becomes embroiled in disruptive controversy concerning, for example, 
the boundaries of  the particular unitary business that has nexus with 
a particular state, or the distinction between business and investment 
income. I conclude that countries adopting formulary apportionment 
would be well-advised to apply their formulas to all of  a taxpayer’s global 
income, from all sources.
This conclusion, however, raises difficulty under typical income tax 
treaties. They generally entitle countries to assert tax jurisdiction on 
legal entities operating within the country only with respect to income 
attributable to the entity’s permanent establishment (PE) within the 
country, generally interpreted to mean a physical presence. This 
limitation might reasonably be interpreted as requiring that international 
formulary apportionment be limited by nexus rules similar to those that 
have been problematic in the US.
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A related concern is that income tax treaties typically contain language 
suggesting that income must be apportioned among related legal entities 
as if  they were independent parties transacting with one another at arm’s 
length. It can reasonably be argued that apportioning a group’s global 
combined income according to a formula would not meet this standard.
Accordingly, for formulary apportionment to be implemented efficiently 
on the basis of  taxpayers’ global combined income, international tax 
treaties may need to be modified or governments may need to be willing 
selectively to override the relevant provisions of  their current tax treaties. 
Neither of  these outcomes is likely unless strong global political support 
arises for formulary apportionment, and this seems unlikely in the near 
future. Therefore the provisions of  current income tax treaties may 
add significantly to the barriers facing the adoption of  international 
formulary apportionment, at least until current political alignments with 
respect to international taxation change markedly.
Accounting barriers to formulary apportionment 
Formulary apportionment will place large and novel accounting demands 
on corporate taxpayers, as well as on the agencies that must audit 
their tax returns. These demands arise largely from the fact that each 
country has unique rules for translating taxpayers’ ‘book’ (i.e. financial 
statement) income into taxable income.10 To determine a taxpayer’s 
local taxable income, a national tax authority will need a measure of  the 
taxpayer’s global income – the income earned by the taxpayer from all 
sources around the world – that has been translated into taxable income 
according to the locally-applicable tax accounting rules. For example, 
if  a taxpayer conducts business in ten different countries, and all of  
those countries have adopted formulary apportionment, the taxpayer 
might need to make ten separate translations of  its global book income 
into taxable income under the different tax accounting rules of  all 
ten countries.
This task is complicated by the fact that translating book into taxable 
income typically requires a detailed transaction-by-transaction look at 
the taxpayer’s activities, since tax accounting rules are often activity-
specific (e.g. requiring acceleration of  income for long-term construction 
contracts, or mark-to-market accounting for some holdings of  investment 
instruments).
The need for multiple book-to-tax translations might not be as 
prohibitive a barrier to formulary apportionment as it might initially 
appear to be. Multinational groups almost certainly already collect 
all the information necessary to accomplish the translations in their 
accounting databases; gearing up to conduct the translations, therefore, 
might amount primarily to an exercise in computer programming, albeit 
an expensive one. Although categorising some transactions under the 
applicable rules will require human judgement, the translation process 
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should remain primarily electronic, and over time companies would 
likely learn to accomplish the task reasonably smoothly. After companies 
surmount the learning curve, the cost of  the accounting needed for 
formulary apportionment might end up being less than is now required 
to implement, document and defend a group’s transfer pricing under 
arm’s length rules.
For the new accounting practices required for formulary apportionment 
to be developed, however, companies will need to commit willingly 
to the necessary work. A less-than-full commitment is likely to cause 
endless breakdowns in the accounting system, and delays in successful 
implementation of  the formulary system. Accordingly, the adoption of  
formulary apportionment on a widespread basis will probably need to 
wait until much greater support develops for it among business leaders.
An alternative means of  dealing with the complexities of  book-to-tax 
translations under formulary apportionment would be for the countries 
of  the world to adopt a largely uniform tax base. Taxpayers doing 
business in multiple countries then generally would need to convert 
their combined global book income into taxable income only once, 
just as is required today in each country under arm’s length transfer 
pricing rules. Countries might even, in connection with the adoption of  
formulary apportionment, take the step of  adopting book-tax conformity 
– conforming their tax accounting rules to financial accounting rules – 
thereby achieving many simplifications to their tax systems, in addition to 
smoothing the route to formulary apportionment.11
Substantially greater uniformity among countries’ tax accounting 
systems – even to the point of  book-tax conformity – seems politically 
unlikely, unless a great deal of  support arises around the world for 
a formulary apportionment regime. The many differences among 
contemporary tax accounting regimes have tended to arise from local 
political considerations, and might be politically quite difficult to modify. 
Moreover trying to establish a global norm for tax accounting might 
be perceived by some countries’ governments as infringing on their 
flexibility in lawmaking, and even on national sovereignty.
In sum, of  the major concerns typically raised against formulary 
apportionment, the need to simplify translations of  book into tax income 
constitutes the largest practical impediment. The political will necessary 
to overcome this obstacle is not evident today, so the sensible course 
of  action, as the OECD and IMF have advised, is to defer attempts to 
implement full-scale formulary apportionment, and instead to draw on 
various potential remedies for BEPS, some of  which are derived from 
principles of  formulary apportionment, in order to assist countries in 
controlling base erosion within the overall framework of  existing transfer 
pricing rules.
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Hybrid transfer pricing methods
The Profit Split Method
The high priority, especially for developing countries, is to try to identify 
a method for allocating profits that is both relatively simple to administer 
and capable of  producing economically-realistic results.
Of  the transfer pricing methods currently in use around the world, the most 
obvious candidate is the Profit Split Method, under which income from 
a particular economic activity of  a multinational group is divided among 
group members according to their relative contribution to the group’s 
activity. More frequent use of  Profit Split Methods might benefit developing 
countries, allowing them both to avoid searches for comparables and to 
establish the case for greater margins being attributed to operations in their 
countries, thereby reducing revenue losses from profit shifting.
A number of  different kinds of  Profit Split Method are currently used 
around the world.12 The type of  profit split likely to be most useful to 
developing countries is the overall profit split, sometimes called the 
contribution-analysis profit split, in which profits are divided in a one-step 
process among participants based on their relative contributions. This 
contrasts with the residual profit split, in which as a first step TNMM 
returns are assigned to participants’ perceived routine activities, and then 
the remaining profit is divided based on relative contributions. The residual 
approach involves relying to some extent on comparables data, and also 
involves the difficult task of  separating group members’ activities into 
routine and non-routine components. An overall profit split, on the other 
hand, does not require identifying comparables, nor does it require trying 
to distinguish between routine and non-routine activities.
For overall profit splits to serve as the workhorse of  developing country 
transfer pricing regimes, however, it will be necessary to solve two 
important problems that historically have hampered the application 
of  profit splits. First, the OECD Guidelines, perhaps seeking to avoid 
the perception of  endorsing a formulary approach, state strongly that 
profit splits must be designed on a case-by-case basis, according to a 
detailed economic analysis of  each taxpayer’s facts and circumstances. 
Although perhaps appealing in theory, this individualised approach lends 
substantial subjectivity and unpredictability to the design of  profit splits, 
and also requires expenditure of  time and resources, by taxpayers and 
tax administrations alike, which are disproportionate to any degree of  
persuasiveness actually added to the method by the extended economic 
analysis. This difficulty is likely to be especially severe in the resource-
limited context of  developing country tax administration. As a practical 
matter, if  the Profit Split Method is to be used reasonably efficiently 
by developing country tax administrations, some level of  uniformity 
will need to be tolerated in the application of  the method to different 
taxpayers operating in the same industry. 
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In addition, for profit splits to be effective in controlling base erosion, 
they will need to apportion income to different parties – not according to 
the parties’ mere levels of  expenditure in supporting the group’s income-
producing activities, but instead according to the business activities 
actually performed by the parties. In practice many profit splits have 
apportioned income according to the parties’ mere expenditure of  cash, 
and therefore have contributed to the proliferation of  BEPS transactions. 
It will be necessary to change this practice if  profit splits are to be useful 
as a tool against BEPS – but the change will be perceived as a substantial 
one, and is bound to elicit political opposition.
The Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) and international 
tax planning
Currently transfer pricing practice around the world depends heavily 
on the OECD’s TNMM, generally referred to as the comparable profits 
method under US practice. In a TNMM analysis, the net income of  a 
taxpayer affiliate in a particular country is supposed to be benchmarked 
against that of  comparable companies that are not themselves part of  
multinational groups, operating in the same markets.
TNMM, as contained in the OECD Guidelines, is based on comparables. 
Consider, for example, a distribution subsidiary that a multinational 
beverages group might establish in Country A. The subsidiary might 
report on its Country A tax return that it has earned a net operating 
margin (ratio of  operating income to sales) during the taxable year of  
3.5 per cent. The subsidiary is supposed to have reviewed these results 
by reference to the results of  comparable distributors of  similar products 
in Country A that are not members of  multinational groups. The 
tax authority is then entitled under TNMM to review the taxpayer’s 
determination by conducting the authority’s own analysis of  available 
data from comparables; if  the taxpayer’s reported income is materially 
lower than the level indicated by the tax authority’s analysis, the tax 
authority can propose an upward adjustment to the subsidiary’s income. 
The use of  TNMM by multinationals in global tax planning involves 
several conceptual steps. First, the group will form companies, to serve as 
what are typically referred to as hub or principal companies, in zero- or 
low-tax countries.13 The group typically will cause these hub companies 
to enter into contracts with the group’s operating entities around the 
world – the various distribution, manufacturing and service-provider 
subsidiaries through which the group conducts its business – under which 
the hub companies claim to indemnify the operating subsidiaries against 
most of  their major business risks. In legal form, the contracts establish 
the operating subsidiaries essentially as servants of  the hub companies, 
performing their business operations at the behest of  and under the 
financial protection of  the hubs.
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It is a hallmark of  this kind of  tax structure that the hub companies 
physically perform few active business functions of  their own: instead, 
the hubs typically have few employees, with the great bulk of  the group’s 
personnel distributed among the group’s many operating subsidiaries. 
The contracts, therefore, tend to reflect a certain amount of  artificiality, 
in that they provide for many of  the risks of  a business to be borne in 
countries where few, if  any, of  the activities that give rise to those risks 
are performed. As a legal matter, however, the risk-limiting contracts 
established under the tax planning structure conform to patterns that 
might be found in agreements made between unrelated companies 
acting at arm’s length; hence, under longstanding legal principles, tax 
administrations around the world generally respect their bona fides. 
The groups involved in these kinds of  contractually-based tax planning 
structures typically perform transfer pricing analyses, under TNMM, 
based on the theory that the protection against risk afforded to the 
group’s operating subsidiaries entitles the subsidiaries to earn only limited 
levels of  operating income, consistent with the results observed among 
the simplest kinds of  business entities for which comparables data can 
be found. In general, tax administrations around the world have not 
challenged the sufficiency of  the levels of  income reported by local 
subsidiaries under this approach. Notable exceptions to this tendency 
have been India and China, which are often reported as challenging 
what they perceive to be low levels of  subsidiary income determined 
by taxpayers’ applications of  TNMM.14 As a result, the use of  the hub 
structure, based upon networks of  risk-limiting contracts, has become 
virtually universal among the world’s business groups.
It seems likely to this author that the apparent toleration by most 
developing country governments of  tax planning structures based 
on TNMM reflects, in large part, a homeostatic equilibrium that has 
developed in recent decades between countries’ desire for tax revenue on 
one hand, and their countervailing desire to keep corporate tax burdens 
low to avoid discouraging inbound investment. Numerous conversations 
in which the author has engaged with tax specialists around the world 
rather strongly support this perception of  political-economic equilibrium. 
The possibility that global toleration of  TNMM-based planning 
structures represents an economically determined equilibrium, however, 
does not mean that the perpetuation of  the current equilibrium is 
normatively desirable. In particular, there is no reason to assume that the 
current equilibrium happens to have settled at a point that is optimal in 
terms of  social well-being. To the contrary, it may well be the case that 
the current equilibrium leaves developing countries with corporate tax 
revenue that is insufficient to meet the countries’ reasonable economic 
and social needs. If  that is the case, then measures designed to modify the 
current corporate tax equilibrium to some extent, in favour of  developing 
countries, may provide significant net social benefits.
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As a matter of  practical politics, given the pervasiveness of  the forces 
of  tax competition that have brought about the current North-South 
corporate tax equilibrium, measures designed to change the equilibrium 
are not likely to occur of  their own accord. Instead, multinational 
companies, and the governments that represent their interests, will need 
to be willing to exercise a degree of  restraint in their tax policymaking 
in favour of  the fiscal interests of  developing countries.15 Essentially 
these parties will need to be willing, as a group, to forgo tax advantages 
they would otherwise, as a matter of  political and economic power, be 
able to retain, in order to assist developing countries in raising revenue 
to build social and economic infrastructure. This chapter assumes that 
multinational companies and their governments do in fact perceive 
advantages, at both the humanitarian and economic levels, in improving 
the relative fiscal positions of  developing countries, so that proposals like 
the one suggested here are not entirely unrealistic as a political matter.
The following section of  this chapter therefore proposes changes to 
the rules governing TNMM that are designed – subject, of  course, to 
verification by revenue estimates – to enhance developing countries’ 
ability to raise corporate tax revenue, while at the same time avoiding 
increasing corporate tax burdens to competitively untenable levels. The 
proposals address two features of  TNMM as currently configured in the 
OECD Guidelines:
 l Problems related to comparables. TNMM’s reliance on searches for 
uncontrolled comparables have long been perceived as posing serious 
and unresolved problems in administration. On economic grounds, 
there are reasons to expect close comparables for the activities 
performed by members of  multinational groups to be difficult to 
locate, even in wealthy countries with highly developed economies.16 
The difficulty of  locating satisfactory comparables appears especially 
acute in developing countries, where few independent companies of  
any kind are likely to exist that are publicly traded, and therefore do 
not report financial data in a format that is useful for analysis under 
TNMM.17
 l Problems related to profit shifting through interest payments. Large volumes 
of  profit shifting are attributable to payment of  interest by corporate 
subsidiaries, on loans that have been extended to the subsidiaries by 
zero- or low-tax hub affiliates. TNMM, however, like other transfer 
pricing methods under the OECD Guidelines, generally requires 
taxpayers to report minimum levels of  operating income, which is 
an accounting measurement of  income before payment of  interest. 
Historically, international tax law has not sought to limit the volume 
of  interest payments between affiliates by means of  transfer pricing 
rules, but on separate, specialised systems of  rules for limiting 
interest on related-party debt. However, perhaps from pressures of  
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tax competition, countries’ limitations on interest deductions have 
typically been of  limited effect, or have been non-existent. The 
OECD, in its BEPS studies, has recommended some tightening of  
existing interest-limitation rules, but it is unclear whether these will 
lead in practice to substantial changes.18 The suggested changes 
to TNMM would seek to redress this difficulty to some extent by 
substituting ‘earnings before tax’ (EBT), a measure of  a company’s 
earnings after payment of  interest, in place of  operating income as the 
basis for benchmarking under TNMM. 
Proposal for a Modified Net Margin Method (MNMM)
A Modification of the TNMM
This section outlines a proposal to modify the TNMM, which might be 
described as a Modified Net Margin Method. The suggested revisions 
would leave the rules for TNMM identical to those now in the OECD 
Guidelines, except that: (i) benchmarking would not be based on searches 
for comparables, but taxpayers would instead be required to earn profit 
margins equal to 25 per cent of  the global consolidated margin earned 
by the taxpayer’s multinational group; and (ii) the measure of  profitability 
used for purposes of  benchmarking under TNMM would be earnings 
before tax, instead of  operating income. 
Consider for illustration the situation of  a distribution subsidiary, 
Sellco, that earns $1 billion in revenue during the taxable year. If  the 
multinational group of  which Sellco is a member reports on its annual 
financial statements a consolidated EBT margin of  15 per cent, then the 
revised TNMM will require Sellco to earn an EBT margin of  .25 x 15, 
or 3.75 per cent. Therefore, under the revised TNMM, Sellco’s income 
for the year should be $37.5 million. (If, alternatively, the consolidated 
group had operated at a loss for the year as measured by the group’s 
consolidated EBT, then Sellco would be permitted for tax purposes 
to report a corresponding loss, based on the 25 per cent rule. The 
loss would be subject to any carryover rules allowed under the locally 
applicable income tax laws.)
In the case of  a subsidiary that is not a distributor, but is instead a 
manufacturer, the revised TNMM would not base its benchmarking 
on the taxpayer’s return on sales, but instead – as is commonly the 
practice today under TNMM – on the taxpayer’s return on its total 
expenses. Consider, for example, a manufacturing subsidiary, Manuco, 
with total expenses of  $800 million per year. If  Manuco’s group earns a 
consolidated EBT return on total expenses of  24 per cent, then Manuco 
would be required under the revised TNMM to earn an EBT margin 
of  at least 0.25 x 24, or 6 per cent, indicating an arm’s length level of  
income of  $48 million. Again, if  application of  the revised TNMM 
indicates that Manuco should incur a loss, the loss will be allowed for 
corporate tax purposes. (As is true under the current version of  TNMM, 
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subsidiaries that are neither distributors or manufacturers, but instead are 
engaged in the provision of  services, might be benchmarked by reference 
either to their returns on sales or their returns on costs, depending on the 
clientele served by the particular subsidiary.)19 
The suggestion that the revised TNMM be applied using a coefficient 
of  0.25 – that is, that the taxpayer be required to report an EBT margin 
that is 25 per cent of  the group’s consolidated margin – reflects several 
considerations. First, conceptually, it seems reasonable to assume that 
any single function of  the taxpayer, like distribution, manufacturing 
or the provision of  services, is likely in itself  to account for only a 
relatively small portion of  the total income generated by a multinational 
group, and 25 per cent seems like a reasonable broad estimate of  the 
appropriate percentage. Second, a coefficient of  25 per cent appears to 
lead to results that are roughly in line with expectations of  practitioners, 
as recalled by the author, when TNMM was first developed in the early 
1990s, but before its application in practice had been affected on a 
large scale by the proliferation of  limited-risk subsidiaries. Ultimately, 
the choice of  a particular coefficient reflects some degree of  subjective 
judgement, but 25 per cent seems sensible (subject to verification by 
revenue estimates) if  the revised method is to result in meaningful, but 
still relatively moderate, increases in effective tax burdens.
The key to the improved administrability of  the revised version of  
TNMM is its reliance for purposes of  benchmarking on information 
taken from groups’ routinely reported financial results, rather than 
on data derived from attempted searches for comparables. Most 
large multinational groups publish their consolidated results annually, 
under the supervision of  professional auditors and national securities 
regulators. Companies are unlikely to try to understate their global 
profitability, as that would put the companies at a disadvantage in 
the capital markets; therefore, the information on profitability that is 
published by multinational groups generally should be reliable for use 
in tax administration. Not all multinationals are publicly traded, but all 
but the smallest nevertheless maintain audited financial statements, and 
even those that do not typically will maintain some form of  consolidated 
financial information. Also, those without audited statements are likely 
to be the smallest multinationals, for which little revenue is at stake under 
transfer pricing laws.
Limitations and arguable shortcomings of the MNMM
The suggested revisions to TNMM are not intended as a panacea for all 
problems of  transfer pricing administration, but to provide a reasonable 
backup to current methods, and, in particular, to reduce the degree of  
profit shifting that the TNMM now permits in connection with the use 
of  limited-risk subsidiaries. As a consequence of  its deliberately limited 
reach, the revised TNMM admittedly retains some of  the weaknesses 
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of  current transfer pricing methods, including the current version of  
TNMM.
In particular, the revised TNMM will continue to require the taxpayer 
and the tax authority to characterise particular subsidiaries or divisions 
within subsidiaries (tested parties) as distributors, manufacturers or 
particular kinds of  service providers, and sometimes this characterisation 
is difficult to accomplish. In addition, the revised TNMM will continue, 
like OECD transfer pricing methods generally, to benchmark taxpayers’ 
book (financial statement) incomes, not their taxable incomes. This 
means that, even after revision, TNMM will continue to require 
the taxpayer and the tax authority to determine how results under 
the applicable transfer pricing method should be translated from 
book to taxable income – sometimes a difficult accounting task. The 
suggested revisions to TNMM do not attempt to address this significant 
methodological weakness, which seems unavoidable under any transfer 
pricing method that is in use today.
Another limitation is that the revised TNMM would be useful 
to benchmark financial results only of  the kinds of  distribution, 
manufacturing and service operations to which TNMM currently is 
applied under the rules of  the OECD Guidelines. Even after revision, 
TNMM would not be useful in benchmarking the incomes of  other 
kinds of  taxpayers, including those with especially complex operations. 
In particular, the revisions to TNMM would not solve the problem 
– currently unsolved under existing OECD transfer pricing methods 
– of  evaluating the income of  banks, insurance companies and other 
financial businesses. The revisions would, however, enable governments, 
including governments in developing countries with relatively limited 
tax administration resources, to reduce revenue losses in a large number 
of  situations in which taxpayers have established tax planning structures 
based on the use of  risk-limited distribution, manufacturing and service 
provider subsidiaries.
Although the revised TNMM, by benchmarking based on EBT rather 
than operating income, will provide developing country governments 
with greater protection against excessive interest deductions than is 
available today, the protection provided by the revised TNMM will 
remain somewhat porous. Because the revised TNMM will not prescribe 
minimum EBT levels for a group’s entire operations within a particular 
country, but instead only for tested parties that have been identified for 
purposes of  applying TNMM, some taxpayers will have an opportunity 
to seek to apportion some or all of  their interest deductions to portions of  
their operations that are not subject to TNMM. To the extent this occurs, 
tax administrations will need to rely not on transfer pricing rules, but 
instead on special rules for the limitation of  interest deductions (which, 
as discussed above, tend to be quite weak in many countries) to prevent 
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excessive revenue leakage. Therefore, although the suggested revisions to 
TNMM should help to some extent in reducing profit shifting through 
the use of  interest deductions, institution of  the suggested new method 
will not obviate the need for more effective overall limitations on interest 
deductions.
The revised TNMM might also be criticised for basing its minimally 
required levels of  income not on the success or failure of  the specific 
business operations that the taxpayer conducts in its particular country, 
but instead on the financial success or failure during the year of  the 
taxpayer’s global group as a whole. At least in theory, this feature of  
the revised TNMM will dilute some of  the risk-mitigating effects of  
the income tax. Normally, when taxpayers invest to perform particular 
activities within a country, they can theoretically expect that the risks of  
that investment will be dampened by the fact that their tax burden will 
increase only in the case of  success, and that failure will be cushioned to 
some extent by deductible losses in that country. This risk-dampening 
effect would seem to be diluted if  tax obligations in a particular country 
are determined by the taxpayer’s global, rather than local, financial 
results, from all the activities in which the group is engaged.
This problem, however, seems likely to be less significant in practice than 
in theory. It would indeed be better from the perspective of  mitigating 
financial risk to base tax results on a taxpayer’s local rather than global 
profitability – but the problems of  transfer pricing administration over 
many decades have shown that measurement of  local profitability with 
any degree of  precision is infeasible. Indeed, the inherent technical 
problems of  local income measurement appear to have contributed 
greatly to the current situation with respect to base erosion and profit 
shifting. In addition, the revised TNMM’s approach to benchmarking in 
effect allows multinational groups some degree of  cross-border offsetting 
of  losses and sub-part profitability – a feature that investors in the group 
as a whole should find attractive on grounds of  risk mitigation.20
It also might be objected that, under the revised TNMM, start-up 
subsidiaries that are contained within profitable multinational groups 
might be required to report positive levels of  income, even before they 
realistically could be expected to be earning a profit on a local basis. 
This prospect might be viewed as posing a disincentive to new inbound 
investment. It is unclear whether the taxation of  local subsidiaries 
during a start-up period is entirely inappropriate as a conceptual matter. 
Arguably, all subsidiaries of  a multinational group should be seen as 
supporting the operations of  the group as a whole, even when some 
of  the subsidiaries are in start-up phases, as all subsidiaries can be 
seen as mutually supportive parts of  the group’s overall programme of  
geographic diversification. Thus, even in a start-up period a subsidiary 
can be seen as performing a service for the parent company, for which 
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the subsidiary should receive net compensation. This argument, however, 
is not likely to be persuasive to developing country governments, which 
historically have perceived some kind of  special tax treatment for start-up 
operations as being necessary to afford appropriate investment incentives. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that governments that currently accord new 
businesses tax incentives during a start-up period continue to do so after 
adopting revisions to TNMM.
Some may criticise the suggested revisions to TNMM on conceptual 
grounds, as a departure from a longstanding international consensus 
in favour of  transfer pricing methods that adhere closely to reliance 
on data from comparables, and on refraining from reliance on group-
wide financial results. It is true that both of  these preferences are now 
deeply embedded in practice under transfer pricing law, and even 
minor departures from these tendencies might reasonably raise fears of  
unintended adverse effects. Conceptual models of  taxation, however, 
are always approximate. International tax law is an amalgam of  many 
different and sometimes idiosyncratic rules, which have been conditioned 
over time by a wide variety of  practical considerations, political as well 
as economic. Models in tax policy and administration inevitably need to 
change from time to time, at least to some extent, to meet new economic 
and political needs; indeed, even the changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines in 1995, which introduced the TNMM, responded to changing 
perceptions of  the practical exigencies of  transfer pricing administration. 
Conceptual models have their value in tax policy and administration, 
but they should not be elevated to the level of  a controlling theology. 
In the current global environment, some departure from historically 
influential conceptual models should be seen as acceptable if  it can 
achieve politically viable improvements in the fiscal situation of  
developing countries.
Conclusion
Revenue estimates will need to be made as a first step in considering 
the implementation of  the proposals made in this chapter. In addition, 
the adoption of  changes to TNMM along the lines suggested in this 
chapter will depend heavily on some measure of  political support from 
the world’s large multinational companies, and from the governments of  
countries where the groups are based. On both political and economic 
grounds, however, proposals along the lines suggested above would 
appear to offer sufficient potential, from the standpoint of  contributing to 
the fiscal wellbeing of  developing countries, to justify careful evaluation, 
beginning with an assessment of  their likely revenue effects.
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Notes
1. Portions of this chapter are based on material previously published by 
Bloomberg BNA. These materials are reprinted with permission, all rights 
reserved.
2. Durst (2015b). Chapters of this study were originally published as 
articles, as listed in the references.
3. e.g. Duncan and Cohen (2012) and Syal and Wintour (2012). 
4. e.g. ActionAid (2012).
5. This topic is addressed particularly in Durst (2013c). The discussion in 
that article is based on Durst (2012a) and Durst (2012b).
6. In some situations taxpayers may be able to mitigate the uncertainty 
raised by arm’s length pricing rules by obtaining advance pricing 
agreements (APAs) before making investments, or by obtaining relief 
from double taxation after the fact through competent authority 
negotiations conducted under bilateral tax treaties. However, APAs 
are expensive and typically cannot be completed before investment 
decisions must be made; competent authority negotiations can involve 
considerable expense and delay, are not always concluded successfully, 
and are unavailable in cases where the countries involved in particular 
cross-border transactions are not party to a bilateral tax treaty.
7. For a discussion of formulary apportionment among the US states, see 
Durst (2013e), and Chapters 6 and 10 in this collection.
8. The accounting difficulties arising from attempts to apply formulary 
apportionment to only a portion of a taxpayer’s combined global income 
are discussed in Durst (2013a, 2013b).
9. See Durst (2013d).
10. See the discussion of this topic in Durst (2013a), and by Murphy and 
Sikka in Chapter 5 of this collection.
11. For discussion of this topic, see Hanlon and Shevlin (2005).
12. The various profit splits in use today are described in the OECD’s 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD 2010), beginning with paragraph 2.118.
13. Although many countries are willing to host hub companies, the 
Cayman Islands, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands are among the 
jurisdictions in which multinational groups establish their hubs. The legal 
arrangements involved in hub-based tax planning are discussed in detail 
in Kleinbard (2011a, 2011b) and US Congress (2010). A report that is 
highly critical of the effects of hub tax planning structures on developing 
countries has been compiled by the non-governmental organisation 
ActionAid (ActionAid 2012).
14. The extent to which the apparent reluctance of other countries 
to challenge TNMM results can be attributed to considerations of 
tax competition, to technical difficulties encountered by revenue 
administrations in applying TNMM, or to some combination of these two 
factors, cannot, of course, be determined.
15. See, e.g., Durst (2014b).
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16. Essentially, the argument is that multinational groups form in industries 
where the common ownership of legal entities performing different 
functions is necessary in order to operate competitively. Therefore, 
in industries that are organised in international groups – precisely 
the industries for which transfer pricing regulation is required – few 
satisfactory comparables for, say, distribution and manufacturing 
subsidiaries are likely to be found. See, e.g., Durst and Culbertson (2003: 
81-87).
17. The OECD and other international organisations are committed to 
assisting developing countries in seeking remedies for current difficulties 
in locating comparables for use in transfer pricing administration. The 
author hopes that the observations offered in this chapter will be helpful 
in the design and implementation of this technical assistance effort. 
18. The recommendations relating to the limitation of interest deductions 
are found in the OECD’s reports under BEPS Action 4: OECD (2014e), 
OECD (2015a Action 4), and OECD (2016). For a discussion of this 
topic, see Durst (2015c), and Chapter 1 above.
19. Subsidiaries that provide services primarily to unrelated customers in 
the local market (as might be the case, e.g., for a local subsidiary of a 
global oil drilling services group) are typically treated under TNMM 
similarly to distributors, and benchmarked on the basis of return 
on sales. Subsidiaries that provide services mainly to related parties 
(e.g. subsidiaries that provide R&D services, or operate customer call 
centres for the benefit of other members of their commonly-controlled 
groups), are typically treated under TNMM similarly to manufacturers, 
and are benchmarked on the basis of their returns on costs.
20. An alternative to basing required margins, under TNMM, on consolidated 
group results would be to adopt a system of fixed margins similar to 
that employed by Brazil. Fixed margins, however, would appear to 
involve more potential for economically anomalous results than the 
approach suggested here; moreover, fixed margins, unlike consolidated 
group margins reported in companies’ audited financial statements, are 
vulnerable to political manipulation. 
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Formulary Apportionment and 
International Tax Rules 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Zachée Pouga Tinhaga
Any proposal to adopt unitary taxation (UT) of multinationals has to 
contend with whether such taxation is compatible with existing international 
tax rules, and, in particular, with the bilateral tax treaty network. Indeed, 
some researchers have argued that the separate accounting (SA) method 
and the arm’s length standard (ALS), introduced in the early twentieth 
century,1 are so embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary 
international law, and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. We 
disagree, because the unitary approach is just as widely embodied in most 
of the current international tax treaties, and, where there are no treaties, 
national laws allow for a unitary approach to taxation. In this chapter we will 
argue that UT can be compatible with most existing tax treaties, and that 
developing countries, in particular, can implement it in most cases with or 
without a tax treaty and in accordance with their domestic laws.
UT and the existing treaty network
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of  the treaties, which 
assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial 
relations between associated enterprises.2 Initially, the term permanent 
establishment (PE) was meant to include separate entities (subsidiaries). 
However, in 1933 the League of  Nations introduced Article 5, ancestor 
to the current Article 9 of  the Model,3 where separate enterprises were 
no longer considered PEs. If  UT were adopted, Article 9 would become 
irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e. where a unitary 
business is found to exist), because UT ignores the transactions between 
related parties, and treats them instead as part of  a single enterprise.
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), 
‘[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of  a Contracting State 
controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of  the other 
Contracting State… shall not of  itself  constitute either company a 
permanent establishment of  the other’. However, it is well established 
that a dependent agent can be a PE (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an 
agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises legal and 
economic control over the agent.4 ‘An agent that is subject to detailed 
instructions regarding the conduct of  its operations or comprehensive 
control by the enterprise is not legally independent’.5
Chapter 4
68 
In the case of  a modern, integrated multinational enterprise (MNE) 
that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument can be made 
in most cases that the parent of  the MNE exercises both legal and 
economic control over the operations of  the subsidiaries, especially 
where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of  loss, and acquire goods and 
services exclusively or almost exclusively from the parent or other related 
corporations. The existence of  Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in 
most important operational decisions being centralised. In that case, the 
subsidiaries should be regarded as dependent agents of  the parent. Such 
a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and 
developing countries (Le Gall 2007).
If  the subsidiary is an agent of  the parent, Article 7(2) of  the treaties 
requires the attribution of  the same profits to the subsidiary ‘that it might 
be expected to make if  it were a distinct and independent enterprise 
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions’. Arguably, the application of  UT satisfies this arm’s length 
condition, because in the absence of  precise comparables, which almost 
never exist, it is not possible to determine exactly what profits would have 
been attributable to the subsidiary under SA. 
When the US adopted the Comparable Profit Method and Profit Split 
in the 1994 transfer pricing regulations, some countries objected that it 
was violating the treaties because these methods did not rely on exact 
comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these objections 
eventually subsided, and the OECD endorsed similar methods in its 
transfer pricing guidelines, and more recently granted them equivalent 
status to the traditional methods. The US has always maintained that 
both the Comparable Profit and Profit Split Methods satisfy the arm’s 
length standard despite the lack of  precise comparables (and in the 
case of  profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate any residual 
profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the ‘super-royalty rule’ 
of  the Internal Revenue Code section 482 (which requires royalties to 
be ‘commensurate with the income’ from an intangible, and therefore 
subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s length 
standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such 
adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties.
Before the recent changes to the OECD Model Convention (MC), it 
was therefore quite plausible to argue that UT was compatible with the 
treaties if  the subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or economically 
dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country 
that wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of  the OECD MC 
Article 7(4): ‘Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to 
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment on 
the basis of  an apportionment of  the total profits of  the enterprise to its 
various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
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State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment 
as may be necessary; the method of  apportionment adopted shall, 
however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Article’.
Since it can be argued that in the absence of  comparables the result 
reached under UT is equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this 
language seems to permit the use of  UT for dependent agent PEs. 
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to Article 7 of  the MC 
that would make this argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the 
OECD adopted the ‘authorised OECD approach’ to the attribution of  
profits to a PE, which treats a PE as the equivalent to a subsidiary, and 
has suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject 
UT should be applied to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the 
US lead and deleted Article 7(4) from its MC. However, not all OECD 
countries accepted these changes, which were also rejected by developing 
countries, and the UN model still contains Article 7(4).
In fact, the vast majority of  existing actual treaties have not been revised 
to incorporate those changes. In particular, our research shows that many 
developing country treaties contain Article 7(4), even when the treaties 
are with OECD members.6 We identified 174 such treaties by developing 
countries that contain this language, including recent treaties such as 
India-Lithuania (2011), India-Nepal (2011), Korea-Panama (2010), and 
treaties with OECD members such as India-Sweden, India-UK, Mexico-
UK, and Sri Lanka-US. In all of  those cases, or in the absence of  a 
treaty, countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the 
analysis set out above. 
Customary international law
Nor does the argument of  customary international law impede the 
application of  a UT approach. The argument is based on the contention 
that because SA and the ALS are embodied in all the treaties, they 
should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not 
enough to create a customary international law ban on UT, since Article 
7(4) is embodied as well. Furthermore, it should be noted that model tax 
treaties do not, in any way or form, create a ‘right to tax’.7 The key issue 
is the actual practice of  states – what countries actually do – as domestic 
laws reign supreme in the area of  taxation, and many of  them follow UT 
approaches in practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the 
UN Model, which does not adopt the changes made by the OECD, and 
which is also widely followed.
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its 
approach. The authorised OECD approach may have marked the high 
point of  OECD commitment to SA. With the unfolding of  the base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project,8 which is influenced by large 
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developing countries like China and India, it is possible that the OECD 
may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA. Specifically, 
the adoption under BEPS of  country-by-country reporting (which was 
already required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis 
for implementation of  UT.9 This development is very important for 
developing counties, as many rely heavily on extractive industries. The 
requirements of  country-by-country reporting will allow a profound 
change in taxation of  the major industry in the developing world: the 
extractive industry.
Does Article 7 preclude application of UT to entire MNEs?
One important question raised by Durst (Durst 2013a: 8) is whether 
the requirement that profits be attributable to a PE under Article 7 of  
the model treaties means that if  UT is applied, it must be done on an 
activity-by-activity basis. Otherwise, profits would be attributed to the 
PE that have nothing to do with it, because the PE is not engaged in 
the activity that generates these profits. However, one would rather not 
make this assumption, because allowing an MNE to split its activities 
among different subsidiaries is notoriously hard to combat, and facilitates 
precisely the kind of  profit shifting that developing countries, in 
particular, have a hard time policing.
In our opinion, the phrase ‘attributable to a permanent establishment’ 
does not preclude attribution of  global profits of  an MNE to a PE under 
whatever formula is adopted for UT purposes. The reason is that once a 
functional analysis is performed, and whatever can be attributed to the 
various functions by using either comparables or a proxy, such as a fixed 
percentage of  costs (Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst 2009), the remaining 
residual can be allocated in any way we wish, since it is attributable to the 
entire MNE.
Transfer pricing adjustments frequently result in a residual that cannot 
be allocated under the traditional functional analysis, because it results 
from cost savings that inhere in the relationship of  the group members 
to each other. The classic example is the US case involving Bausch and 
Lomb (B and L).10 B and L developed an unpatented technology that 
enabled it to manufacture contact lenses at a cost of  $2.50 per lens, 
when its competitors had costs of  $7.50 per lens. B and L contributed 
the knowhow to its Irish subsidiary, to enable it to manufacture the 
lenses. The question facing the US court was whether to accept B and 
L’s view that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method should apply 
to determine the price charged by the Irish subsidiary to its parent for 
lenses based on a comparison with prices charged by independent lens 
manufacturers, despite the difference in production costs. The IRS 
argued that the residual profit from the know-how belonged to the US 
parent that developed it, but the court rejected that view because the 
residual profit inhered in the relationship between the parties. Had B and 
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L Ireland been unrelated to its parent, the know-how would have been 
disclosed, the competitors would have used it, and the residual profit 
would have disappeared.
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not say what should be done 
with residuals under the Profit Split Method. The US regulations followed 
the White Paper,11 in assuming that any residual results from intangibles 
and allocating the residual to where the intangibles were developed. This 
is a view that favours US revenue interests, because more intangibles 
are developed in the US than elsewhere, but not surprisingly it has not 
been accepted by other OECD members. Nor is it congruent with the 
facts, since residuals can result from other reasons, such as cost savings 
from synergies or advantages of  scale, and they usually inhere in the 
relationship among the group members and cannot be allocated to any 
one of  them.
The OECD’s preferred method of  applying the Profit Split Method is to 
analyse the functions, assets and risk of  each member of  the affiliated 
group. However, in the context of  residuals this method also proves to 
be illusory. A functional analysis can only be applied to those functions 
that can be assigned to the group members, such as production or 
distribution, but it does not help with residuals that result from the 
relationship among the group members. Assets can include intangibles, 
which are usually the most valuable assets of  a modern MNE, but 
intangibles also get their value from the relationship among the group 
members, as illustrated by the B and L case. This makes it very difficult 
for them to be allocated to either where they were developed or where 
they are exploited. The Glaxo case, in which the IRS and HMRC 
disagreed about whether the profit from selling Zantac, a drug developed 
in the UK, into the US market were attributable to the intangibles 
embodied in the drug itself  or those used in Glaxo’s marketing, resulted 
in massive double taxation.12
Risk is the trickiest concept of  all. Recent case studies by the US Joint 
Committee on Taxation (US Congress 2010) reveal a model in which 
the entrepreneurial risk for a product is assigned to an affiliate in a 
low tax jurisdiction, and the manufacturing and distribution of  the 
product in high tax jurisdictions are done on a contract manufacturing 
and commissionaire basis. But it is not clear what the allocation of  
entrepreneurial risk means among related parties. If  a product fails 
because of  technological change or defects in manufacturing or 
environmental hazards, the risk is effectively borne by the entire MNE – 
or more accurately by its management, who risk being fired, and by its 
shareholders, who see the stock price plummet.
Under UT, these issues can be solved by using the formula to allocate 
the residual by the Profit Split Method. The specific formula used can 
be negotiated, as discussed in other chapters in this book, and by Durst 
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(2014c). But in our opinion it is clear that whatever formula is decided 
upon should be applied under UT to the entire profit of  the integrated 
MNE, and not divided into separate activities, and that this would be 
perfectly congruent with Article 7.
UT and developing countries 
What can a developing country do to implement UT? In the absence of  
a treaty, or in the event that the treaty contains Article 7(4) language, the 
biggest obstacle to UT implementation may be access to information.
The recent redraft of  the UN Transfer Pricing Manual recommends that 
among the documentation that a tax administration should request 
for a transfer pricing audit should be the ‘Group global consolidated 
basis profit and loss statement and ratio of  taxpayer’s sales towards 
group global sales for five years’ (para. 8.6.9.12). This provides a good 
basis for application of  UT. The development of  a global template 
for country-by-country reports by MNEs, mandated by the G20 and 
developed as part of  the OECD’s BEPS project, would also facilitate 
such an approach. The rejection of  UT in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines is based on its definition of  formulary apportionment as 
‘applying a formula fixed in advance’. This leaves considerable scope for 
adoption of  UT approaches with ad hoc formulas, which are not based 
on a fixed formula.
Specifically, allocation according to operating expenses would be clearer 
and easier to administer, and most importantly would fit within the 
current rules of  international tax. We have argued that in the context 
of  the Profit Split Method, the residual profit cannot be allocated on the 
basis of  comparables, and therefore can be allocated based on operating 
expenses without deviating from the ALS (Avi-Yonah et al. 2009). This 
would entail first assigning to each country an estimated market return 
on the tax deductible expenses incurred by the multinational group in 
that country.
Developing countries should therefore be encouraged to draft their 
transfer pricing laws to include powers to adjust the accounts of  any 
foreign-owned local company or branch, if  the revenue authority 
considers that its accounts do not fairly reflect the profits earned locally, 
to bring the taxable profits into line with those that such a business would 
be expected to earn, having regard to (a) similar businesses either in that 
country or elsewhere, and/or (b) the relationship of  the local business 
to the worldwide activities of  the corporate group of  which it is a part. 
This would involve analysis and comparison of  provisions in the tax 
laws of  appropriate countries. A good model would be Section 482 of  
the US Internal Revenue Code, which predates the ALS and is very 
open-ended.13
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Conclusion
The transition from SA to UT is likely to be a long process, and it may 
ultimately require renegotiating treaties or even drafting a multilateral 
treaty like the EU’s Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. 
However, a good beginning can be made now by exploring how 
developing countries can adopt UT principles within the context of  the 
existing treaty network. This paper has endeavoured to show that such 
approaches are quite feasible, because most developing countries are 
not bound by the authorised OECD approach to Article 7, and even 
the OECD may be reconsidering its approach in the context of  the 
BEPS project.
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Notes
1. The reports to the League of Nations of 1927-1933, which resulted in 
the first model tax conventions, were reprinted in a Legislative History 
of US Tax Conventions, and are now available online in the Digital 
Collections of the University of Sydney; for a brief account of the 
history see Picciotto (2013), esp. pp.10-15.
2. The quoted articles are identical in all the tax treaty models except when 
the differences are discussed in the text.
3. See League of Nations Fiscal Committee (1933), Annex, Art. 5.
4. See, e.g. Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd v. Administracion General del Estado, 
Case No. STS/202/2012 (Spanish Supreme Court Jan. 12) (Swiss 
principal had PE in Spain through an affiliated Spanish company; 
activity of the subsidiary was directed, organised and managed in a 
detailed manner by the principal); Salad Dressing, Fiscal Court Baden-
Wurttemberg, 3 K 54/93, Internationales Steuerrecht 1997 (Swiss 
principal had a PE at the premises of an unrelated German contract 
manufacturer based on detailed instruction by principal); Milcal Media 
Limited, Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Case nos. 7453-54-02 (2005) 
(Cyprus principal had a PE through Swedish subsidiary because it was 
subject to detailed instructions and control); eFunds Corp. v. ADIT, Case 
45 DTR 345 / 42 SOT 165, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi; Lucent 
Technologies v. DCIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 2008 (US parent 
company had a service PE in India); and the cases cited by Le Gall (2007). 
5. U.S. Treasury (2006: Art. 5(6)). 
6. See Appendix A of Avi-Yonah and Pouga Tinhaga (2014).
7. Vogel (1997: 26) and OECD (1958: 12).
8. See final BEPS reports (OECD 2015a).
9. See BEPS final report on country-by-country reporting, available at 
www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-
country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report-9789264241480-
en.htm (last retrieved 26 July 2016).
10. Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. C.I.R., 933 F.2d 1084.
11. US Treasury (1988) (a US Treasury study of transfer pricing 
methodology that resulted in the development of the Comparable 
Profits Method and Profit Split).
12. GlaxoSmithKlineHoldings (Americas) Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 
No. 5750-04 (T.C. Apr. 2).
13. ‘In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether 
or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, 
and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or 
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or 
among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that 
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to 
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such 
organizations, trades, or businesses.’ IRC s. 482.
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Unitary Taxation: the Tax Base and the 
Role of Accounting 
Richard Murphy and Prem Sikka
Introduction
As argued generally in this book, the world’s system of  corporate taxation 
is in crisis. There is, very obviously, a need for fundamental reform of  
that system, and yet so embedded is the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) system of  arms length 
transfer pricing, that even research into available alternatives is limited. 
Since this principle is based upon the idea of  separate entity accounting, 
the relation between taxation and corporate accounts is central.
This chapter looks at one of  the issues that would be key to the 
implementation of  any unitary taxation system for corporations, whether 
on a national, regional or international basis – how accounting data 
may provide a foundation for a unitary base for corporate taxation, and 
what changes in approach to that data may be required to achieve that 
purpose. Despite the clear importance of  this issue to the prospects for 
unitary taxation, it has, like many other aspects of  this subject, been 
little studied. As a result there are few precedents for us to draw upon 
in considering this subject, and we have had to go back to some first 
principles when making suggestions. Hence, this chapter is in five parts. 
First we consider, very briefly, the current purposes of  accounting 
information, and why these make it unsuitable for the purposes of  
assessing taxation of  any sort, let alone on a unitary basis. Secondly, 
we briefly review the evidence on different countries’ approaches to 
the relationship between accounting data and taxable profits. Thirdly, 
we look more specifically at the proposals made in the EU’s Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), and show that this has 
proposed a potentially coherent accounting methodology for preparing a 
unitary taxation base. This leads to discussion on the varying approaches 
that can be adopted to create this tax base from the disparate accounting 
information that needs to be either consolidated or aggregated for this 
purpose. Next, we look at the practical consequences of  these issues, 
and as a result make suggestions as to the ways in which they might 
be resolved in practice. We propose that what might initially appear 
to be intractable problems can be addressed in stages, if  appropriate 
accounting measures and design features are adopted to facilitate 
progress towards unitary taxation.
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The purposes of financial accounting data
The starting point for a company’s reporting for both financial and 
tax purposes is its basic accounting books and records. Since separate 
records are not normally expected to be kept for the two purposes, tax 
calculations usually begin with the financial statements that are based 
upon these records. However, this gives an impression of  convergence 
between the information needs for tax and accounting purposes, 
which can be misleading. Whilst both accounting and taxation share 
vocabularies that refer to capital, income and profit, there is considerable 
divergence in the meaning that the two practices attach to such terms.
There is no room here to discuss the history of  accounting, and 
developments in the purpose of  financial reporting over time. It is 
sufficient to note that contemporary financial reporting is primarily 
intended to respond to the assumed needs of  shareholders, and those 
buying and selling shares or other financial instruments in capital 
markets. Thus, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
states that the primary objective of  financial reporting is ‘to provide 
financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing 
and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity’ (FASB 2010: 1-2). Indeed, the 
current view of  the IFRS Foundation, the largest accounting standard 
setter, is summarised in their Conceptual Framework:
[The IFRS Foundation] believes that further [accounting] 
harmonisation can best be pursued by focusing on financial statements 
that are prepared for the purpose of  providing information that is 
useful in making economic decisions.
The Board believes that financial statements prepared for this purpose 
meet the common needs of  most users. This is because nearly all users 
are making economic decisions, for example:
(a) to decide when to buy, hold or sell an equity investment. 
(b) to assess the stewardship or accountability of  management. 
(c) to assess the ability of  the entity to pay and provide other benefits to 
its employees. 
(d) to assess the security for amounts lent to the entity. 
(e) to determine taxation policies. 
(f) to determine distributable profits and dividends. 
(g) to prepare and use national income statistics. 
(h) to regulate the activities of  entities. 
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The Board recognises, however, that governments, in particular, may specify 
different or additional requirements for their own purposes. These requirements 
should not, however, affect financial statements published for the benefit of  other 
users unless they also meet the needs of  those other users.
(IASB 2013: A14) (emphasis added)
In other words, accounting data produced using the two most important 
sets of  accounting principles in use in the world is explicitly not at present 
prepared for the purpose of  assisting the assessment of  corporate tax 
liabilities. It is, therefore, almost inevitable that accounting data produced 
by companies for use by their suppliers of  capital will have to be, at least 
to some degree, restated when it comes to the use of  that data for tax 
purposes. The areas where issues arise are diverse, but there are three 
core problems with using either US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) or International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) data (and that from many other GAAPs, because each country is 
at liberty to create its own).
Firstly, financial reporting standards do not aim to provide data 
indicating the profit or loss as conventionally understood for an 
accounting period. This is the primary reason why the historically 
familiar term ‘profit and loss account’ has been replaced in these 
financial statements with the term ‘income statement’. What that 
statement shows is the movement in the recorded financial value of  the 
reporting entity over the period covered by the financial statements. 
As a result, the data in the income statement mixes realised profit (i.e. 
activity likely to have cash consequences) with unrealised profits, which 
are simply movements in value of  assets and liabilities that the reporting 
entity includes on its balance sheet. Since these key financial reporting 
standards also do not require that these two very different types of  
change in financial fortune be reported separately, there is real risk that 
the reported surplus or deficit for the period (which is not in any sense a 
profit or loss as once understood) might have no bearing at all on what 
has conventionally been thought of  as taxable profit.
The second problem is that the criteria for measuring movements in 
value used by companies reporting under these financial reporting 
standards need not be consistent. To summarise a complex issue, all 
accounting (including tax accounting) requires the use of  a ‘capital 
maintenance concept’ against which change in value is measured. 
For example, physical capital might be the basis for recognising value 
change. This will then require that inventory be valued at, in effect, an 
approximation of  replacement cost. Alternatively, financial value might 
be maintained, implying a very different basis for inventory valuation. 
Financial capital can also be maintained in current or historical terms. 
On all these issues financial reporting standards are not consistent, 
and not even mandatory in all cases: considerable discretion is left to 
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companies themselves, or to the jurisdiction in which they report, on 
these issues. The result is that not only do financial statements not 
report a figure for income that is useful for tax purposes, but that figure 
may well be inconsistently prepared. This makes it of  little use for tax 
purposes. Any tax base must ensure that a consistent and comparable 
capital maintenance concept is used if  the system is to be perceived as 
fair. The use of  financial accounting does not make that possible.
Thirdly, even taking the above points into consideration, there will still be 
items that can quite appropriately be included in the financial statements 
of  a corporation that are either not taxable receipts, or that are not to 
be taken into account as costs that can be offset against income for tax 
purposes. The adjustments required in this area are familiar to most 
tax practitioners, but the main ones are worth noting. For example, 
some capital gains are not considered taxable in some jurisdictions. 
Further, it is commonplace that the depreciation charges included in 
the financial statements of  almost all companies are not allowed for tax 
purposes. This is because depreciation, which is in accounting terms 
seen as a measure of  the diminution in the value of  certain assets as 
they are used over time, is too subjectively measured to form the basis 
of  a claim for an expense for tax purposes, and capital allowances are 
instead given in its place. In the course of  our research for this project, 
we surveyed how widespread this modification of  accounting estimates 
for taxation purposes was in 149 corporate tax systems in jurisdictions 
covering 98.46 per cent of  world GDP, focusing especially on developing 
countries. Whilst the degree of  modification did vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, we could find no jurisdiction that accepted unmodified 
financial accounts for tax purposes (Murphy and Sikka 2015: Section 4). 
Combine these three factors, and it is clear that financial statements are 
not readily compatible with the demands of  tax accounting, whether for 
conventional or unitary taxation. 
The focus on prediction of  future cash flows depends on a range of  
revenue recognition and valuation concepts, such as fair value, market 
value, present values, deprival values and mark-to-market models. 
The emphasis on reporting to capital markets means that profits and 
losses can be recognised simply because the market prices of  assets and 
liabilities have fluctuated, irrespective of  any actual sale. The actual or 
historical prices of  assets are not important in this model, and unrealised 
profits can be recognised in financial statements. This approach is now 
central to the accounting and financial reporting standards set by both 
the US FASB and the IFRS issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), and is in marked contrast to the requirements 
of  most tax authorities. Taxation is generally levied on realised profits, 
whereas accounting standards directed at financial markets prefer 
valuations based on anticipated profits. 
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At this most basic level the conflict between accounting for taxation 
purposes and financial reporting is already obvious. A second major 
reason for the divergence (as the fifth section evidences) is that financial 
accounting approaches to the definition of  key concepts such as 
depreciation, profits and capital are frequently considered to be too fuzzy 
for taxation purposes (Lamb 2002). Hence a more prescriptive approach 
is often adopted for taxation purposes: for example, depreciation charges 
are commonly replaced with a capital allowance for taxation purposes. 
Adjusting accounting data for tax purposes
One of  the hopes of  some, at least, of  those who have promoted unitary 
taxation has been that it may be possible to use it to overcome one 
particular aspect of  tax avoidance, which has been the arbitraging of  
differing accounting methodologies to secure a tax advantage. 
This opportunity presents itself  most clearly if  the unitary apportionment 
to be used covers the enterprise as a whole. There is very good reason 
for this: when accounts are prepared for the enterprise as a whole, only 
one accounting standard is used, and the impact of  all intra-group 
transactions should have been eliminated from the financial statements in 
the course of  the consolidation process that is a prerequisite of  preparing 
group financial statements. All the issues noted in the previous section 
still suggest that those group financial statements are not a suitable 
basis for assessing corporation tax, but the risk of  arbitrage between 
different financial reporting standards in the preparation of  the financial 
statements of  a group of  companies is reduced.
This is not the case if  unitary taxation is applied to only a part of  the 
reporting enterprise. This might happen, for example, because the 
unitary tax base was being applied to only part of  the geographic area 
in which it might operate. When this happens, as might well be the case 
(e.g. the European Union’s CCCTB would work on this basis), then two 
serious arbitrage risks remain. This can continue despite the fact that 
there has been growing adoption of  IFRS. This is because even an issue 
as important as precisely when and how to recognise revenue has been 
surprisingly neglected in those standards until recently, although an IFRS 
has recently been proposed to try to resolve this issue. Despite that, it is 
entirely possible, at least at present, for income from an intragroup source 
to be recognised outside the unitary tax base in a later period than the 
matching intragroup cost might be recognised within it. In other words, 
the opportunity for arbitrage still exists.
This risk is dramatically increased because there is at present no 
requirement that members of  a group of  companies, if  they are in 
different countries, prepare their financial statements on the basis of  
the same set of  financial reporting standards, and many might for legal 
reasons use a local standard that is entirely inconsistent with that used 
by the group as a whole. In this case the risk that there will be timing 
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mismatches within and without the unitary tax base is significant. This 
creates the very real possibility that costs will be accelerated where offset 
against income will be most tax advantageous, and that the matching 
income will be either deferred for recognition purposes in another 
location, or will simply be relocated to a place where tax might not be 
due, to secure a tax advantage. 
Many opportunities for such arbitrage exist. One has been with regard 
to the basis for stock (inventory) valuation, for which some territories, 
notably the USA, use what is called the LIFO (last in, first out) basis of  
valuation, whereas others, such as the UK and most of  Europe, used the 
FIFO (first in, first out) basis. This difference in approach can, depending 
upon rates of  inflation and inventory flows, produce significant 
distortions in the recognition of  income in reported financial statements. 
Since intragroup transfers of  inventory are commonplace within 
multinational companies, this has given rise to significant opportunity for 
accounting arbitrage undertaken with a tax motive.
What this then suggests is that there are additional issues to address 
when the relationship between accounting data and unitary taxation 
bases are considered on a regional basis. A study of  the EU’s CCCTB 
helps suggest ways in which these issues may be addressed, because it has 
recognised that these problems exist and has sought to address them in 
innovative ways. In effect, it recognises that there are two ways in which 
accounting data could be adapted for regional unitary taxation purposes. 
The first would be to adopt a ‘top down approach’, which implies 
starting from the group consolidated accounts. It would, however, be 
necessary to eliminate some companies under common control that 
are represented in the group consolidated financial statements because 
they would be operating outside the regional tax base. Unless definitive 
guidance on how to achieve this goal was given, arbitrage opportunities 
would remain, and for all the reasons previously noted considerable 
difficulties will be encountered in trying to achieve that goal.
Alternatively, a ‘bottom up’ approach might be used, resulting in a new 
aggregation or consolidation of  those entities that are within the regional 
tax base. We stress that in either case there is little likelihood that the 
tax base will directly relate to the group financial statements, whilst the 
risk of  arbitrage between accounting systems will remain between group 
companies within the regional tax base and those outside it. But, for the 
reasons we note in the next section, there appears to be much greater 
merit to this second alternative, albeit this means that in anything but 
a global unitary tax calculation the corporate taxation base will have 
to adjust reported accounting profits for many more reasons than those 
already noted in the second section.
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The CCCTB approach
The proposal being developed by the EU for a CCCTB seeks to 
harmonise the tax base on which each member state can levy taxes, 
applying unitary taxation and formulary apportionment. A review of  
the development of  the CCCTB proposal over a period of  more than 
a decade, including the revisions proposed in 2013,1 shows that it has 
recognised the need to adjust accounting profits for taxation purposes. 
Consequently, the CCCTB proposal now embodies the first attempt 
at an internationally harmonised definition of  a tax base for corporate 
income taxation. There is no room to consider all the detailed provisions 
in those proposals, whether as originally put forward or as now suggested, 
but we will bring out what we consider to be the most salient points.
The EU Commission adopted what might best be called a pragmatic 
approach to accounting data. Firstly, and wisely, they have in essence 
entirely dropped the notion of  profit as a basis of  taxation. This is the 
obvious reaction to the problems raised in the second section, above. 
Instead, the CCCTB adopts a transactional approach to defining 
corporate income, stating in Article 10 that: ‘The tax base shall be 
calculated as revenues less exempt revenues, deductible expenses and 
other deductible items’. 
This Article does not use the term profit in defining the tax base. 
However, Article 1 defines profits as: ‘an excess of  revenues over 
deductible expenses and other deductible items in a tax year’.
In effect this aggregates the individual calculations that Article 10 
requires. The resulting notion of  profit is far removed from the much 
broader accounting definition, and effectively suggests that the tax base 
is the subset of  all the accounting transactions undertaken by a company 
that may fall within the scope of  corporate taxation. 
The CCCTB is quite specific about the way in which that subset of  
transactions should be identified, stating in Article 9 that: ‘In computing 
the tax base, profits and losses shall be recognised only when realised. 
Transactions and taxable events shall be measured individually. The 
calculation of  the tax base shall be carried out in a consistent manner 
unless exceptional circumstances justify a change. The tax base shall be 
determined for each tax year unless otherwise provided. A tax year shall 
be any twelve-month period, unless otherwise provided’.
Based on these three provisions, a clear accounting framework can 
be seen to be inherent in the CCCTB. Its key characteristic is that it 
is transactionally based, hence the emphasis upon revenues less costs. 
Defining net taxable income in this way also makes clear where the 
focus of  this accounting framework lies: revenue recognition is its core 
objective. This puts it in marked contrast to the prevailing financial 
accounting norms promoted by the FASB and the IFRS, both of  which 
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(as we discussed above) are heavily focussed on the fair valuation of  
the assets and liabilities of  the entity from the viewpoint of  the capital 
markets, which makes balance sheet valuation their core objective.
Placing revenue recognition on a prudent and consistent basis also 
contrasts this CCCTB accounting framework with most prevailing 
accounting norms. These have, for example, imprudently demanded that 
losses be recognised on a realised and not anticipated basis until reform 
of  this issue was forced onto the agenda in 2014. 
The CCCTB also removes any choice of  capital maintenance concept: 
its adoption of  a realised profit approach to the recognition of  income 
makes clear that the preservation of  historical financial capital is its core 
capital maintenance concept. This is, of  course, consistent with the long-
term prevailing philosophy of  most tax systems, that tax should only be 
paid when cash to facilitate that payment has been realised. 
The adoption of  an accounting philosophy that is so far removed from 
that promoted by many international and national financial reporting 
standards boards means that the EU Commission had to propose that 
the CCCTB use an unexpected approach to the aggregation of  profits 
to form a unitary taxation base. In this context the term aggregation 
is appropriate, because what the Commission suggested was that each 
company to be included in that unitary taxation base should have 
its own accounting profits adjusted in accordance with the rules laid 
down by the CCCTB, and it is the resulting adjusted income that 
should be aggregated to provide the EU-wide tax base that will then be 
apportioned to individual member states for taxation purposes.
It should be stressed that this is not, in accounting terms, a consolidation, 
despite that term being used to describe this tax base in the Commission’s 
CCCTB proposal. An accounting consolidation involves the preparation 
of  a single set of  financial statements covering the consolidated entities 
with all accounting transactions with third parties, and assets owned 
and liabilities owing to such third parties, each being stated as single 
numbers within that consolidated financial report, all being adjusted to 
ensure that they are stated in accordance with a single set of  financial 
reporting standards. So, for example, a single and internally consistently 
prepared figure for turnover, cost of  sales, interest paid, tangible assets, 
inventory and trade receivables and payables will all be given in such a 
statement. This is not what will be produced as a result of  the CCCTB 
aggregation process. 
In that process, the starting point would be accounts prepared under 
potentially quite disparate accounting standards, for reasons already 
noted above. No attempt is made to adjust for these different bases: the 
source data is accepted as stated, even if  that basis of  preparation is 
potentially inconsistent. 
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What then happens is that all transactions undertaken and reflected 
in the separate income statements with other related companies to 
be included in the CCCTB aggregation would be removed from the 
accounts, whether as revenue or as an expense. It is obviously true 
that if  inconsistencies are apparent in this process, they will have to be 
addressed. The CCCTB proposal was not clear as yet on how this might 
be done.
Finally, the remaining subset of  transactions left for each individual 
entity would be adjusted in accordance with the CCCTB rules to 
provide an adjusted net income figure that is then aggregated with the 
similarly adjusted figures for all other such entities to be included in the 
unitary tax base – even though each such dataset potentially started 
from accounts prepared on the basis of  different, and so inconsistent, 
financial reporting standards. For this reason it might best be said that 
technically the CCCTB is not a charge on consolidated profits at all, but 
on aggregated adjusted realised taxable net income. 
Issues arising from the CCCTB approach to profit aggregation
The CCCTB approach to profit aggregation raises some technical issues 
that are worthy of  consideration in the context of  developing countries 
and their potential use of  unitary taxation, whether on an individual 
(federal) state basis, or within a defined region with a number of  
jurisdictions.
First, and importantly, the CCCTB proposal was based on taxation 
principles such as consistency, the taxation of  realised profits and 
prudence, which have long been familiar to tax accountants and tax 
authorities, and which are also popular with taxpayers, because they 
are seen as the basis for fair corporate taxation. In terms of  political 
acceptability this is significant.
Secondly, by rejecting many of  the profit concepts inherent in modern 
financial reporting standards, and by reverting instead to a transactional 
basis for assessing what might best be called realised net income, the 
CCCTB proposal simply walked around many of  the conceptual 
issues and accounting difficulties that cause so many problems when 
adjusting profits for taxation purposes. This is not to say that problems 
with regard to income recognition on complex financial transactions, 
such as derivatives and hedging, cease to exist in this model of  taxation. 
However, it allows such transactions to, in effect, be siloed, based on the 
idea that each transaction is technically taxable on a net basis in its own 
right, depending firstly upon it being within the scope of  taxation, and 
secondly upon the existence of  allowable offset expenses. This means 
that each such problem area can then be put into separate and distinct 
categories, where the issues that they give rise to can be treated in 
isolation rather than as a subdivision of  a whole. 
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This transactional approach is likely to be pragmatically significant, 
because it suggests that agreement could be achieved on the creation 
of  a harmonised unitary taxation base for a very broad range of  
transactions; those that might present difficulty might be separated for 
consideration at some future point. This could facilitate an alternative 
basis for apportionment (e.g. a residual profit split basis), to be used as 
a compromise even prior to the introduction of  a full unitary taxation 
system. In this way, a pathway towards agreement on a broadly based, 
even if  incomplete, unitary taxation base may be possible without 
requiring unanimity on all points.
Thirdly, and perhaps surprisingly, the aggregation process, whilst 
inevitably a compromise, may not be as intellectually incoherent as it 
might first appear. This is precisely because the CCCTB does not aim 
to create a coherent set of  financial statements based upon a unified 
set of  financial reporting standards. There is, instead, the objective of  
creating a reported aggregate of  the subset of  transactions that give rise 
to taxable revenues and tax allowable costs that take place within the 
financial reporting environment of  the various entities that make up the 
unitary group as a whole. In that case many of  the areas where subjective 
accounting difficulties arise, for example with regard to many disputed 
aspects of  valuation, will simply fall out of  consideration because there is 
no attempt to prepare a balance sheet. In addition, in a great many cases 
the resulting interactions with the income statement that might arise from 
these valuations will either fall into the category of  unrealised income or 
expense, and so not be within the subset of  transactions considered for 
the purposes of  CCCTB tax base estimation, or may well be eliminated 
on aggregation. This is, again, not to say that there are no remaining 
issues, but it is necessary to put them into their true perspective.
This is also the case with regard to the use of  differing accounting bases 
within a single aggregation. In principle this makes no sense, until it is 
realised that the risk of  causing tax distortion is small if  steps are taken to 
ensure that both sides of  any transaction undertaken to take advantage 
of  any differences in approach are eliminated from the subset of  
transactions making up the tax base within the same period. This might 
suggest that in some key areas a general, or even targeted, anti-avoidance 
principle specifically addressing this issue, with significant penalties 
attached, may be necessary. 
What is in fact created by this process, if  such precautionary measures 
are taken, is a subset of  transactions representing taxable income and 
expenditure, with significantly lower scope for dispute as to their status 
for tax purposes than in the financial statements as a whole. This, of  
course, does not obviate the need for guidance with regard to issues 
such as income recognition, allowable expenditure, the treatment of  
capital expenditure and intangible assets. What we are suggesting is that 
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the number of  occasions where this guidance will be needed is reduced 
in the case of  a system like the CCCTB, because of  the income and 
expense recognition bases adopted. 
A way forward
It seems then that, despite the frequent pessimistic assertions that the 
CCCTB initiative is floundering, some significant progress was made 
on its technical foundations. As explained in other chapters in this 
book, unitary taxation has very obvious merit in tackling some of  the 
inherent weaknesses within the existing international corporate taxation 
architecture, and yet many obstacles are put in the way of  its adoption. 
In no small part this is because of  the desire of  politicians to retain what 
they perceive to be sovereignty over their own taxation systems. 
Their perception of  the degree of  sovereignty they have on this issue 
may be misplaced: it is impossible for them to control three variables at 
the same time. These three variables are accounting profit, the tax base 
and the tax rate. As a matter of  fact, at least one of  these must be fixed 
to have any chance of  control over the others. Whilst this perception of  
lost sovereignty over what are considered to be key issues of  tax policy 
as a result of  the use of  unitary taxation persists, there is little chance of  
progress toward the goal of  its implementation. This issue can, however, 
we think, be overcome.
We suggest that there is, in fact, a wide range of  transactions where 
agreement on what is and what is not a taxable revenue and allowable 
expense might be very easily agreed upon by many countries. The vast 
majority, though not all, of  these may well arise before the estimation of  
what is called EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation 
and amortisation), a calculation that firms generally make and publish. 
At this level, we think that definition of  accounting profit as adjusted 
for tax purposes should not be unduly difficult. To put this another way, 
most disagreements in defining the tax base arise when addressing issues 
such as what allowance should replace depreciation, how interest and 
other financial income is recognised for tax purposes, what interest can 
be offset against taxable profits, and other similar issues, almost all of  
which do, however, happen to be recorded below the point in the income 
statement where EBITDA is reported.
As an example, the accounting entry for depreciation in financial 
statements is almost always removed from consideration for taxation 
purposes, but what is put in its place can vary between countries. The 
CCCTB seeks to overcome this problem by the adoption of  straight-line 
depreciation based on very rigid rules, but many countries would have 
great difficulty with that because they use their capital allowance system 
as a way of  incentivising the location of  capital-intensive industry in their 
jurisdiction. There is, then, an inherent conflict between the adoption 
of  a harmonised unitary taxation base, and the desire of  countries to 
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offer incentives for actual expenditure on physical assets within their 
jurisdiction. Agreement on a unitary taxation base would be much 
easier if  the apportioned tax base excluded depreciation charges, while 
leaving it open for each country to decide on its own replacement capital 
allowances.
The same may also be true with regards to, for example, interest 
expenditure. This is, again, an area where international tax competition 
occurs. Intra-group finance income and expense within the unitary tax 
base would, of  course, be taken out of  consideration in any unitary 
tax computation (as would all intra-group transactions), but this does 
not mean that problems with regard to the payment of  third-party 
interest, or of  payments of  interest to members of  the group located in 
jurisdictions beyond the unitary taxation base, are avoided in any unitary 
taxation system. Our suggestion is that under a unitary taxation system, 
whether it be global or in a limited geographic area, the profit to be 
apportioned should be stated before any interest charge, and that the 
extent to which any interest deduction is allowed in any jurisdiction for 
offset against the profits apportioned to it should be a matter for it alone 
to decide in the first instance, taking international recommendations 
that now exist into account if  it so wishes. We make this suggestion with 
the deliberate intention of  removing disputes on issues such as thin 
capitalisation from unitary taxation negotiations when such discussions 
first take place, with the sole purpose of  making it easier to achieve some 
agreement. We suggest that issues such as interest deduction and capital 
allowances are left as issues to resolve, once experience of  the system’s 
use in other areas has been established. 
We suggest that this approach to aggregation offers a workable starting 
point for agreement, and that the practicalities involved in achieving 
this goal might be regulated by what we would call ‘Tax Reporting 
Standards’. It is our suggestion that such standards would make clear 
how a unitary profit for apportionment might be defined. We think 
that this would be most easily achieved if  this common aggregated tax 
base broadly approximated to the EBITDA earned by the group of  
companies, for the reasons noted in the preceding paragraphs. 
We are not, of  course, at this juncture suggesting that we have solved 
the problem of  defining a unitary taxation base, or that the approach we 
recommend is ideal. Instead what we propose is a pragmatic step on the 
way to a unitary taxation base. But, in conjunction with the work that is 
reflected in other chapters in this book, involving proposals that appear 
inherently sound as a basis for resolving many of  the current issues 
within international corporate taxation, what we are suggesting embraces 
three important issues.
Firstly, we suggest that further work should be done to create Tax 
Reporting Standards that can provide a consistent, coherent and widely 
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agreed basis for determining an aggregated unitary taxation base. 
These could be used by a wide range of  jurisdictions covering the vast 
majority of  transactions, and the major part of  the income of  many 
unitary groups where dispute as to the nature of  taxable revenues and 
deductible expenses may be quite limited. In our view, this is possible if  a 
transactional basis for tax base calculation is adopted.
Secondly, we believe that this approach to accounting opens up a 
pragmatic basis for the negotiation of  a unitary taxation base that could 
be implemented in stages, and that politically this might represent a 
significant contribution to debate.
Lastly, and importantly, we think that this process would greatly help to 
eliminate many potential areas of  transfer pricing abuse, many aspects of  
the impact of  accounting arbitrage, and therefore much of  the potential 
for profit shifting, while avoiding the political objections to an overly 
prescriptive and dogmatic approach to the entire taxation base. 
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Notes
1. This discussion is mainly of the European Commission’s proposal tabled 
in 2011 (COM(2011) 121/4), which was approved by the parliament 
in March 2012 with some amendments that are not relevant to the 
concerns in this paper. The text was then subject to close technical 
evaluation in the EU Council through its Working Party on Tax 
Questions, which produced a series of revised ‘compromise proposals’, 
some of which significantly changed the Commission’s version. These 
are not discussed here. The Commission is expected to relaunch the 
proposal with a new text in November 2016.
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Lessons for International Tax Reform 
from the US State Experience under 
Formulary Apportionment
Kimberly Clausing
This chapter condenses findings from my recent research, which 
investigates the experience of US states in taxing corporate income 
under formulary apportionment (Clausing 2014, 2016a). This enquiry 
is, of course, relevant to both policymakers in US states and those 
policymakers in other sub-national jurisdictions that presently employ 
formulary apportionment. In addition, there are important lessons for 
possible formulary approaches to taxing the international income of 
multinational firms.
My work considers two essential questions: (1) How does formulary 
apportionment of corporate income affect the location of economic activity 
across US state borders?; and (2) How does formulary apportionment affect 
US state corporate tax revenue?
This short chapter will summarise that work. In the first section, I will 
provide background on the rationale for formulary apportionment. 
Second, I will discuss whether the US state experience is relevant to the 
international arena. In the third and fourth sections, I will discuss the 
research strategy of my work and summarise the main results of the paper. 
Finally, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of drawing lessons 
from the US state experience for international tax reform.
Why formulary apportionment?
In the United States there are many critics – and few, if  any, defenders 
– of  the present system of  taxing multinational corporations. Critics 
note that the system collects less revenue as a share of  GDP than that 
collected by peer nations, despite a relatively high statutory tax rate. The 
system is known for being absurdly complex, and transfer pricing rules 
are notoriously difficult to comply with, administer and enforce. 
Similar dissatisfaction occurs in many countries, set within an 
environment where multinational firms have become increasingly 
adept at shifting their income to low-tax destinations, and even creating 
income that is taxed nowhere. Concerns regarding income shifting and 
corporate tax base erosion have led to prominent hearings in the US 
Congress and the UK Parliament, and the issue has been given priority 
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in recent G8 and G20 meetings. The OECD’s project on base erosion 
and profit shifting, and the IMF’s policy paper on Corporate Tax Spillovers 
(IMF 2014), are also responding to these concerns. 
The present system relies on ‘separate accounting’, and this has both 
conceptual and practical limitations. Conceptually separate accounting 
is nonsensical, since it asks integrated firms to account for their costs, 
revenue and profits as if  they were operating at ‘arms-length’, when 
the very reason that the integration occurred is because the profits 
are likely greater than they would be if  the entity were separate firms. 
This generates a residual profit due to the corporations’ synergies, or 
internalisation advantages. Where should these extra profits be assigned? 
There is no clear conceptual basis for a precise answer to this question.
As a practical matter, the separate accounting framework provides 
ample opportunity for income shifting from high-tax to low-tax 
countries, draining revenue from high-tax countries and distorting the 
organisation of  economic activity. These income-shifting incentives are 
well-documented in an extensive literature; see, for example, reviews 
by De Mooij (2005) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2008). Indeed, 
multinational firms have become especially adept in recent years at 
generating ‘stateless income’, which is not taxed by any jurisdiction; this 
problem is described in detail in Kleinbard (2011b).
My own recent work in Clausing (2016b) suggests that, by 2012, profit 
shifting reduced US corporate tax revenue by $77 billion to $111 billion, 
and revenue costs likely exceed $100 billion at present. Revenue costs 
due to profit shifting in other countries without low tax rates are also 
high, likely exceeding $300 billion at present. Other researchers have 
found similar magnitudes, including OECD (2015a Action 11), Crivelli 
et al. (2015), Keightley and Stupak (2015), Dowd, Landefeld and Moore 
(2014), and Zucman (2014, 2015). 
For example, in 2011 US Bureau of  Economic Analysis data on US-
headquartered multinational corporations indicates that 48 per cent 
of  all gross income of  US affiliates abroad was booked in just seven 
tax havens. Figure 6.1 shows the ten countries with the largest share 
of  foreign income; all but three of  these countries (UK, Canada and 
Australia) are havens with effective tax rates on US affiliates under 
6.5 per cent. This data indicates a large and continuing problem. 
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Figure 6.1 Top ten income countries, by share of total gross income, 2011
 
Data is from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Financial and Operating Data for US 
Multinational Companies. Available at: www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop.htm.
These problems make formulary apportionment an appealing solution. 
In particular, multinational corporations would no longer be asked to 
separately account for their income and expenses in each jurisdiction; 
instead, they would determine their worldwide profit, and then profits 
would be apportioned to national jurisdictions by formula.
For example, if  a multinational company earned $10 billion worldwide, 
and 30 per cent of  its economic activity (measured by the factors in 
the formula) occurred in the United States, the US tax base would be 
$3 billion. While there are legal and accounting issues surrounding the 
definition of  a consolidated business and the measurement of  the factors 
in the formula, a formulary solution still has the potential to be a vast 
simplification, while dramatically reducing income shifting.1
Indeed, this logic is what led US states to first adopt formulary 
apportionment for assigning US income to individual states. While 
corporate income tax arose in the early twentieth century, it was not 
until the middle of  the twentieth century that states turned to formulary 
apportionment, in large part due to the impracticality of  separately 
accounting for income and expenses when businesses are substantially 
integrated across US states (see Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1998) for a 
detailed history). Formulary apportionment is also used by other sub-
national jurisdictions, including Canadian provinces and Swiss cantons, 
and is under discussion by the European Union in the proposals for a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), as discussed in 
Chapter 10 by Siu and others in this collection.
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It should also be remembered that separate accounting and formulary 
apportionment are intellectual ideals on a spectrum of  profit allocation 
methods. There are aspects of  commonly-used transfer pricing practices 
that have formulary elements, and there are possible hybrid options 
like formulary profit splits. Thus, one can also learn useful things 
about tendencies under each end of  the spectrum that inform possible 
in-between proposals, as pointed out by Durst and Picciotto in their 
chapters in this collection. 
Finally, one possible confusion should be cleared up immediately. 
While a formulary approach acts as an implicit tax on the factors in the 
formula for profitable firms, it is not equivalent to a tax on the factors in the 
formula, typically assets, payroll or sales, as sometimes alleged. Why not? 
The essential difference is that the tax is proportionate to corporations’ 
worldwide profits, net of  deductible expenses. Thus, if  a corporation 
does not earn profits it will not incur tax liability, no matter how large its 
sales, assets or employment.
Similarly, there are no cascading effects with the sales factor, as 
there might be with a sales tax. If  a firm has a number of  steps in its 
production process, that will generate tax liabilities based on the profits 
due to each step of  the production process. Thus, a vertical consolidation 
of  a firm will not affect the resulting tax liability beyond the effect 
of  the different profit apportionment due to the location of  the final 
products’ sales.2
In sum, formulary apportionment provides a promising way to tax 
multijurisdictional firms when businesses are integrated across borders. 
It eliminates most options for income shifting, and bases tax liabilities on 
plausible measures of  economic activity and overall profits. Depending 
on the details, there is the potential for administrative and compliance 
costs to be far lower than under the present system. While there are legal 
and accounting issues to be worked out, some of  which are addressed in 
this collection, formulary solutions seem promising in many respects.
The rest of  this chapter considers two important issues that are essential 
for understanding the economic consequences of  formula apportionment. 
First, how does economic activity respond to the tax incentives under 
formulary apportionment? Second, how does formulary apportionment 
of  corporate income affect government revenue in jurisdictions? 
These are two essential questions that are frequently on the minds of  
policymakers as well as academic observers, and thus it is useful to 
examine the lessons from the US state experience.
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Are there useful lessons from US states?
US states have a long experience with formulary apportionment, which 
they adopted in the middle of  the twentieth century to help address 
the impracticality of  taxing corporations that operate in an integrated 
fashion across US states. At first, most states used a three-factor formula 
that equally weighted sales, payroll and assets. Thus, a state’s tax base 
would be their total income3 times the weighted average of  the shares 
of  sales, assets and payroll in a particular state. For example, if  a 
corporation had 20 per cent of  its sales in Massachusetts, and 50 per 
cent of  its payroll and assets in Massachusetts, then 40 per cent of  its 
total income would be taxable in Massachusetts under an equal-weighted 
formula (20+50+50 divided by 3). 
Over time, many states decided to increase the weight on the sales factor. 
These decisions often resulted from business lobbying by corporations 
with large local production, as states feared that businesses might move 
production elsewhere. For example, if  Massachusetts were to shift their 
formula to a ‘single-sales’ formula (with a 100 per cent weight on sales), 
then the corporation in the example above would have 20 per cent of  
its US income taxable in Massachusetts, lowering its Massachusetts tax 
burden substantially.
In theory, if  all states increased their sales factors and if  all sales 
generated taxable income, overall tax burdens for multi-state firms would 
be unchanged by these formula changes. In the above case, for example, 
sales in other states would simply generate more tax liabilities there, and, 
overall, states can be expected to consume in line with their production 
(if  we ignore interstate borrowing). However, two considerations prevent 
this outcome. First, not all states choose the same formula. Second, 
corporations do not have a taxable presence in all states where they 
have sales. Hence, it is important that apportionment based on sales be 
accompanied by rules that reapportion income that would otherwise 
go untaxed. (Throwback rules, one such solution, are discussed further 
below, and in Chapter 10). 
Figure 6.2 shows the evolution of  state formulas in recent years, and it 
demonstrates a dramatic evolution away from equal-weighted formulas 
and towards formulas with heavier weights on the sales factor.
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Figure 6.2 Share of states using different formulas
 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of states with a 1/3 weight on sales (equal-weighted formula 
with sales, assets and payroll), with heavier weights on sales (between equal and single), and with 
single-factor sales formulas. Data on formulas was compiled from various sources, including 
Multistate Corporate Tax Almanac (1986-1989), Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 
(1990-1994), Multistate Corporate Tax Guide (1995-2000), Commerce Clearing House State 
Tax Handbook (2001-2008), and Commerce Clearing House Master Multistate Corporate Tax 
Guide (2009-2013).
This evolution of  formulas shows that state policymakers are not immune 
from tax-competition pressures under formulary apportionment. They 
are prone to increase sales factor weights, and they often change other 
features of  the corporate tax base in ways that are advantageous to 
corporate taxpayers. For example, some states allow choice about the 
formula weights, or whether firms use combined reporting.
However, some states also take steps to protect their corporate tax base. 
Many states require combined reporting, limit elective choice, and 
implement throwback rules. A throwback rule will tax income that is not 
taxed in other states.
While US states provide a host of  relevant evidence regarding taxing 
corporate income under formulary apportionment, there are also 
several caveats to bear in mind. First, tax considerations may affect 
location decisions less in the United States, since US states have lower 
tax rates than most countries. For the time period analysed in this study, 
the state corporate tax rate averaged 7 per cent. This is an important 
consideration, since one would expect a greater responsiveness to 
taxation at higher tax rates. Tax-motivated behavioural changes are 
more likely with larger potential tax savings. Second, and also important, 
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US states operate within a common federal system. This helps solve 
issues regarding the tax base definition, since most states begin with the 
federal tax base as a starting point. 
On the other hand, tax competition pressures among US states within a 
common country are likely more fierce than tax competition pressures across 
countries. For example, it is much easier to move factories and production 
processes across state lines than across international borders. Also, 
product price competition is more intense due to a common currency 
and greater flows of  information. These considerations suggest that 
behavioural responses to tax differences might be enhanced in the sub-
national context.
How does formulary apportionment affect the location of 
formula factors?
Prior studies on this question have found some tax effects on the location 
of  formula factors. These studies include Goolsbee and Mayhew (2000), 
examining employment responses between 1978 and 1994, Gupta and 
Hoffman (2003), examining capital expenditure responses between 
1983 and 1996, and Klassen and Shackelford (1998), examining sales 
responses between 1983 and 1991. Goolsbee and Mayhew (2000) find 
employment responses that they describe as beggar-thy-neighbour, since 
states that increase sales factor weights gain employment at other states’ 
expense. Gupta and Hoffman (2003) find small capital expenditure 
responses in their full model, and Klassen and Shackelford (1998) find 
some sales response for throwback states, although they are only able to 
utilise cross-section analysis.
The research strategy of  the present work is to consider all three types 
of  response, extending the sample period to the years 1986 to 2012, 
16-21 years more than the prior studies. This focus on a longer period 
is essential to capture a great deal of  policy experimentation, as well 
as the longer run effects of  changing policies in the context of  other 
state actions. For example, ‘first-mover’ states may experience different 
economic consequences from heavy sales weights in their formulas than 
do states that change their policies later.
In this analysis, tax policy choices regarding formula weights, tax rates 
and other policy rules are analysed in the context of  a full set of  controls. 
My empirical strategy employs panel data techniques that include state 
fixed effects, not always included in prior research. This allows each 
state to have a different base level of  economic activity. State-level fixed 
effects are particularly important, since one would not want to attribute 
economic consequences to corporate tax policy changes that happen 
to be correlated with other special features of  a state. For example, if  a 
state is particularly business-friendly, and that is correlated with a higher 
sales weight in the formula, one would risk overestimating the effect of  
formula changes, absent state-level fixed effects.
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I also include a full set of  controls for the economic structure of  the state 
and the state’s macroeconomy, including variables measuring state-level 
economic growth, unemployment, workforce educational attainment, 
demographic variables and other controls.
All results are described in detail in the full research paper and are 
merely summarised here. The most noteworthy result is that all three 
measures of  economic activity (employment, investment and sales) show 
very little responsiveness to tax burdens. Indeed, tax burdens do not 
have statistically significant effects on levels of  economic activity in most 
specifications. Tax burdens are measured as the multiple of  the corporate 
tax rate and the factor weight in the formula. For example, a state with 
a 10 per cent tax rate and a 50 per cent weight on sales in the formula 
would show a tax burden on sales of  5 per cent. Many robustness checks 
are considered, but all the most ideal specifications show no negative and 
statistically significant relationships between tax burdens and economic 
activity.4 The full implications of  these results are discussed below.
How does formulary apportionment affect state corporate 
tax revenue?
The full research paper also presents an empirical analysis of  the 
determinants of  state government corporate tax revenue as a share of  
Gross State Product (GSP), again controlling for state-level fixed effects 
as well as other control variables. Policy choices have important effects on 
revenue. Tax rates are positively and statistically significantly associated 
with revenue in all specifications. A tax rate one percentage point higher 
is typically associated with a share of  corporate tax revenue in GSP that 
is about 5 per cent higher.
Higher sales weights typically lower revenue. Typical results imply that 
moving from an equal-weighted formula to one that double-weights 
sales will be associated with a share of  corporate tax revenue in GSP 
that is about 2.5 per cent lower. This result suggests that the lost revenue 
from taxing corporations that are producing in a state but selling their 
products out-of-state are not compensated for by increased revenue 
from corporations that are selling in the state. This finding likely results 
from the fact that many corporations selling in a particular state lack a 
taxable presence, and thus cannot be subjected to the state’s corporate 
tax. Otherwise, in theory, if  a state consumes roughly in line with its 
production, its revenue should not be adversely affected by a higher 
sales weight. 
Findings also suggest that US states with throwback rules have higher 
revenues, but the effects of  many other tax policy variables are not 
estimated precisely. The important revenue results in this analysis are 
consistent with those in the prior literature that used earlier data sets, 
most notably Gupta, Moore, Gramlich and Hoffman (2009).
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Discussion and policy implications 
This analysis studies a time of  frequent policy changes, 1986 to 2012. 
Eight per cent of  the data observations show an increase in the sales 
weight of  the formula, and 3 per cent of  the observations show a 
substantial change in the corporate tax rate, providing a useful set of  
policy experiences for study.
It is also a period of  increasing corporate profits and decreasing 
corporate tax revenue across US states. Figure 6.3 shows corporate 
profits as a share of  GDP for the US as a whole (left axis, solid line), as 
well as US state and local corporate tax revenues relative to GDP (right 
axis, dashed line). Over the past quarter century, corporate profits have 
increased by over five percentage points of  GDP; though they fluctuate 
with the macroeconomy, there is a clear upward trend. State and local 
corporate tax revenues also fluctuate with the state of  the economy, but 
there is a detectable downward trend over this time period.
Figure 6.3 Corporate profits and state corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP
Note: Data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as reported in the 2013 Economic 
Report of the President. 2012 data is preliminary; revenue data for 2012 is from the BEA and the 
Office of Management and Budget.
During this time period, there also may be changes in the dynamics of  
tax competition. States that were early adopters of  higher sales weights 
may have gained employment at the expense of  other states, as shown in 
Goolsbee and Mayhew (2000). Indeed, if  I restrict my sample to the early 
years of  my data, I find results that are more consistent with this finding. 
However, over the longer time period the tax sensitivity of  formula 
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factors fades, and states that increase their sales weights do not attract 
additional economic activity. Instead, they merely lose revenue. 
This changing tax competition dynamic is intuitively appealing; states 
that increased sales weights early on may attract disproportionate 
economic activity in comparison with, for example, the thirtieth state to 
undertake such a policy change; this raises the ‘bang for the buck’ for 
early adopters.
This analysis suggests some cautious lessons for international tax 
reform. First, while there are concerns that the choice of  formula 
factors in apportioning the tax base will affect corporate investment and 
employment, economic activity does not appear to be sensitive to tax 
burdens under formulary apportionment, as long as the analysis controls 
for other considerations that may also affect economic activity. This 
is encouraging, and it is also consistent with a long literature in public 
finance that emphasises a hierarchy of  behavioural response to taxation: 
timing and financial responses are generally much larger than real 
behavioural responses.5
However, one should be cautious in noting that the US state experience 
may not translate into the international arena. Nevertheless, there are 
counter-balancing aspects of  this problem. On the one hand, US state 
tax rates are much lower than those commonly found at the international 
level, which implies that tax responses may be larger at an international 
level. On the other hand, tax competition is likely more fierce within 
countries than between countries, due to easier goods and factor mobility. 
This consideration implies that tax responses may be more muted at an 
international level.
In addition, the experience with corporate tax revenue under formulary 
apportionment provides some cautionary lessons for corporate tax base 
protection. Under formulary apportionment, states will have at least a 
short-run incentive to engage in tax competition with other states by 
changing formulas and other rules. These considerations, like much else 
in tax policy, suggests that the details of  implementation are important. 
If  a degree of  international agreement can be reached on the formula 
and elements of  the tax base, that would ease tax competition pressures. 
Of  course, formula harmonisation would also reduce the possibility of  
double taxation or double non-taxation due to disparate formulas.6 
While formulary apportionment is a long way from international 
adoption, there are still important lessons to be learned from US states 
regarding how best to implement formulary apportionment in both tax 
systems that already use formulary methods, and in any possible future 
tax systems. These lessons can also inform understanding of  possible 
hybrid solutions that rely on methods for profit allocation that have 
formulary elements. 
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Notes
1. See Durst (2013e, 2014a) and Chapters 5 and 10 in this collection for 
discussion of these issues. Mintz and Smart (2004) provide evidence 
on reduced income shifting under formulary apportionment in Canada. 
For a more detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages 
of formulary apportionment at an international level, see Avi-Yonah 
and Clausing (2008). One particularly vexing issue is the possible 
requirements of treaty modification, which are discussed in work by 
Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2010) and in Avi-Yonah’s chapter in this 
collection.
2. As an example, imagine a computer chip manufacturer earns $100 
million in profit selling to a downstream computer company that 
operates in two countries, a low tax country (with a 10% tax) and the US 
(with a 35% tax). The computer manufacturer also earns $100 million in 
profit selling to customers in the US (35%) and a medium-tax country 
(20%). If the two firms integrate, the sales from the chip manufacturer 
to the computer manufacturer would be disregarded, but there would 
still be $200 million in profit. The only change would be that the sales 
weights would change to be based on the computer manufacturer’s 
customers, which (in this simple example) would raise the tax burden 
on the $50 million of the chip-maker’s profits that would have been 
attributed to the low-tax country from 10% to 20%.
3. Some states later extended this beyond the US to worldwide income, 
leading to the international controversy in the 1970s discussed in 
Chapter 10.
4. For reasons previously discussed, it is important to include state (fixed) 
effects; econometric testing also shows that this is the appropriate 
specification. However, if state effects are nonetheless excluded, or if 
very simplistic specifications are used, some results indicate negative 
effects of tax burdens on economic activity. All results are discussed in 
more detail in the full research paper.
5. Slemrod and Bakija (2008), Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), and Saez, 
Slemrod and Giertz (2012) summarise a vast body of research on 
taxation that suggests this hierarchy of behavioural response.
6.  Although, as Michael Durst points out in his chapter in this collection, 
such concerns may be exaggerated.
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Key Findings from Global Analyses of 
Multinational Profit Misalignment
Alex Cobham, Petr Janský and Simon Loretz1 
Summary
This chapter draws on our two studies published by the International Centre 
for Tax and Development (ICTD), using the two leading datasets on the 
global activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The approaches are 
complementary but necessarily distinct, given the difference in available 
data. We summarise the approaches taken, and the specific findings that 
emerge from each, and then highlight three major common results. First, 
notwithstanding uncertainty and data issues, this is a first-order problem 
in relation to the world economy. Second, the overall effect of a switch to 
unitary taxation, almost regardless of the actual apportionment formulas 
used, would be a substantial redistribution from MNEs towards most 
countries of the world. Only a handful of jurisdictions would see significant 
revenue losses, and these are far outweighed by the gains of all others. 
Third, there are significant differences in the extent of redistribution implied 
by a global apportionment approach relying on different factors – with 
corresponding implications for the development impact of given global 
choices, and/or for unilateral decisions at regional and national level. Overall, 
the findings confirm the critical importance of improving the available data. 
In doing so, they underline the failure of the OECD base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) process to deliver on commitments in this area, but also 
highlight the potential of using the newly-required country-by-country 
reporting data of MNEs. A specific proposal for a data registry is 
put forward.
Introduction
With the political support of  the G8 and G20 groups of  countries, the 
OECD launched its BEPS initiative in 2013, with the specific single 
aim of  reforming international corporate tax rules so that they ‘better 
align rights to tax with economic activity’ (OECD 2013: 11). The BEPS 
process reflected particular political pressures that arose after the 2008 
financial crisis, both from public anger about perceived corporate tax 
avoidance, and from policymaker concern over tax revenue. 
In addition, as this volume explores in detail, there are longstanding 
criticisms of  the international rules for corporate taxation that date back 
to their inception in the inter-war years (Picciotto 2013). Conceptually, 
the major criticism is that the ‘separate accounting’ approach flaunts 
Chapter 7
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basic economics by treating individual companies within a multinational 
group as if  they were distinct, profit-maximising entities. Practically, the 
major concern is that a serious misalignment may have emerged between 
the locations of  multinational groups’ economic activity, and that of  their 
declared profits. 
The BEPS Action Plan, as delivered in late 2015, has been roundly 
criticised. Many areas of  potential progress appear to have stalled 
due to the resistance of  individual OECD members. For example, the 
UK’s defence of  the ‘patent box’ has led to the mechanism’s effective 
codification, and widespread adoption by other states, rather than its 
elimination. In addition, there has been broad criticism of  the minimal 
inclusion of  developing country views (even of  those inside the G20, 
which provided the OECD with its mandate). One element of  this has 
been the perceived failure to consider more radical alternatives to arm’s 
length pricing approaches, including those based on a unitary approach. 
A fundamental but less widely recognised concern relates to BEPS 
Action 11. This committed the OECD to establishing baseline findings 
for the extent of  profit misalignment, in order to understand the scale of  
the problem and to be able to track the progress of  the BEPS initiative 
over time (OECD 2014d). It proved impossible, despite the efforts of  
those involved, to obtain sufficient data to produce such a baseline. The 
outcome document indicates a desire and expectation of  being able to 
work with member governments to access data in future. Commentary 
from the professional services firm PwC suggests a lack of  confidence 
(emphasis added): ‘It appears to us, from action 11 of  the BEPS Action 
Plan, that the OECD has not yet given up on continued economic analysis 
of  existing data to determine the scale of  BEPS’. 
The obstacle that faced the BEPS 11 team was the successful MNE 
lobbying in Action 13 (on transfer pricing documentation), against the 
publication of  country-by-country reporting data. The new OECD 
standard, the result of  long-term advocacy and campaigning based on 
the Tax Justice Network’s proposal (Murphy 2003), requires MNEs to 
provide tax authorities with data on the economic activity, profits made 
and tax paid in each jurisdiction where they operate. By design, the 
resulting dataset, if  collated globally, would track precisely the scale and 
nature of  misalignment between profit and real activity. 
At present, such collation – even with confidentiality safeguards by or 
for the OECD – is not planned. Nor has the OECD been able to bring 
together equivalent partial data from member states. The result is that 
the BEPS process lacks any internal baseline against which to monitor 
progress – and so there can be no clear accountability. 
In this context, the work of  external researchers on the scale of  profit 
misalignment takes on greater importance. This research may provide 
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the lacking BEPS baseline – albeit on the basis of  inevitably imperfect 
data. In addition, the results provide an indication of  the potential 
impact of  adopting unitary approaches, using formulary apportionment 
to curtail, if  not to eliminate outright, specific dimensions of  profit 
misalignment. Our own research has used the two main data sources that 
are publicly available in order to address these questions. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section sets out the data, 
approach and some specific findings of  Cobham and Loretz (2014), 
and the following section does the same for Cobham and Janský (2015). 
We then highlight the key findings from the two papers, drawing also 
on related literature to establish the broad state of  knowledge of  global 
patterns of  profit misalignment, before concluding with a brief  discussion 
of  policy opportunities and research horizons.
Results with balance sheet data
In the first study (Cobham and Loretz 2014), we used the leading 
global balance sheet database, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), to assess the 
misalignment between profits and location of  activity, and simultaneously 
to consider the tax base redistribution that would be associated with 
apportionment according to various formulas that reflect activity 
more closely. 
The paper responds to two different strands of  research literature. 
One strand is mostly concerned with profit shifting out of  the US, and 
investigates how much more tax base would be allocated to the US if  
they were to extend unitary taxation and formula apportionment to the 
worldwide income of  US-headquartered multinationals. Shackelford 
and Slemrod (1998) used geographic segmental reporting data, and 
showed that 46 of  the largest US firms would face a 38 per cent increase 
in their US tax liabilities. Clausing and Lahav (2011) update the analysis 
of  Shackelford and Slemrod, but find only a modest increase of  the 
tax base in the US. While this approach is appealing because it uses 
consolidated group profits as a starting point, it is highly data-demanding 
and therefore was only conducted for a small number of  companies. 
Furthermore, segmental reporting does not usually allow identification of  
the distribution of  the apportionment factors in all countries, and hence 
the two studies are limited to the revenue impacts on the headquarters’ 
economy. 
A range of  studies have considered the application of  formulary 
apportionment within national borders. Mintz and Smart (2004) find 
that apportionment between Canadian provinces results in substantially 
less income shifting. Where Canada has a common formula (based on 
sales and wages), US states can apply their own factors (see Chapter 
10 below). Clausing (2014: 25) assesses the experience in the US, and 
finds ‘some cautious optimism for advocates of  international formulary 
apportionment. Formulary apportionment has the potential to reduce 
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income-shifting incentives without generating accompanying large tax 
responses in economic activity such as employment and investment’.3 
A different approach is used in papers addressing the revenue impact 
of  various potential apportionment factors in the context of  the 
EU proposal for a formulary apportionment system, the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). Here the approach is 
bottom-up, as the information of  the subsidiaries is aggregated to obtain 
the geographical distribution of  the profits and the apportionment 
factors. Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2007) use data about German 
inbound and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI), while Devereux 
and Loretz (2008) use international data to investigate the same 
questions. Aside from the higher quality of  the German administrative 
data used by Fuest et al. (2007), and the broader coverage in the 
international data used by Devereux and Loretz (2008), the main 
difference in approach is that the latter explicitly model the impact 
of  international loss consolidation. Devereux and Loretz (2008) also 
investigate the impact of  the EU’s CCCTB proposal. 
The core of  Cobham and Loretz (2014) is an extension of  Devereux 
and Loretz (2008) to all countries for which equivalent balance sheet 
data is available. In addition to the apportionment factors proposed by 
Agúndez-García (2006), we also consider the two-part apportionment 
discussed in Avi-Yonah et al. (2009). This method allocates ordinary 
profits according to the geographical distribution of  operating expenses, 
and excess profits are then allocated according to additional factors 
(e.g. assets).
There are three main findings of  interest. First, the results clearly 
establish that it is not currently possible to use balance sheet data for a 
meaningful global analysis of  changes to international tax rules. While 
Orbis in principle covers all firms worldwide, and contains approximately 
100 million entries, in practice there is only data on actual activity for a 
much narrower set. After narrowing the dataset to multinational groups, 
we have a sample of  322,525 individual corporate entities in 29,984 
groups, which is dominated by European companies, and with very little 
information about developing countries. The core sample, requiring 
data on the main factors of  economic activity (tangible assets, payroll, 
employee numbers and turnover), contains only 86,000 firms on average, 
spread across 32 countries.4 As Table 7.1 shows, these are predominantly 
European countries. 
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Table 7.1 Baseline results for different apportionment factors (ORBIS balance sheet data) 
Country No.  firms
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change under unitary taxation, apportioned by
Total  
assets
Tangible 
assets Turnover
No. 
employees Payroll
Avi-Yonah 
1% return
Avi-Yonah 
5% return
Austria 1,040 71,153.69 -21.3% -31.4% -21.7% -34.4% -19.7% -20.7% -17.6%
Belgium 4,296 293,037.10 29.7% -48.6% -24.8% -46.5% -30.1% 24.7% 6.0%
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 185 442.32 -7.2% 165.9% 17.1% 195.8% 24.0% -5.7% 1.6%
Bulgaria 491 7,866.76 -19.3% 23.3% -15.2% 67.4% -31.7% -18.8% -16.1%
Croatia 784 6,741.58 -20.3% 4.8% -13.1% 10.9% -17.1% -20.2% -19.1%
Czech 
Republic 3,145 67,705.02 -25.5% 28.4% -6.5% 31.4% -26.4% -24.1% -18.6%
Denmark 1,365 65,639.08 -19.2% -27.9% -23.0% -24.4% -18.4% -19.6% -21.0%
Estonia 698 6,248.35 -22.1% 7.1% -13.6% 73.2% -23.6% -21.8% -19.5%
Finland 2,337 63,196.36 -25.6% -24.5% -14.9% -15.6% -15.4% -25.1% -22.7%
France 16,707 752,573.14 -17.5% -17.3% -11.8% -24.8% -6.8% -16.8% -13.8%
Germany 4,480 562,141.18 -24.1% -30.5% -14.5% -23.5% -12.4% -23.1% -18.7%
Hungary 403 16,094.57 -15.7% 26.5% -6.2% 62.4% -22.2% -15.6% -13.9%
Ireland 702 37,917.33 -12.2% -17.9% -18.4% -44.6% -48.2% -13.4% -16.8%
Italy 8,716 257,083.65 -4.1% 11.2% 11.4% 8.3% 6.3% -2.9% 2.0%
Japan 1,535 142,926.62 -2.9% 1.9% -2.0% -1.2% -10.8% -3.9% -3.7%
Latvia 27 -369.76 51.3% 91.5% 10.1% 116.5% -4.4% 47.2% 35.4%
Luxembourg 154 47,508.76 -8.4% -76.5% -43.4% -81.2% -77.2% -11.8% -15.5%
Netherlands 775 91,369.11 -26.5% -44.5% -32.4% -62.7% -61.2% -26.1% -23.5%
Norway 3,147 154,679.47 -22.0% -10.9% -21.8% -26.6% -20.3% -22.1% -22.5%
Poland 2,504 67,735.79 -30.7% 33.3% -5.3% 67.4% -31.6% -28.7% -20.4%
Portugal 1,636 73,624.67 -13.3% -5.6% -11.0% -5.0% -11.9% -13.4% -13.7%
Romania 2,096 23,749.13 -30.5% 49.6% -7.1% 160.0% -13.3% -29.8% -26.1%
Serbia 839 1,217.25 -17.8% 75.6% -12.7% 91.0% 5.7% -18.4% -19.2%
Slovak 
Republic 800 23,213.89 -10.3% 32.8% 1.2% 39.4% -8.9% -9.9% -7.6%
Slovenia 192 2,808.68 -16.2% 0.9% -12.5% -1.0% -12.7% -16.1% -15.6%
South Korea 793 90,274.47 -18.3% -1.4% -13.2% -6.5% -25.7% -18.5% -18.6%
Spain 9,692 447,315.23 -12.1% -7.6% -15.5% -12.1% -13.3% -12.4% -13.3%
Sweden 2,514 108,766.46 -10.9% -19.3% -24.6% -29.4% -21.4% -11.9% -15.7%
Switzerland 20 1,423.89 6.3% 15.6% -18.7% -3.3% -1.2% -2.3% -20.8%
Taiwan 144 106,711.90 -1.5% -1.6% -2.0% -2.1% -2.9% -1.6% -1.9%
Ukraine 807 29,419.52 -39.8% -1.3% -19.2% 89.2% -27.2% -38.9% -34.6%
United 
Kingdom 12,961 966,003.66 -6.2% -0.5% -7.0% 0.1% 0.8% -6.0% -5.1%
Total 85,986 4,595,884.80 -11.7% -11.8% -11.7% -11.8% -11.8% -11.7% -11.1%
Source: Reproduced from Table 4, Cobham and Loretz (2014). 
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003 to 2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD. 
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Table 7.2 Results for tax reported, balanced subsample for different apportionment factors (ORBIS balance sheet data)
Country No.  firms
Sum reported 
tax liabilities
% change under unitary taxation, apportioned by
Total  
assets
Tangible 
assets Turnover
No. 
employees Payroll
Avi-Yonah 
1% return
Avi-Yonah 
5% return
Austria 936 17,435.76 -16.7% -24.4% -13.2% -33.6% -10.5% -16.1% -12.6%
Belgium 3,714 35,907.10 145.9% 2.1% 51.6% 0.7% 28.7% 132.3% 90.8%
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 185 39.41 74.5% 287.5% 94.9% 329.0% 92.0% 75.8% 92.7%
Bulgaria 491 1,093.64 -5.1% 25.7% -7.6% 65.9% -28.4% -6.0% -7.2%
Croatia 784 1,607.59 -7.4% 19.0% -0.9% 23.1% -8.7% -7.7% -6.2%
Czech 
Republic 3,145 13,468.11 -23.5% 23.6% -7.2% 24.9% -29.7% -21.6% -12.8%
Denmark 1,365 21,051.29 -16.2% -28.2% -12.1% -20.1% -14.1% -16.6% -17.5%
Estonia 533 516.35 -1.5% 14.5% -6.9% 85.6% -19.5% -0.7% 7.3%
Finland 2,122 11,499.48 -13.8% -13.3% -6.5% -7.8% -7.3% -13.0% -7.7%
France 16,706 160,761.14 4.4% 4.5% 12.5% -2.5% 20.8% 5.9% 12.4%
Germany 4,249 141,524.73 -14.8% -20.9% 1.5% -14.6% -1.1% -13.1% -4.4%
Hungary 340 2,045.87 -9.7% 61.4% 15.2% 89.7% -7.7% -9.7% 0.2%
Ireland 730 5,277.63 -20.3% -33.2% -25.1% -55.2% -57.9% -20.8% -21.1%
Italy 8,716 138,309.47 -12.2% -7.3% -4.6% -0.1% -2.1% -11.1% -6.1%
Japan 1,535 49,283.03 1.8% 5.6% 0.4% 4.8% -7.0% 0.3% 2.2%
Latvia 27 40.70 28.0% 46.3% -10.5% 42.5% -22.2% 25.0% 16.1%
Luxembourg 142 4,398.86 101.9% -62.8% -6.9% -68.0% -63.6% 87.0% 63.0%
Netherlands 751 26,917.74 -23.5% -24.4% -20.8% -60.7% -59.7% -23.2% -18.3%
Norway 3,147 55,837.13 -27.1% -18.1% -34.4% -46.8% -39.4% -27.2% -27.6%
Poland 2,311 12,919.87 -33.5% 12.3% -14.1% 75.3% -33.7% -31.0% -20.3%
Portugal 1,594 13,442.49 -17.2% -8.1% -13.5% -6.2% -13.5% -17.4% -17.1%
Romania 2,096 6,718.75 -29.2% 27.3% -26.3% 110.4% -14.8% -28.7% -25.5%
Serbia 839 227.88 144.5% 365.5% 113.2% 406.3% 166.4% 140.0% 132.0%
Slovak 
Republic 800 4,799.56 -14.4% 21.4% -8.1% 26.9% -16.8% -14.0% -11.1%
Slovenia 158 650.42 -6.9% 15.9% -3.5% 10.3% -3.7% -6.6% -4.4%
South Korea 701 22,996.31 -14.8% -2.6% -12.8% -6.6% -21.9% -14.9% -13.9%
Spain 9,083 99,009.29 18.6% 23.3% 14.6% 17.9% 16.9% 18.1% 17.3%
Sweden 2,514 19,533.51 6.3% -2.7% -6.2% -11.0% -2.6% 4.2% -1.3%
Switzerland 18 213.86 5.6% 29.6% -34.8% 19.8% 16.6% -6.8% -35.7%
Taiwan 144 12,900.70 6.7% 6.6% 6.1% 6.0% 5.0% 6.5% 5.7%
Ukraine 807 10,098.12 -40.5% -22.8% -31.8% 21.3% -35.2% -39.9% -36.4%
United 
Kingdom 11,662 216,528.84 11.6% 17.2% 7.5% 17.1% 19.9% 11.9% 13.7%
Total 82,345 1,107,054.60 2.0% 0.5% 1.8% -0.2% 2.3% 2.0% 4.1%
Source: Reproduced from Table 5, Cobham and Loretz (2014).
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum reported tax liabilities refers to the simple 
sum of the tax liabilities in the accounts and is reported in million USD. 
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Three aspects of  this partial coverage should be of  particular concern for 
any international tax research: 
 l The effective absence of  developing countries means that findings 
will be distorted, to the extent that companies in developing countries 
have significantly different characteristics. Most obviously, this means 
that findings based on Orbis are likely to understate the scale of  global 
problems, if  findings such as those of  Crivelli et al. (2015) are accurate 
in demonstrating greater relative economic losses in developing 
countries. 
 l The effective absence of  non-European tax havens and secrecy 
jurisdictions means that any analysis of  profit shifting (such as ours) 
will be substantially incomplete, and any analysis of  elasticities due to 
the interaction of  different CIT regimes is likely to be unreliable (see 
discussion in Clausing (2015)). 
 l The grave under-representation of  the United States, leading MNE 
headquarters jurisdiction and a major market for foreign MNEs, casts 
substantial further doubt on the global applicability of  results obtained 
using Orbis. In this respect at least there is an opportunity to address 
the gap with Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) data, as discussed in 
the following section.
While Orbis has by a distance the widest coverage of  any available 
balance sheet database, any research findings that rely upon it should not 
be considered as globally representative (OECD 2015b). Moreover, the 
expectation should be that the dataset will give rise to systematic biases, 
and so any research design and interpretation should respond carefully 
to these.
The second notable result is that international loss consolidation under 
a unitary tax approach would reduce the total MNE tax base materially, 
compared to separate accounting, since it would allow international 
off-setting of  losses. Such a change may have a short-run transition 
effect because of  stocks of  losses in the respective countries, but also 
two longer-term effects: the direct effect that more losses are usable 
immediately, which has a depressing effect on the overall tax base; 
countered by the fact that losses are more likely to be used immediately 
so that the stock of  losses to be carried forward will be smaller, which 
has a positive impact on the overall tax base. Which of  the two effects 
dominates depends on the level and the variance of  the expected profits. 
Our sample period of  2003-2011 covers the first major impacts of  the 
global financial crisis that began in 2008, implying larger losses in at least 
some countries. Overall, Table 7.1 shows an average reduction in the tax 
base of  11 per cent to 12 per cent. This reflects the freeing up of  losses in 
particular countries if  MNEs are able to pool profits and losses globally 
under a unitary approach, and implies a substantial reduction in the 
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current disincentive to make risky investments in new countries. Overall, 
however, the reduction in the tax base is offset by the elimination of  
current opportunities to shift taxable profits from the jurisdictions of  real 
activity to ones with much lower effective tax rates.
The third major finding is just that: a clear pattern of  misalignment 
to the benefit of  a small number of  profit-haven jurisdictions, and to 
the detriment above all of  the lower-income countries in the sample. 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the implied changes in the tax base, and in tax 
revenues, of  each country and for profit misalignment according to a 
variety of  potential measures of  economic activity. Changes in countries’ 
tax base, if  profits were fully aligned with individual measures of  
economic activity, are summarised in Figure 7.1. 
The major losers of  tax base, which would see between 20 per cent 
and 80 per cent of  their current tax base eliminated under a switch 
from separate accounting to direct alignment through formulary 
apportionment, are Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and 
Austria. Alignment with workforce measures would see potentially very 
large increases in the tax base of  eastern and central European countries, 
more than doubling in a number of  cases. These are, of  course, losses of  
tax base and not of  tax revenue, and it is this reattribution of  tax base 
that would produce an overall increase in tax revenue.
While these findings are suggestive, however, we return to stress the first 
result of  this analysis: that the weaknesses of  the Orbis, or any other 
balance sheet database, are so important that any findings made on this 
basis should be treated with very significant caution. In particular, the 
absence of  most tax havens and developing countries means that the 
analysis omits what may well be the two extreme groups in terms of  the 
misalignment between profit and real activity. As such, these results may 
indicate the leading profit-shifting jurisdictions within Europe, but little 
more. For this reason, we sought and analysed alternative data – the 
results of  which are presented in the following section.
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Finally, note that the sales factor is captured in company accounts on an 
origin, rather than destination basis. That is, the data reflects the location 
of  the affiliate making sales, rather than the location of  the market into 
which those sales are made – for example, a company booking online 
sales into the UK market via an Irish subsidiary would record the 
turnover in Ireland rather than the UK. As a result, the findings here are 
likely to understate, perhaps substantially, the degree of  misalignment of  
profits in relation to turnover. In addition, the analysis sheds no light on 
the potential impact of  introducing a destination-based sales tax.
Figure 7.1 Changes in tax base for alignment with main economic activity measures 
 
Source: per Table 7.1.
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Results with MNE survey data
The results summarised in the previous section are for globally-
headquartered multinational groups but with limited host country 
coverage, while Cobham and Janský (2015) use survey data with much 
broader host country coverage, but for multinational groups from just 
a single country of  headquarters: the United States. The choice of  the 
US is due to the relative ease of  data access, but also because of  its 
importance for the global economy – including developing countries. 
The data used comes from the annual US Direct Investment Abroad 
survey of  all US multinational groups carried out since 1983 by the 
Bureau of  Economic Analysis. The data has been used previously for 
research. For example, Blonigen, Oldenski and Sly (2014) use the firm-
level data to estimate the impact of  bilateral tax treaties on investment 
behaviour of  US multinational firms, allowing for differential effects of  
treaties across sectors that use homogeneous versus differentiated inputs 
with varying intensity; while Stewart (2014) and Clausing (2012) use the 
aggregate data to compare effective corporate rates, and shares of  total 
foreign income and employment, respectively. Sullivan (2004) uses the 
BEA data to highlight a dramatic shift of  profits to few jurisdictions, 
whereas Zucman (2014) employs different data sets to show the same. 
IMF (2014) uses the BEA data to identify spillover effects in international 
taxation. Keightley and Stupak (2015) use the BEA as one of  their data 
sources to document the large problem of  base erosion and profit shifting 
in the United States and elsewhere.
Generally, the data includes ownership by a US investor of  at least 10 
per cent of  a foreign entity. Since data on US parents are only available 
for 1994, 1999, and from 2004 to 2012, and since we are interested in 
the US as well as international impacts, these are the years of  data used 
in our final sample. Although the data is gathered through surveys from 
individual firms, the publicly-available data is aggregated to country- 
and/or industry-level. We use the country-level aggregation to explore 
the pattern of  tax at this level. The use of  country-level data can lead 
to biases, for example from effective consolidation of  underlying profits 
and losses, for which unfortunately we cannot control or even estimate 
a magnitude. Access to firm-level data (currently only provided for 
approved researchers who are US citizens) could allow future research to 
assess the implications of  these partial aggregations.
Throughout the paper, we limit our findings to individual countries 
where data is available at the country level, and to one residual group 
that contains the rest of  the world. Unfortunately, the data availability is 
skewed against lower-income and African countries. When we employ 
the World Bank’s classification according to regions and income groups, 
valid as of  July 2015,5 there are no low-income countries, six lower-
middle income countries (Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nigeria 
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and Philippines) and only Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria (with limited 
data) from Africa with data for 2012 to be included in the presented 
results. While the data in theory has global coverage, the limited range 
of  US foreign direct investment (FDI) in smaller and lower per capita 
income economies is likely to give rise to greater data suppression here. 
The resulting limited availability of  data for some groups of  countries 
leads us to present the results for individual countries only, rather than 
by groups.
Our main measure of  misalignment is based on comparison of  the 
current location of  the tax base, with that implied by alignment with 
individual factors of  economic activity. Here we put more emphasis on 
the combinations of  factors that are used for formulary apportionment 
among Canadian provinces (a simple combination of  payroll and sales), 
and in the proposed EU CCCTB (tangible assets, sales and an equal split 
between payroll and employee numbers). Figure 7.2 shows the sum of  
excess profits by various measures of  economic activity – that is, the total 
value of  US MNEs’ additional taxable profits that are ‘excess’ to activity 
in the places they are declared. Misalignment by this measure grows over 
the period from roughly 5-10 per cent of  total gross profit in the 1990s, 
to around 15-25 per cent in the 2000s pre-crisis, through an artificial 
maximum of  around 50 per cent during the sharp profit fall in 2008, and 
broadly in the range of  25-30 per cent since 2009. In other words, the 
crisis, and measures taken in the immediate years after it, do not appear 
to have reversed the sharp growth in misalignment since the 1990s.
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As with the balance sheet findings of  Cobham and Loretz (2014), the 
ranking of  misalignments is broadly consistent over time: the greatest 
misalignment among the most fixed components of  activity (wages and 
employees, followed by tangible assets); the least misalignment among 
the components with the most easily manipulatable location – sales. The 
BEA data allows the potential to focus on ultimate location and to exclude 
related-party transactions, but we use here the most basic measure: sales 
of  foreign affiliates, without limitation in terms of  destinations or sales to 
affiliated firms. This means, again, that the results are likely to understate 
the degree of  misalignment of  profit with sales. (Tangible assets become 
less powerfully misaligned than employees over the sample period.) 
Gross profit (US$ billion, RHS)
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Figure 7.2 Extent of global profit misalignment with main economic activity measures
 
1994 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tangible assets 10.9% 8.9% 22.2% 23.6% 21.4% 25.6% 52.1% 33.4% 28.4% 25.6% 27.6%
Sales 6.7% 6.1% 18.2% 19% 17.3% 21.1% 44.9% 30.7% 24.7% 22.3% 24.7%
Employees 9.5% 9.8% 24.3% 25% 23.3% 27.5% 53.2% 36.2% 31.5% 29.2% 30.8%
Wages 12.3% 11% 27% 26.5% 25.4% 29.8% 56.4% 37.5% 33.3% 31% 32.3%
CCCTBtg 8.7% 7.5% 21.6% 22% 20.5% 24.5% 49.9% 33.3% 28% 24.9% 27.2%
Canada 9.1% 7.9% 22.3% 22.2% 20.8% 24.7% 50.5% 33.9% 28.5% 25.9% 27.7%
Gross profit (US$ billion, RHS) 395.5 768.5 1185.4 1560.7 1792.6 1867.0 1325.0 1646.6 2268.9 2541.8 2440.8
Source: Figure 3 of Cobham and Janský (2015).
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Figure 7.3 shows the impact of  misalignment by various measures on 
the tax base of  individual countries for the most recent year (2012), and 
so is equivalent to Figure 7.1 but with survey data on US-headquartered 
MNEs, rather than balance sheet data on primarily European-
headquartered MNEs. We are now able to confirm one major finding of  
the Orbis data analysis: a clear pattern of  misalignment to the benefit 
of  a small number of  profit-haven jurisdictions. Again, Luxembourg, 
Ireland and Netherlands feature strongly. While Belgium and Austria 
are less prominent, we now add Bermuda, Barbados, Switzerland and 
Singapore. Where Figure 7.3 highlights the most extreme misalignments 
in relative terms, Table 7.3 shows the biggest ‘excess-profit’ and ‘missing-
profit’ jurisdictions, in absolute dollar value.
 
Figure 7.3 Changes in tax base for alignment with main economic activity measures
 
 
Source: Annex I.B of Cobham and Janský (2015).
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Table 3 shows the relative scale of  the major excess-profit and missing-
profit jurisdictions, compared to full alignment with the CCCTB 
formula. In the former, panel (a) shows that more than a fifth of  excess 
profit cannot be disaggregated from the residual ‘Rest of  the World’ 
category – jurisdictions that are not fully and individually accounted in 
the 2012 BEA data. Of  the remainder, just four jurisdictions with tax 
rates of  2 per cent or below account for more than 80 per cent of  the 
misaligned profit: The Netherlands, Ireland, Bermuda and Luxembourg. 
A further 10 per cent is due to Switzerland and Singapore, which have 
effective tax rates of  around 4 per cent; and an additional 1 per cent 
of  misaligned profits is due to Hong Kong, with an effective tax rate of  
9 per cent. This is in line with the existing literature on international 
profit shifting, which indicates that the corporate tax base is sensitive 
to tax rate differences across countries (de Mooij and Ederveen 2008). 
Furthermore, most of  these six countries are also important secrecy 
jurisdictions, providing financial secrecy to other countries (Cobham, 
Janský and Meinzer 2015).
The other countries identified in the top ten are not recognised in the 
same category: Norway, Indonesia and Denmark each exhibit effective 
tax rates over 30 per cent. For the first two, natural resource activity 
may play a part in inflating the apparent share of  gross profit. In the 
case of  Norway, which accounts for the major share, the year 2012 
in particular is clearly anomalous with a major jump in gross profits. 
Further investigation is needed of  this and the remaining cases, ideally 
with company-level data. Note that a similar pattern exists in the 
Orbis analysis.
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Table 7.3 Top ten excess-profit and missing-profit jurisdictions
a. Excess profit
Additional 
gross profits,  
$bn
Percentage of 
current gross 
profits
Additional tax 
payments,  
$bn
Average 
effective  
tax rate
Share of global 
excess profits
Share of global excess 
profits (individual 
countries only)
Rest of the world -151.2 -78% -35.5 23% 23%
1 Netherlands -151.8 -88% -3.5 2% 23% 30%
2 Ireland -93.6 -77% -2.2 2% 14% 18%
3 Luxembourg -93.6 -97% -1.0 1% 14% 18%
4 Bermuda -76.1 -95% 0.0 0% 11% 15%
5 Switzerland -38.5 -67% -1.7 4% 6% 8%
6 Norway -22.0 -67% -8.4 38% 3% 4%
7 Singapore -13.7 -32% -0.6 4% 2% 3%
8 Indonesia -7.3 -51% -2.4 33% 1% 1%
9 Hong Kong -3.9 -28% -0.3 9% 1% 1%
10 Denmark -2.8 -50% -1.4 51% 0% 1%
Memo: All other 
individual countries -9.3 -31% -2.1 20% 1% 2%
Source: Table 5 in Cobham and Janský (2015). Memo refers to Venezuela, Egypt, Barbados, Israel, Malaysia, Peru and 
Sweden. Memo values are sums except for percentage of gross profits and tax rate, which are unweighted averages.
b. Missing profit
Missing gross 
profits,  
$bn
Percentage of 
current gross 
profits
Missing tax 
payments,  
$bn
Average 
effective  
tax rate
Share of global 
missing profits
Share of global  
missing profits  
(ex.US)
United States 463.0 38% 84.8 18% 71%
Germany 25.8 154% 7.1 28% 4% 14%
Canada 23.5 33% 3.0 13% 4% 13%
China 15.0 65% 2.6 17% 2% 8%
Brazil 14.3 98% 3.7 26% 2% 8%
France 13.9 110% 3.7 27% 2% 7%
Mexico 13.7 64% 3.3 24% 2% 7%
India 11.4 184% 3.6 32% 2% 6%
United Kingdom 9.2 12% 1.2 13% 1% 5%
Italy 8.6 187% 4.2 49% 1% 5%
Spain 8.2 496% 4.9 59% 1% 4%
Memo: All other 
individual countries 41.5 103% 10.4 24% 6% 22%
Source: Table 5 in Cobham and Janský (2015). Memo refers to Australia, Japan, Poland, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, 
Philippines, Korea Rep., Belgium, Russia, Czech Rep., New Zealand, Hungary, Panama, Thailand, Greece, Honduras, Taiwan, Costa 
Rica, Austria, Ecuador, Dominican Rep. and Colombia. Memo values are sums except for percentage of gross profits and tax rate, 
which are unweighted averages.
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In panel (b), three features stand out. First, as expected for US-
headquartered MNEs, the US is the biggest loser by far, accounting 
for more than 70 per cent of  the total gross profit that is misaligned 
away from the location of  the real economic activity that gave rise to it. 
Second, the range of  major economies is broadly represented – from the 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to leading OECD countries. 
Third, the missing profit is in some extreme cases greater than that which 
remains – by a smaller margin in the cases of  India and Germany, for 
example, and by a factor of  four in the case of  Spain and some smaller 
economies.
Key findings, policy opportunities and research horizons
The agreed, single aim of  the G20-mandated BEPS Action Plan is to 
reduce the misalignment between profits and the location of  MNEs’ real 
economic activity. A fundamental issue – and the most obvious failing of  
the OECD in its attempt to deliver that Action Plan – is the absence of  
a baseline measure of  that misalignment. In this chapter, we summarise 
two papers that examine this baseline.
The first conclusion we may draw is that MNE profit shifting is of  
first-order importance for the world economy. Whether we use the biggest 
corporate balance sheet database as in Cobham and Loretz (2014), or the 
survey of  US-headquartered MNEs as in Cobham and Janský (2015), we 
find that for almost all countries, and all measures of  economic activity, 
the implied change in the MNE tax base would be substantial. Overall, 
the scale of  the problem is great – and, hence, so too would be the 
impact of  genuine reforms. 
Our preferred spot estimate for shifted profit by US-headquartered 
MNEs alone uses the European Commission’s proposed formula for 
economic activity, and amounts in 2012 to $660 billion, or 27 per cent 
of  gross profit; or approximately 0.9 per cent of  World GDP. The US is 
responsible for roughly 20 per cent of  World FDI, so, depending on the 
relative scale of  profit shifting among non-US MNEs, it is likely that the 
issue reaches the accounting materiality threshold of  5 per cent in respect 
of  global economic accounts. The estimated revenue loss is roughly $130 
billion, which is not immediately inconsistent with the estimate by IMF 
researchers Crivelli et al. (2015), of  global revenue losses to MNE profit-
shifting of  $600 billion annually. 
The second conclusion, common to both analyses, is that only a handful 
of  jurisdictions are the destinations of  profit shifting. The Netherlands, 
Ireland and Luxembourg emerge as common excess-profit jurisdictions 
in both approaches. Belgium and Austria also stand out in the balance 
sheet analysis, which overstates the role of  European MNEs, while 
Bermuda, Singapore and Switzerland do so for US MNEs. The effective 
tax rate for those jurisdictions important to US MNEs is 4 per cent 
or below in every case, and 0 per cent for Bermuda, 1 per cent for 
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Luxembourg, and 2 per cent for Ireland and the Netherlands. These 
jurisdictions are therefore central to the tax losses suffered by almost 
every other country, but themselves receive only a small fraction of  tax 
revenue from these shifted profits. 
The big winners are, of  course, the MNEs themselves. Note, however, 
that the providers of  equity and debt may not benefit. Recent research 
(Brooks, Godfrey, Hillenbrand and Money 2016) suggests that, for 
UK-listed firms at least, a lower effective tax rate does not translate into 
higher shareholder returns. It does, however, expose shareholders to 
greater risk. A quite different analysis finds that US banks impose higher 
interest rates and harsher non-interest terms on firms with a greater 
degree of  tax avoidance – indicating that banks, too, perceive higher 
associated risks (Hasan, Hoi, Wu and Zhang 2014). 
The Orbis data analysis suggests the biggest proportional losses are 
suffered by lower-income countries in the sample, while higher-income 
countries are less affected. However, the absence from Orbis of  serious 
data on either developing countries or most tax havens (or financial 
secrecy jurisdictions) means that these findings are likely to be limited. In 
particular, the extent of  profit shifting is likely to be seriously understated. 
The picture based on the BEA survey of  US MNEs therefore seems more 
likely to be accurate. While US MNEs may be systematically more or less 
aggressive than others, it seems reasonable to expect a similar pattern – 
namely that all countries, bar the profit-shifting jurisdictions, and clearly 
including the home jurisdiction, lose out substantially. However, given 
the generally lower tax revenue and higher relative reliance on corporate 
income tax of  lower-income developing countries, a broad distribution 
of  losses is likely to be more costly there. For example, Cobham and 
Gibson (2016) show that Crivelli et al.’s (2015) estimates imply costs of  
2-3 per cent of  tax revenue for OECD countries, but 6-13 per cent for 
developing countries. 
The third conclusion is that the measures of  activity used to measure 
misalignment, or as the basis for formulary apportionment under unitary 
taxation, will have powerful implications for the eventual redistribution. 
In general, the least mobile factors (tangible assets and employment) 
imply the greatest redistribution under formula apportionment – whereas 
intangible assets, and to some extent sales, appear themselves to be used 
as the basis for creating misalignment. However, there is substantial 
overlap in the redistribution implied by the two combined formulas: the 
Canadian, combining sales and payroll, and the CCCTB formula. 
The broader finding, however, is that the level of  understanding possible 
from existing data is simply insufficient. That insufficiency might be 
dismissed as just one more dead end for researchers, in a world of  data 
gaps and imperfections. But, for two reasons, that should not happen 
here. First, as seen in this chapter, the scale of  the problem is too great. 
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Second, the data exists – so it is not a question of  calling it into existence, 
with the associated need for political will, institutional delivery and 
corporate compliance costs. Instead, it is simply a question of  efficiency 
– for policymakers to reverse the current decision, which stands to waste 
those imposed costs.
A major success of  the BEPS Action Plan was the development of  an 
OECD standard for country-by-country reporting. MNEs will now 
report to their home tax authorities on this basis, and the information 
will be shared through a somewhat complicated process with certain 
other tax authorities. However, BEPS Action 13, through which this 
was delivered, also ruled out the possibility not only of  publishing the 
data, but even of  collating it in one place. Consequently, the BEPS 11 
team, dedicated to establishing a baseline to track misalignment, had 
the rug pulled from under them. As such, the only deliverable was a 
vague commitment to governments working to provide some data for 
OECD analysis. 
Making country-by-country reporting data publicly available would 
deliver a range of  accountability benefits likely to build public confidence 
in international tax rules, bolster corporate transparency and hence 
market efficiency, and discipline the behaviour of  aggressive MNEs 
and profit-shifting jurisdictions. But it would also, of  course, provide 
researchers with the means, finally, to analyse misalignment as a complex 
global phenomenon. 
The simplest means to achieve this would be through an online registry, 
such as that pioneered by the International Aid Transparency Initiative, 
allowing a wide range of  users simply to record the location of  their 
data in a central place, while hosting it on their own sites in a consistent 
format. Per Cobham (2014), the likely effect would be to reduce 
compliance costs below those of  the current OECD arrangements – 
while delivering the (necessarily uncertain level of) benefits outlined.
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sample, i.e. only those countries with a minimum of ten firms reporting 
data across the range of factors. Results based on less restrictive 
criteria should be treated, correspondingly, as having a higher degree of 
uncertainty. 
5. Each year the World Bank revises analytical classification of the world’s 
economies based on estimates of gross national income (GNI) per capita 
for the previous year. As of 1 July 2015, low-income economies are 
defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank 
Atlas method, of $1,045 or less in 2014; middle-income economies 
are those with a GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than 
$12,736; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of 
$12,736 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income 
economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125.
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Unitary Taxation of the Finance Sector
Kerrie Sadiq
This chapter details and summarises a longer companion paper explaining 
the significance of multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) to developing 
nations, and how unitary taxation could be applied to this sector. MNFIs 
play a significant role in financing the activities of their clients in developing 
nations. Because of the fiscal impact associated with such activities, this 
chapter investigates a case for an MNFI industry-specific adoption of 
unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the 
current regime. In doing so, it considers the practicalities by examining both 
definitional issues and possible formulas for MNFIs. This chapter argues 
that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the 
current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important 
guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs 
should be defined, as well as the factors that should be included in an 
allocation formula, along with the appropriate weighting. This chapter 
concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable 
industry-specific alternative for MNFIs.
Introduction
Multinational financial institutions are the intermediaries that facilitate 
foreign investment. By financing primary activities such as mining, 
tourism and manufacturing, it is also their own activities that affect 
the economies of  developing nations. Often the finance and banking 
industry is not considered a primary participant in the economic growth 
of  developing nations. However, its influence on that growth cannot be 
underestimated. MNFIs are following clients into locations where there 
is significant growth. Therefore, MNFIs are themselves taxpayers that 
are entering the markets of  developing nations and profiting from their 
strong growth rates.
This chapter, drawing heavily on longer companion papers (Sadiq 2014, 
2015), explains the significance of  MNFIs for developing nations, and 
argues a case for industry-specific adoption of  unitary taxation based on 
formulary apportionment. Specifically, this chapter analyses the effects 
of  a unitary taxation approach on the allocation of  the profits of  MNFIs 
to the developing nations in which the profits are earned. It examines 
the practicalities of  the implementation of  unitary taxation for MNFIs 
in terms of  the key components of  such a regime. It considers how the 
financial sector should be defined for the purposes of  unitary taxation, 
Chapter 8
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and what would constitute a unitary business for that sector. Available 
data from existing domestic unitary tax regimes, proposed regimes and 
current practices in relation to advance pricing agreements (APAs) for 
global trading is then analysed to consider an appropriate allocation 
formula for the purpose of  apportionment of  the profits of  the MNFI. 
The effect of  the different variations of  the predominant three-factor 
formula of  assets-labour-sales is also discussed.
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is concluded to be a 
viable industry-specific solution to a fair and equitable allocation of  
the profits of  MNFIs. A two-factor equally-weighted formula of  sales 
and labour is suggested to be the most appropriate formula to apply. 
Agreement on the definitional and practical implementation issues is also 
suggested as possible. 
The impact of MNFIs on developing nations
A primary reason for the globalisation of  financial institutions is that 
they typically follow the customer into jurisdictions where international 
capital and international investors are required. Global growth is 
currently being experienced in developing nations, hence MNFIs are 
following their customers into those countries. The role that MNFIs play 
in the global economy and national tax systems by facilitating foreign 
investment is widely acknowledged (OECD 2009). It is also recognised 
that MNFIs not only have clients that use complex structured finance 
transactions to benefit from tax arrangements, but may also receive 
tax benefits themselves from such transactions and structures. MNFIs 
are also persistent users of  tax havens (ActionAid 2013), and previous 
studies have demonstrated that MNFIs have significant opportunities 
for reducing their tax liability by way of  intra-firm transfer pricing 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001). 
The ability of  MNFIs to take advantage of  current tax laws is due to the 
nature of  their business. MNFIs do not provide traditional goods and 
services, but rather are continually innovating and developing new ways 
to provide services to clients. The role of  the MNFI is different from 
the traditional multinational enterprise, as it acts as an intermediary 
between capital users and capital suppliers. The activities of  MNFIs are 
not constrained in the same way as traditional multinational corporations 
that have physical ties to a geographical location. Further, there is the 
economic interdependence of  the parts of  the MNFI entity. This means 
that MNFIs are so highly integrated that, especially when economies of  
scope and scale are taken into account, the entity cannot be treated as 
if  it were just a collection of  independent entities. Put simply, because 
of  their unique nature (Sadiq 2008, 2007), MNFIs are particularly able 
to use techniques of  base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) to attribute 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions in which they maintain affiliates that have 
few or no employees. 
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IMF researchers have recently recognised the significance of  the 
expansion of  MNFIs into developing nations (Claessen and Van 
Horen 2012). In particular, Claessen and Van Horen find that between 
1995-2009 the number of  foreign banks increased by approximately 
40 per cent in OECD and high-income countries, by 72 per cent in 
emerging markets, and by 122 per cent in developing countries. They 
also find that banks are responding to the economic slowdown in 
advanced countries and the increased economic importance of  emerging 
markets, with growth opportunities and profit margins likely to be higher 
in those markets. Given the significant impact of  MNFIs on developing 
nations, coupled with their ability to take advantage of  existing tax laws, 
this chapter proposes unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as 
a viable alternative. 
Definitional issues
If  unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is to be adopted for 
the MNFI industry, the definition of  the unitary business and unitary 
business activities needs to be established. What constitutes the unitary 
business group, and the income to which the formula will be applied, is a 
precursor to any apportionment. 
The multinational bank is the most obvious MNFI, as it includes 
a wide variety of  activities, such as currency trading, participation 
in the Euromarket, borrowing and lending, and the financing of  
international trade. The MNFI sector also includes insurance companies, 
mortgage companies, investment and pension funds, stock brokerages 
and investment advisory services (Carter 2013). However, continual 
growth and change means that the MNFI industry is evolving, and 
it is impossible to predict the type of  financial activities that will be 
undertaken and entities that will undertake them in the future (Williams 
2002). Financial services are increasingly being supplied by a broader 
category of  financial institutions, as well as non-traditional providers. 
To ensure that all providers whose business is predominantly that of  
providing financial services are subject to the same international tax 
regime, a wide, principles-based definition would be required. 
Those parts of  the business of  the financial institution that are 
considered part of  the MNFI for unitary taxation purposes also need 
to be defined. This definition focuses on the parts of  the MNFI that are 
to be included in the unitary business (the scope of  the group), and the 
activities of  the MNFI that are to be subject to unitary taxation (the 
scope of  the business activities). A wide definition of  both the scope 
of  the unitary business and the unitary business activities is the most 
appropriate to ensure that the potential advantages of  unitary taxation 
for developing countries are not limited. However, from a practical 
perspective this is a more difficult approach to adopt. 
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The MNFI legal and allocational organisational structure may take 
on several different forms. Allocational structure (allocating duties, 
responsibilities and authority) can be done based on geographic, 
functional or divisional lines. The legal structure will determine the 
unitary group and will vary, with the regulations of  host nations often 
affecting the final structure. Broadly, there are eight legal organisational 
structures in financial services: correspondent banking, representative 
offices, agencies, consortium banks, merchant bank subsidiaries, Edge 
Act Corporations, bank branches and bank subsidiaries (Williams 2002), 
falling into three broad categories – branch, subsidiary and agent. A 
branch is not a separate legal entity, and will generally be engaged in the 
same type of  business as the entity of  which it forms part. Determining 
whether other legal structures fall within the scope of  the unitary 
business of  the MNFI will be more difficult. Legal unity and economic 
unity are two approaches that have developed to determine whether 
separately-incorporated affiliates are part of  the unitary group. The 
first defines the unitary business by reference to legal control, whereas 
the second defines the unitary group by reference to common economic 
activities. Both approaches have their own difficulties, the most obvious 
being that the legal approach may be open to manipulation, while 
the economic integration approach leads to uncertainty and practical 
difficulties in its application.
Finally, the scope of  the unitary MNFI needs to be considered. Two 
issues arise: first, whether the income should include both business 
and non-business income, and, second, whether the income should be 
subject to the formulary apportionment regime on an activity-by-activity 
basis. It has historically been difficult to distinguish between business 
and non-business income, with different jurisdictions having different 
rules for doing so. This would be exacerbated in the finance industry, 
given the highly complex structures and transactions entered into. As 
such, allowing MNFIs to distinguish between business and non-business 
income would most likely lead to aggressive tax planning practices 
whereby developing nations would lose out. The ability to reclassify 
business income as passive income would likely be easily achieved by 
MNFIs. Hence, all income should ideally be included. 
A formula may be applied to the global income of  the MNFI or the 
combined income of  certain activities of  the MNFI, known as the 
activity-by-activity approach. The activity-by-activity approach would be 
relatively easy to implement, because MNFIs have fairly delineated retail, 
commercial and investment banking activities, along with separate global 
trading activities. However, such an approach would run counter to the 
principle of  unitary taxation, which is based on understanding that the 
activities carried out by an integrated firm are interdependent, and its 
profits derive from their synergies. For developing countries, in particular, 
it is likely to result in them being allocated relatively low levels of  profit 
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resulting from activities such as retail banking. Hence, a combined 
income approach is one that more accurately captures all the activities of  
an MNFI globally. 
A formula for MNFIs
The question to be addressed is whether a standard formula should 
be used for MNFIs, or a formula should be adopted that is specific to 
that industry. Several working examples provide insight. These models 
allow an evaluation of  both general and industry-specific formulas, the 
various factors to be incorporated into a formula, and the appropriate 
weightings. 
Existing formulas
Existing formulas are discussed in Chapter 9. As such, this section 
focuses on those situations where countries have separate formulas for 
the finance industry. The Canadian rules are an example of  a system 
that provides for nine industry-specific formulas, all of  which maintain 
two factors (sales and payroll). Variations apply to the banking industry, 
as well as trust and loans corporations. While a two-factor formula 
is retained for banks, the split is varied to one-third payroll and two-
thirds loans and deposits. For trust and loans corporations, the special 
provisions relate to the definition of  gross revenue of  the permanent 
establishment – that is, the amount of  the sales component. It is argued 
that the Canadian system represents a balanced compromise between 
uniformity and coordination, and provincial flexibility, meets the criteria 
of  fairness, and has relatively low compliance costs (Mayer 2006). 
The German model for allocating trade tax is another example of  
a jurisdiction that contains industry-specific rules. Its system does 
not apportion the income amongst the taxing authorities, but rather 
apportions the tax. Trade tax, with a tax base consisting of  trade 
proceeds so defined, is apportioned amongst those municipalities in 
which a permanent establishment is maintained. The formula applied 
to the basic tax amount is a single factor of  salary and wages, on the 
basis that this represents the cost of  trade activities. Historically, there 
have been two instances of  industry-specific formulas, with one being 
the banking, insurance and loan industry. For this industry, until 1974 a 
single-factor formula of  gross receipts was used, with receipts attributed 
to the permanent establishment where the main business activities 
were located. It has been suggested that the German system operates 
satisfactorily, and that ‘the system effectively prevents double taxation 
and the results are generally acceptable both for the taxpayers and the 
affected municipalities. However, the conditions for applying group 
taxation are very strict, and the only flexibility the municipalities enjoy is 
that of  determining the rate of  assessment’ (Mayer 2006: 3.4.2).
With 26 cantons applying different formulas, and different formulas 
applying to different industries, the Swiss tax system is complicated, 
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and allows for substantial independence of  the Swiss cantons from 
the federal state. However, in the case of  banks the direct method of  
apportionment is generally applied, thereby reverting back to a separate 
accounting approach. The outcome of  such a complex and canton-
specific approach is that a body of  case law has been developed to deal 
with the constitutional requirement that prohibits double taxation, and to 
determine appropriate allocation principles. 
The EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal 
(European Commission 2011) adopts a three-factor equally-weighted 
formula comprising labour, assets and sales. However, in contrast to 
previous examples, the labour factor is computed on the basis of  payroll 
and the number of  employees, with each counting for half  of  the labour 
factor. The CCCTB proposal also includes special apportionment, 
or modification, rules for financial institutions. Generally, intangibles 
and financial assets are excluded from the formula due to their mobile 
nature and the risk of  circumventing the system. However, where the 
entity is a financial institution 10 per cent of  the value of  financial 
assets is included, except for participating interests and own shares. 
Such a modification is seen as necessary because of  the significance of  
these assets to MNFIs. The sales factor is also varied from the general 
definition to include 10 per cent of  its revenue in the form of  interest, 
fees, commissions and revenue from securities – amounts that would 
normally be excluded. Financial services are deemed to be carried out, 
in the case of  a secured loan, in the member state in which the security is 
situated, or, if  this member state cannot be identified, the member state 
in which the security is registered. Other financial services are deemed to 
be carried out in the member state of  the borrower or of  the person who 
pays fees, commissions or other revenue. 
Internationally, of  course, arm’s length pricing methodologies are 
generally applied. Interestingly, it is in the finance sector that a unitary 
approach, combined with what is essentially formulary apportionment, 
has been applied in relation to global trading. This was developed by the 
US, and formulated in the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) Notice 94-
40, Global Trading Advance Pricing Agreements (IRS 1994). This document 
contains the experience and generic information relating to APAs 
applied to the specific business segment of  global trading of  financial 
products. The application of  Notice 94-40 is limited to ‘global trading 
operations of  companies that are functionally fully integrated [and] are 
characterized by the centralized management of  risk and personnel. 
The business is managed as one global position for purposes of  risk 
management rather than several discrete businesses’ (IRS 1994: 3). In 
relation to such operations, the IRS has for over 20 years used a Profit 
Split Method of  allocating income between the taxing jurisdictions, 
stating that this method ‘reflects the contribution of  each trading location 
to the profitability of  the global book’ (IRS 1994: 5). The factors used in 
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global trading APAs are heavily weighted towards payroll, with very little 
emphasis on sales. Further, while it has not been possible to determine 
the weighting placed on the factors used in actual cases, it is unlikely that 
the risk factor is significant. It is also notable that these have been agreed 
with the other countries concerned, as bilateral or multilateral APAs.
Payroll, property and sales factors defined
Any factor used in a formula must be defined. Here, the three most 
common factors of  payroll, property and sales are revisited with the aim 
of  defining each, explaining the rationale for each, and outlining the 
likely issues that would arise and the impact on developing nations if  they 
were used in an industry-specific formula for MNFIs. 
The payroll factor, generally defined as total employee compensation 
including salaries, commissions and bonuses, is included to reflect the 
contribution of  labour to the generation of  the income of  the entity. 
There are two significant issues in relation to the payroll factor that 
would impact on developing nations. First, compensation is generally 
much lower in developing countries than it is in developed countries. 
As such, there is an argument that the factor should take into account 
the number of  employees rather than remuneration. However, it should 
also be borne in mind that a heavy weight to the labour factor would 
also discourage employment in a particular jurisdiction. The proposed 
EU model combines both payroll and number of  employees, by equally 
weighting the two within the labour factor. A model that places equal 
weight on remuneration and number of  staff is likely to be more suited 
to MNFIs, given the high salary and bonuses paid to some staff as 
compared to others who undertake simple retail activities. A second 
problem of  outsourcing labour functions needs to be considered, as the 
payroll factor does not generally include independent contractors. In the 
context of  MNFIs payroll will be an important factor, especially given 
it is the most difficult to manipulate. However, to ensure an accurate 
reflection of  the cost of  labour to MNFIs, there should be no distinction 
between employees and independent contractors (Benshalom 2008). 
The property (asset) factor is included in some formulas on the basis that 
capital is an important income-producing factor. However, property is 
also the most complex item to define and value – for example, whether 
historical cost or market value should be used. In relation to intangibles, 
there is a major problem of  allocation to the relevant jurisdictions. 
Hence, intangibles may be removed from the property factor, as is often 
done in the US and in the CCCTB. The property factor may also be 
omitted altogether, as in Canada. Where a property factor is used in the 
US, a different definition is generally applied for financial institutions, 
and, as Martens-Weiner explains, ‘the property factor may also include 
intangible property, such as coin and currency, loans related to in-state 
property and credit card receivables if  the fees and charges are billed 
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to the state’ (Martens-Weiner 2006: 56). This is also consistent with the 
approach of  the proposed EU CCCTB. While the formula itself  does 
not change, the definition of  property does vary to include an amount of  
10 per cent of  the value of  financial assets.
In my view, the property factor should not be included in an industry-
specific formula for MNFIs. The ultimate purpose of  an allocation 
formula is to allocate profits in a manner that accurately reflects the 
location of  the activities that give rise to the profits of  the MNFI. This 
is achieved by using labour and sales factors in the formula, and the 
property factor contributes nothing additional to the allocation model. 
No doubt capital is a significant part of  the MNFI’s operations, and, 
given various international and domestic standards required of  financial 
institutions, it may be easy to measure. However, these standards may 
not apply to all financial institutions, domestic capital requirements 
will vary across jurisdictions, and compliance may be a matter of  form 
rather than an indication of  the substantive use of  the funds. Due to the 
difficulties associated with the property factor, along with a move away 
from its use in domestic jurisdictions, it seems that the most appropriate 
approach would be to avoid the use of  this factor in an industry-specific 
formula for MNFIs. This is especially in light of  the significant intangible 
assets held by MNFIs, and the ability to manipulate this factor easily. 
Property is already indirectly represented in the formula, as property will 
be associated with the place of  labour and potentially sales. As such, a 
property factor is likely to add little to the ability of  a formula to allocate 
the profits fairly. 
The sales factor is generally viewed as a relatively easy factor to measure. 
However, under the US model the financial institutions industry is 
subject to special rules in defining sales. This is because the financial 
sector generates receipts that are not easily analogous to sales income 
(Roin 2008). In particular, the sales factor is replaced with a receipts 
factor, and ‘may include income from securities and money market 
instruments, interest income from loans secured by personal property in 
the state, and receipts from credit cards if  regularly billed in the state’ 
(Martens-Weiner 2006: 56).
It can also be difficult to identify the location of  sales. A formula for 
MNFIs must ensure that the sales revenue is allocated to the appropriate 
geographic location. The sale of  intangible goods and services, 
especially intermediary services such as those performed by MNFIs, 
poses the biggest problem. The use of  a destination-based sales factor 
also needs to align with a jurisdiction’s taxing connections in order to 
avoid income being allocated to a jurisdiction that has no taxing rights 
over that income. In the case of  MNFIs, there is also the incentive to 
finalise contracts in low tax jurisdictions (and, more likely, tax havens). 
One solution to this problem is to adopt an ‘ultimate destination’ test 
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to determine where the services are ultimately used, thereby applying a 
tracing rule. Retail services to individuals would readily lend themselves 
to such an approach – however corporate clients would pose significant 
problems, given their ability to establish subsidiaries anywhere 
(Benshalom 2008). In these cases, ultimate destination tracing would be 
problematic and, from a practical perspective, the compliance costs and 
complexities associated with such an approach would lead to resistance. 
Given the role that MNFIs play in developing nations, as well as their 
follow-the-customer motivation for entering those nations, applying a 
destination-based sales factor is consistent with the economic substance 
of  MNFI transactions. MNFIs are operating on business incentives, 
and, as such, there is inelasticity in ultimate destination-based sales 
(Morse 2010). This also reduces the impact of  any property and payroll 
factors, allowing nations to encourage investment and employment in the 
jurisdiction. As Clausing and Avi-Yonah explain, ‘the key advantage of  a 
sales-based formula is that sales are far less responsive to tax differences 
across markets, because the customers themselves are far less mobile than 
are firm assets or employment. Even in a high-tax country, firms still 
have an incentive to sell as much as possible’ (Clausing and Avi-Yonah 
2007: 12). 
However, identifying the destination principle may be done in different 
ways – for example, according to the location where the services are 
performed, or alternatively the location of  the customer. Whichever 
approach is adopted could influence the location of  the activities of  
MNFIs, and, if  there is an emphasis on the location of  the customer, this 
may be considered closer to an origin-based approach, particularly where 
the customers are also encouraged to operate in low-tax jurisdictions. 
The location of  consumption (e.g. where the money borrowed is actually 
used for the purposes of  financing) overcomes this issue, but poses 
significant problems (Morse 2010). In a similar manner to some US states 
in relation to intangible property, where the location of  the income-
producing activity can be identified, the receipts can be assigned to that 
location. However, situations may arise where it is not possible to identify 
a specific location, and in that case it may be necessary to remove those 
receipts from the sales factor (Martens-Weiner 2006). The proposed EU 
CCCTB model adopts a pragmatic approach for financial services, and 
specifies for a secured loan the location of  the security (or its place of  
registration), and for other services the location of  the borrower, or the 
person paying the relevant fee or commission; if  these locations cannot 
be identified, the labour and asset factors should be used. 
A formula designed for MNFIs
Any formula, whether general or industry-specific, needs to be equitable 
and efficient, as well as politically acceptable to both developed and 
developing nations. Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment only 
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works to the extent that the factors of  the formula allocate income based 
on an economically-sound basis. Fairness requires different allocation 
factors to be taken into account, and a balanced weighting applied to 
those factors that results in a distribution of  income according to what 
is viewed as sensible (Martens-Weiner 2006). Generally, factors such as 
the location of  offices, people and sales should be used in the formula 
with a weighting that minimises distortions. Some argue that each 
nation has an incentive to place greater emphasis on the factors that 
maximise taxable income in its jurisdiction (Green 1993). However, as 
pointed out above and in Chapter 2, countries also take into account the 
effects on investment, and indeed this has in practice been a dominant 
consideration in the negotiation of  taxing rights in tax treaties. It would 
be essential to ensure that developing countries are given equal standing 
in any negotiations, as they may be disadvantaged where emphasis is 
placed on such factors as labour and capital that have lower costs in 
developing counties (Casanegra de Jantscher 2000). Ultimately, much 
of  the argument will centre on country bias, dependent on whether 
consumption factors or destination factors produce the best result, and 
depending on what the majority can agree on. Developing nations will 
be wise to argue for greater emphasis on a destination-based sales factor, 
which reflects consumption, on the basis that it is those nations where the 
market is located – that is, where the economic activity giving rise to the 
profits is located. To avoid distortions, minimise complexity and lessen 
opportunities for aggressive tax planning, all key elements of  the system, 
apart from tax rates, should be consistent within and across countries 
(McLure 2002). However, it cannot be assumed that the same formula 
should be applied to all industries, and, as we have seen with domestic 
regimes, financial institutions are one industry where there has either 
been a variation on the standard formula or a special industry-specific 
formula. 
Generally, the tendency in existing regimes has been for fewer factors 
to be used, with a resulting combination of  factor/s at origin (assets 
and payroll) and factor/s at destination (sales) making up the adopted 
formulas. The recommendations in this chapter are consistent with this 
observation, as the discussion above supports the view that an equally-
weighted two-factor formula of  labour and sales for MNFIs is arguably 
the most likely to be broadly accepted, as well as meet the criteria of  
fairness and equity. An origin-based labour factor and a destination-
based sales factor is the most appropriate for MNFIs. The biggest 
difficulty will be the sales factor, and, as Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst 
explain, determining the location for sale of  certain services such as 
financial services ‘will require toleration of  some degree of  reasonable 
estimation and generally will require some restraint in enforcement. In 
addition, owing to the wide range of  situations in which sales can arise, 
regulations will need to be detailed, and a rulings process will be needed 
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to provide flexibility for particularly difficult situations’ (Avi-Yonah et al. 
2009: 518). The same authors also propose statutory language to account 
for this scenario, and suggest that ‘It is anticipated that regulations will 
provide that revenues for the provision of  banking, insurance, brokerage, 
or other financial services will be treated as earned by the related party 
that is resident for income tax purposes in the country in which such 
revenues can be identified, with reasonable certainty in view of  the 
records and other information available to the taxpayer, with services 
provided to individuals resident, property located, or active business 
activities conducted within that country’ (Avi-Yonah et al. 2009: 543).
Conclusion
The behaviour of  MNFIs, as taxpayers profiting from the growth of  
developing nations, needs to be addressed. These MNFIs are earning 
profits from transactions and clients in developing nations, but not 
paying appropriate taxes on those profits. Unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment provides a viable industry-specific solution to 
ensuring that profits are taxed in the location where they are earned. A 
successful formulary apportionment model makes the use of  aggressive 
tax planning strategies worthless, as there is no longer the opportunity 
to have income sourced within that jurisdiction unless factors in the 
formula are present. The model proposed in this chapter is an equally-
weighted two-factor formula of  labour and sales, where labour reflects 
both remuneration and number of  staff. Ideally, this formula should be 
applied to all the income of  the MNFI (broadly defined) on a combined 
income basis. 
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Unitary Taxation in the Extractive 
Industry Sector
Erika Dayle Siu, Sol Picciotto, Jack Mintz and 
Akilagpa Sawyerr
Introduction
This chapter assesses the global unitary taxation approach as applied to 
taxation of  the extractive industry (EI) sector. Governments of  resource-
rich countries that own extractive resource deposits rely substantially 
on resource revenue from the extractive industry to fund their public 
services. Considerable research and policy debate is now attempting to 
improve the design of  taxation, particularly of  mining and hydrocarbons 
(see e.g. Daniel, Keen and Macpherson 2010). The EI sector is generally 
dominated by large multinational enterprises (MNEs). The policy 
prescription currently favoured for developing countries is a combination 
of  corporate income tax (CIT), rent resource tax (RRT) and ad valorem 
royalty (IMF 2012: 26). Both CIT and other profit-related EI levies, 
such as the RRT, pose similar problems in relation to the opportunities 
for what is now described as base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). 
Two important countries operating systems of  unitary taxation (UT) 
with formulary apportionment, Canada and the USA, include states or 
provinces with major revenue from the EI sector, especially oil and gas. 
Yet, to date there has not been much analysis of  how a UT approach 
would apply, in particular to the taxation of  the EI sector. 
This chapter assesses whether a unitary approach can improve the ability 
of  governments to formulate and administer optimally-designed tax and 
royalty policies for the EI sector. We suggest that there are three reasons 
it could do so. First, UT could assist governments to improve general 
CIT design and develop better EI levies. In addition, the use of  UT 
based on a common global corporate group tax base for transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in the EI sector could reduce administration and 
compliance costs associated with both CIT and rent/profit-related 
EI levies.
Second, the development of  new transparency rules will result in 
the reporting of  payments to governments by EIs. This includes 
not only the wider G20 initiatives to improve transparency through 
country-by-country reporting, but the more specific sectoral experience 
under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
implemented in over 40 countries as of  this writing, as well as recent 
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legislation in the EU and US, which require public reporting. Public 
information on tax payments will sharpen the focus on whether 
countries are receiving appropriate revenue from EIs. To the extent that 
governments, under pressure from public opinion, feel that insufficient 
revenue is being raised, they may gravitate to less efficient forms of  
taxation that discourage investment in their jurisdiction. A UT approach, 
which enables countries to share global revenue, could assist in the 
development of  better EI levy policies that are sensitive to the risks and 
costs incurred by private companies in extracting resources.
Third, better-designed levies reduce fiscal distortions affecting EI 
investments. TNCs invest until the return is sufficient to cover the cost 
of  capital including depreciation, inventory cost and risk. A unitary 
approach to rent/profit-related EI levies, which results in governments 
sharing not only the profits but also the risks associated with long-term 
capital-intensive projects, could be efficient in design and easier to 
audit with fewer distortions, thereby maximising the rents shared by the 
government and private producers.
Our fuller discussion of  these issues follows below. The first section 
provides background on issues related to EI fiscal levies. The next 
sections look at how the UT approach as developed in Canada and 
the US is applied to the EI. Following that, we will consider whether 
and how a global UT approach could improve the economic efficiency, 
administrability and fairness of  CIT and rent/profit-related levies 
imposed on the EI. 
Background on fiscal regimes in the extractive sector 
The exploitation of  natural resources, especially extraction of  oil, 
gas and hard minerals, is key to the economic development of  many 
developing countries. Indeed, it has been central to their integration 
into the global capitalist economy. Large foreign-owned firms, often 
vertically-integrated, dominate natural resource extraction. However, 
local small-scale miners continue to exist in some countries, especially in 
hard minerals, although they often find it hard to survive competing in 
a sector that is capital-intensive and has important economies of  scale. 
Where they do continue, they may range from truly artisanal (usually 
alluvial) mining, to operations using increasingly sophisticated machinery, 
generally with small-scale foreign financing and technical leadership, and 
apparently making more than a decent living, while remaining sometimes 
illegal and generally outside the tax net.1
Hence, revenue is generally the primary benefit for host countries 
from exploitation of  natural resources. Expectations have been high, 
especially in periods of  relatively high world prices that help drive new 
investment and improved exploration technology. Yet the experience in 
many developing countries has been that government revenue from EI 
levies has been disappointingly low. Attention has focused especially on 
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profit-based levies, and some have criticised the shift towards such taxes 
and away from volume-based levies.2
Establishing an effective framework for fair taxation of  the profits of  
large foreign-owned TNCs, which generally dominate the EI sector, has 
been especially challenging for smaller developing countries. A particular 
issue of  concern is the widely-accepted separate entity principle. That is, 
for the purposes of  taxes on income or profits, the affiliates of  a TNC in 
different countries should be treated as if  they were independent entities 
dealing at arm’s length. 
Complex governance and opacity
EIs entail large up-front investments resulting in sunk costs, for 
exploration, development, and setting up mining or drilling sites. The 
level of  such investments has indeed been rising fast, as exploitation has 
shifted to less easily-extracted deposits. Concessions are therefore often 
major projects, generally governed by detailed contracts between firms 
and investors with the government (OpenOil 2012; OpenOil, Revenue 
Watch and Vale Columbia Centre 2013). Special rights or privileges may 
be given to the investors under these contracts, or in national mining/
petroleum laws, such as exemption from import duties for equipment, 
special depreciation rules, or ‘standstill/stability clauses’, which restrict 
the effects of  subsequent changes in legislation, including taxation. 
Bilateral investment treaties give foreign investors rights that can override 
national law, especially the prohibition of  ‘takings’, and the obligation 
to give fair and equitable treatment, which may be interpreted to 
restrict actions such as denial of  tax exemptions or imposition of  new or 
exceptional taxes. This has led to complex legal provisions to handle this 
interaction (Wälde and Kolo 2008), but there have been a number of  
international arbitration claims in relation to taxation, especially in the 
EI sector (Transnational Institute 2016). These contractual governance 
structures, national laws and regulations, as well as international treaties, 
form a complex regulatory web, and the resulting legal interactions can 
be surprising and contradictory. Also, the ad hoc nature of  concession 
contracts and other structural features of  EI investment make this sector 
particularly prone to corruption. 
An important response has been the development of  transparency 
obligations, in the form of  country-by-country reporting (CbCR). 
The EITI has established a global standard for disclosure of  company 
payments and government receipts, governed by a multi-stakeholder 
model.3 This has now inspired formal legal requirements in the US and 
the EU. The Dodd-Frank Act introduced an obligation for any company 
subject to Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements to 
report on a country-by-country basis any payments made to government 
or public agencies in connection with development of  oil, gas or 
mineral reserves, by project and business segment.4 Meanwhile, the EU 
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Accounting and Transparency Directive was approved in July 2013,5 
which will require reporting (for financial years after 2016), by companies 
formed in the EU involved in oil, gas, minerals or logging of  natural 
forests, of  payments made to each government and per project.
These specific provisions for CbCR in the EI sector will apply in 
parallel with the more general arrangements developed as part of  the 
OECD BEPS project for CbCR and transfer pricing documentation.6 
A significant difference is that the specific EI regulations aim at 
public disclosure, whereas the OECD envisions disclosure only to tax 
authorities. However, the information to be included in the CbCR tax-
reporting template is more extensive. The introduction of  CbCR will 
have a major impact on TNC taxation. In the EI sector, where it has 
been spreading for some time due to the EITI, this impact is already 
becoming evident. The increased transparency resulting from EITI 
reporting has greatly contributed to the heightened public awareness and 
debate mentioned above. 
EI taxes and their treatment under international tax rules
Governments raise resource revenue through a variety of  EI levies, 
including CIT, severance (or resource) taxes, royalties, bonus bids 
(payments on contract signing) or production bonuses (payments at 
certain levels of  production), as well as rental payments, each of  which 
affects incentives for private producers to invest in the jurisdiction. 
Royalties, severance taxes and production bonuses are ex post payments, 
and may be volume-based, revenue-based (ad valorem) or rent/profit-
related, and are payments made by companies to governments for the 
right of  extracting resources. Bonus bids or rental payments are ex ante 
payments for the property right to explore for a resource.
Fiscal regimes for the extractives sector are distinctive in that, in addition 
to the usual CIT on business profits, states generally seek to tax the 
rent from natural resource extraction through levies, such as royalties 
and severance (or resource) taxes. Economic rent (sometimes called 
super-normal profit) is defined as the excess of  revenue over the costs of  
discovery, development and production, less a normal return to capital. 
Depending on the choice of  base, each type of  EI levy captures varying 
amounts of  economic rent. Rent-based levies are specifically designed 
to capture economic rent, distinguishing it from other volume-, revenue- 
or profit-based levies. In particular, they provide an explicit or implicit 
deduction for the full cost of  financing, including the imputed cost of  
equity financing and full loss offsetting, whereas a profit-based levy 
typically does not include the cost of  equity financing (Chen and Mintz 
2012). Revenue-based or ad valorem levies take account of  market prices, 
but they do not explicitly incorporate costs into the base. Nevertheless, 
a case can be made for a price-based royalty (Clausing and Durst 2015). 
Finally, volume-based levies are assessed on production output, and 
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do not explicitly incorporate costs or market prices. In early stages of  
exploration and production, a rent-based levy will generate much lower 
or negative returns, which may be carried forward under a Resource 
Rent Tax or be refundable under an R-based cash flow tax (IMF 2012: 
32-33). However, once all economic costs are covered, rent-based taxes 
can be expected to produce significantly higher revenue than volume-, 
revenue- or profit-based levies.7
Although revenue- and (especially) volume-based levies are considered 
to be less precise instruments in capturing economic rent, there may 
be an inherent tension between the risk preference of  the government 
and the private producer. This preference for risk will affect the timing 
of  payout. Generally, governments with a low risk preference prefer 
earlier and continuous payout, and the private producer prefers payout 
at a later time after all economic costs have been covered. Hence, even 
though rent-based levies are more effective at capturing economic rents, 
governments with lower risk tolerance may prefer ex ante payments, such 
as bonus bids or rental payments, as well as ex post payments, such as 
volume-based or revenue-based levies. Another advantage of  these types 
of  levies is that they are relatively easy to administer, since they do not 
require accounting of  costs (or prices in the case of  volume-based levies 
and ex ante payments). 
However, volume-based levies (and revenue-base levies to some extent) 
used in isolation may have negative consequences for governments. First, 
because both levies disregard costs they may discourage investment, 
usually in the form of  large upfront outlays for exploration, drilling, and 
construction of  extraction and production facilities. Secondly, use of  
volume-based levies alone may result in less than optimal levels of  rent 
at times of  high prices. Given that revenue in the EI sector is notoriously 
volatile due to fluctuating commodity prices, capturing revenue on the 
upswing would be a distinct advantage for a government. Hence, such 
levies should be used in combination with other instruments that more 
precisely capture rent, and also such levies should be set at a relatively 
low rate so as not to discourage investment from private producers. By 
choosing a suitable mix of  EI levies, a country may be able to optimise 
the advantages of  each type.
The choice of  EI tax structure should also take account of  the 
international tax implications. Formally, a country is only bound by 
international tax rules to the extent that it is party to treaties embodying 
them. Many developing countries have few such treaties. They may 
nevertheless be affected by international tax rules in two main ways. 
First, their governments may be advised of  the desirability of  abiding 
by international tax norms, at least in general terms, to meet investor 
expectations. Secondly, recognition of  the compatibility of  a tax with 
international tax rules may have important implications. In particular, it 
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may enable the MNE to claim a credit for tax paid, rather than treating 
it merely as a deductible expense, either under a treaty or a unilateral 
foreign tax credit (McIntyre 2006; McLure, Mintz and Zodrow 2014). 
A credit is usually more beneficial to the company than expensing the 
payment (in any case, eligibility for credit usually allows the company to 
choose), so profit-based taxes are less likely to deter inward investment. 
Rent/profit-related levies directly pose the issue of  compliance with 
international tax rules – especially the separate entity-arm’s length 
principle, which requires the tax authority to assess the profits of  the 
local affiliate by starting from its own accounts, and adjust intra-firm 
transaction prices using accepted transfer pricing methods. Related 
party transactions on the cost side may include intra-firm charges for 
joint costs, such as management fees and technical services, and royalties 
for intellectual property rights. The latter have become increasingly 
significant, as technology has become more important for EIs. Other 
problems include pricing of  equipment transferred from related parties. 
On the revenue side, any revenue-based levy poses the problem of  
pricing sales of  the product at the well head or pit mouth, since observed 
prices are at a market to which the product must be transported. 
However, in the case of  a vertically-integrated firm such sales will be 
to affiliates, and the firm’s revenue will ultimately come from sales of  
refined or processed products to third parties. The intra-firm contract 
price must therefore be evaluated against a suitable benchmark. 
This poses fewer problems than for manufacturing firms, since raw 
material commodities are more widely-traded, and world market price 
benchmarks exist for some types of  resource, such as crude oil and 
many minerals. Such benchmarks have been used by some developing 
countries as a basis for transfer price adjustments, notably in Argentina’s 
so-called Sixth Method. However, they cannot be used directly without 
adjustments, especially for the quality of  the specific product involved 
and its location. The BEPS project reports included revisions of  the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines regarding these adjustments, which essentially 
assimilated the Sixth Method to the arm’s length principle.8 Even with 
adjustments, such prices may not reflect the real value to the company 
(Charlet, Laporte and Rota-Graziosi 2013). Some parts of  the EI sector 
are so dominated by large firms that market prices do not exist, or are 
clearly unsuitable. For minerals such prices are often for refined product 
and require complex ‘netback’ calculations to arrive at appropriate 
export prices (IMF 2012: 30). 
Even a slight variation may make a big difference to profitability. This 
variation is further magnified if  the same benchmark is used for both 
revenue-based and profit-based levies, due to the high marginal rate 
resulting from accumulation. Finally, probably most significant for rent/
profit-related levies in the EI sector is dealing with the opportunities 
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for tax avoidance through financial engineering, since the high level of  
investment involved means that financing terms are very significant. 
Also, specific financial techniques are available for EIs, notably the use of  
derivatives, which can be designed to attribute losses to affiliates in high-
tax countries and profits to those in low-tax jurisdictions (Aarsnes 2011).
Applying a unitary approach to EIs
The analysis above indicates that, unlike in other sectors, it is to some 
extent possible in EIs to avoid the problems posed by international tax 
rules by greater reliance on non-profit-based levies. However, economic 
analysis suggests that such taxes are sub-optimal for capturing the highest 
level of  economic rent. However, for CIT and other profit-related levies, 
the related-party transaction issues have created difficulties. Hence, it 
is important to evaluate how far, and in what ways, the adoption of  a 
UT approach to aggregation and apportionment of  the tax base could 
enhance the design and administration of  such profit-related levies. 
UT approaches define the tax base by aggregating income from a 
corporate unit, and then apportioning the tax base among the relevant 
jurisdictions through a formula. A formula is used as an approximation 
of  the source of  the income based on the location of  economic value-
creating activities, such as investment in labour and capital assets as 
well as gross revenue. In applying a UT approach, the scope of  tax 
base aggregation should be clarified, as it will be greatly affected by the 
treatment of  expenses such as overheads, transportation and intra-firm 
services, and capital costs, such as depreciation and inventory. 
We now turn to an examination of  select UT approaches as currently 
applied to EI sectors in the Canadian and US subnational formulary 
apportionment systems. Each will be examined in regard to the 
individual levies, their corresponding bases, the scope of  tax base 
aggregation and apportionment formulas. Finally, based on these 
case studies, we conclude with an evaluation of  the advantages and 
disadvantages of  such approaches for the EI sector, with a focus on their 
potential application to EI sectors in developing countries.
Case studies in the Canadian and US formulary 
apportionment systems
There is considerable experience of  a UT approach at the subnational 
level in Canada and the US, which are major natural resource producers. 
In the US there is greater variety, due to the lack of  a comprehensive tax 
harmonisation law among the states (see Chapter 10). For example, for 
CIT in the oil, gas and pipelines sector, Alaska requires aggregation of  
all the income and expenses of  the entities that comprise a worldwide 
unitary business, and apportionment through a special formula that 
takes into account the amount of  resource extracted. Moreover, a 
combined report of  worldwide activities of  the unitary business is 
required in a taxpayer’s annual filing. At the provincial level in Canada, 
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income earned from corporations with permanent establishments in 
more than one jurisdiction is subject to allocation through a two-factor 
formula, comprised of  gross revenue and payroll. However, there is no 
aggregation of  the tax base beyond the legal entity level (in other words, 
no consolidation of  corporate groups). Although there is diversity in 
royalty and CIT rates among the resource-producing provinces, the CIT 
base and allocation formula for the extractive industry follow the general 
rules set for other industries. The following sections describe these 
systems in more detail.
Extractive industries and provincial taxation in Canada
Extractive industries are subject to both CIT and royalties at provincial 
level. CIT in each province follows the federal base in determining 
revenue and costs. The provincial royalties are mostly profit-based in 
Canada – except for conventional oil and gas, which historically began as 
a well-by-well royalty on sales. In Alberta’s revenue-based royalty system, 
royalty rates vary by the volume and price for each well, which is a rough 
manner to account for costs that are not deductible from the base. With 
the development of  non-conventional oil and gas projects, provincial 
governments have in recent years resorted to profit-based or rent-based 
regimes applied on large projects or at the firm level. 
Mining royalties in Canada have historically been based on profits. In 
earlier years, provinces applied royalties on gross profit (no deduction 
was provided for borrowing costs), and capital costs were depreciated. 
To encourage processing, the provinces provided a generous deduction 
for processing capital costs. In the 1980s, British Columbia introduced 
a cash flow mining tax, whereby capital expenditure is expensed against 
mining income or carried forward, indexed at a government bond rate 
to preserve the value of  the deduction written off future income. The 
Alberta government, with respect to oil sand developments, also adopted 
this cash flow approach to the British Columbia mining tax.
In Canada, the main levies on resource rents are provincial royalties and 
bonus bids, which is consistent with provincial ownership of  resources 
under the Canadian constitution. Corporate income tax levies are 
smaller than royalties, in part because corporate tax policy is focussed, at 
least in principle, on a neutral treatment of  different activities, especially 
following the proposals of  the 1997 federal Technical Committee on 
Taxation, which recommended the removal of  special preferences for 
certain industries, along with corporate rate reductions. 
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Figure 9.1 Comparing royalties and CIT payable by Canadian extractive resource industry, 
2008-2012
(CAD$ billion)
 
Source: Authors’ estimate based on Statistic Canada data and Canadian provincial budgets, 
various years. 
Canada’s CIT allocation formula has been an important part of  its 
overall approach to tax harmonisation. Provinces initially operated their 
own corporate income taxes, with income allocated to the province 
according to location of  headquarters, with a tax credit provided for 
any taxes paid in other provinces (Smith 1976). Under the 1942 Tax 
Rental Agreements, gross receipts were initially used to divide income 
of  a permanent establishment operating across provincial boundaries 
(Weiner 2005). With new tax rental agreements after the Second World 
War (1947-52), the allocation principles became even more important to 
businesses, as Quebec and Ontario wished to levy independent corporate 
taxes. In 1946 the provinces adopted a common approach based on two 
factors: payroll and gross receipts. 
Canada considered the use of  capital as a factor, as in the Massachusetts 
formula in the US. However, it was felt that a three-factor approach 
would allocate more revenue to the dominant manufacturing provinces 
(Ontario and Quebec), and less to the Atlantic and western provinces, 
since the sales factor was based on consumer purchases (destination-
based), as opposed to production (origin-based) (Canada 1997: para. 
11.10). However, in later years resource-rich provinces became 
concerned that the formula resulted in too little profit allocated to them, 
given that the destination-based sales factor resulted in the allocation 
of  resource profits to consuming provinces like Quebec and Ontario. 
However, given that difficult negotiations over the common formula take 
place in a zero-sum game, the formula has not been changed.
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The common two-factor approach in Canada has not changed in 70 
years. As outlined in Chapter 10, its virtue is that the provinces agree 
to a common formula, unlike in the United States. It has resulted in 
lower compliance and administrative costs, as well as fewer economic 
distortions. However, because Canada does not have corporate group 
taxation, businesses could avoid allocating revenue across jurisdictions 
by setting up separate entities in each province, subject to separate 
accounting rules. Businesses thus have some discretion to avoid allocation 
if  it helps reduce tax payments.9 Nonetheless, in 1997 about 45 per 
cent of  corporate taxable income was allocated across provinces, with 
roughly half  non-allocated income being represented by small corporate 
businesses (Canada 1997: para. 11.9). 
The Canadian allocation approach begins with identifying whether there 
are permanent establishments operating in more than one province. A 
permanent establishment is a fixed place of  business, which includes an 
oil well, farm or mine. The corporation is regarded as resident where 
its principal place of  business is located. The offshore areas (continental 
shelf) are treated as part of  the provinces of  Newfoundland & Labrador 
and Nova Scotia. As discussed in Chapter 10, the general formula 
requires the company’s domestic income to be allocated to each province 
according to an equally-weighted sum of  the share of  payroll and gross 
revenue by province. 
However, income earned by mining and oil and gas companies is 
allocated in accordance with the general formula. Extractive industries 
in Canada are therefore treated similarly to other industries with 
respect to extraction, refining or processing, and retail operations. The 
income is allocated across provinces according to the payroll and gross 
revenue shares. If  separate subsidiaries are established for different 
operations, allocation only applies to those subsidiaries with permanent 
establishments in various industries.
As for provincial royalties, the corporate income allocation rules are 
irrelevant in the sense that income or sales are typically measured on a 
project or well basis, and administered by energy or mining departments 
at the provincial level.
Extractive industries and state taxation in the US
The US constitution governs federal and state laws, and the federal and 
state governments share taxation powers, except for customs duties. 
Within these bounds, the states levy both direct and indirect taxes 
according to their constitutions, laws and regulations. In all US states, 
mineral resources are either owned by the federal government, the state 
government or by private persons. Generally, the landowner owns the 
right to subsurface minerals, unless the title has been previously severed. 
However, in some US states, such as Louisiana, the state retains title to all 
land beneath water.
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For federally-owned lands, such as the National Petroleum Reserve in 
Alaska and the offshore Gulf  of  Mexico, oil and gas leases are obtained 
through auction, after which a royalty applies to 12.5 per cent of  the 
value of  onshore production, and 16.67 per cent of  the value of  offshore 
production. Coal mining on federal lands is subject to a 12.5 per cent 
royalty on gross value for surface mining, and 8 per cent royalty on 
gross value for subsurface mining, while non-fuel mining operations are 
exempt from federal royalties. There is also a federal excise tax assessed 
on coal production at 4.4 per cent of  the sales price. 
Under current federal CIT laws, there are various tax preferences for 
domestic oil, gas and coal production. The US also has an elective 
loss transfer system for federal CIT, which allows consolidation of  
the tax base of  subsidiaries in a corporate group in which the parent 
owns, directly or indirectly, at least 80 per cent of  the total voting 
power and value of  the stock. As a result profits can offset losses from 
various projects, as well as from up/downstream activities within the 
corporate group.
As explained in Chapter 10, there is no comprehensive federal 
harmonisation law for state taxation. Hence each state has a different 
extractives policy, and a variation of  severance and corporate income tax 
laws. The states collect royalties (usually 12.5 per cent but increasingly 
higher, up to 18.75 per cent depending on extractive capacity) from oil, 
gas and coal extraction on state-owned lands. In all the US states where 
land is privately-held, extractives royalties are payable to the owner of  
the mineral interest. Some states have minimum royalty statutes, which 
typically follow the 12.5 per cent royalty of  the federal government, 
but in many cases there is no statutory minimum. In addition to 
these royalties, states generally assess two additional levies: a CIT or 
franchise tax, and a severance tax. However, Alaska is unique in that 
its CIT is assessed under a global unitary approach for the oil, gas and 
pipelines sector.
Alaska oil, gas and pipelines sector
The state of  Alaska is a leading oil-producing state, with over 190 million 
barrels produced annually.10 Companies in the extractives industry 
of  Alaska are subject to three primary levies in addition to municipal 
property taxes: royalty payments, severance taxes and corporate income 
tax. The statutory minimum for royalty payments for oil and gas 
extraction on state-owned lands is 12.5 per cent. Special taxes/charges 
for the oil and gas sector include the Oil and Gas Petroleum Production 
Tax (PPT); the Oil and Gas Property Tax, at the rate of  2 per cent of  
the market value of  exploration, production and pipeline production 
property in the state; and Oil Conservation Charges, totalling 5¢ per 
barrel produced in the state. 
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From 2014, the PPT was set at 35 per cent of  net value of  production 
(or production tax value) in the state. The net value of  production is 
determined by the gross value at point of  production, less deductions 
for lease expenditure and adjustments to lease expenditure. Gross 
value at the point of  production includes a deduction for the actual 
costs of  transportation. Lease expenditure is then subtracted from the 
gross value. Lease expenditure includes ordinary and necessary direct 
costs upstream of  the point of  production, and overhead expenses for 
exploring, developing and producing oil or gas deposits in the state.11 
Lease expenditure must then be adjusted by subtracting payments or 
credits received by the producer for other leasehold or management 
payments; insurance and other production-related reimbursements; and 
amounts received from the sale or transfer of  assets acquired as a result 
of  the leasehold and oil or gas. There are also gross revenue exclusions 
of  20 per cent for certain new production, with an additional credit of  
$5 per barrel produced. For all other production, there is a sliding scale, 
non-transferable tax credit of  up to $8 per barrel based on oil prices.
For all extractive sectors Alaska’s CIT applies, with a payment of  
$10,830 on the first $222,000 of  taxable income, and the remaining 
taxable income subject to a tax rate of  9.4 per cent. Under this regime, 
the CIT base is aggregated based on the unitary business principle 
(see Chapter 10 for discussion of  this principle). The unitary business 
determination is a factual, case-by-case analysis: where entities are under 
common control, either directly or indirectly, and the activities of  the 
entities are contributory and complimentary, there is a unitary business. 
For all such taxpayers engaged in a unitary business that derive income 
from sources within and outside of  the state, a combined report of  
income from all sources is required. The tax base is then apportioned 
based on the proportion of  economic factors located within the state, 
vis-à-vis out-of-state economic factors. Consolidated returns are allowed 
in any case, and required when filing a federal consolidated return, but 
separate combined reports are required for each unitary business group 
represented in the federal consolidated return.
The unitary business principle also applies in the taxation of  the oil, gas 
and pipeline sector: each subsector is combined into one unitary business, 
and apportioned according to the formulas below. The oil, gas and 
pipelines sector is subject to worldwide combined reporting, and all other 
sectors file returns based on water’s edge combined reporting. 
The oil, gas and pipeline sector tax base is apportioned by a formula 
based on sales (including tariffs), property and an extraction factor, 
consisting of  total production of  barrels of  oil plus 1/6 Mcf  of  natural 
gas. If  the taxpayer is engaged in all three subsectors (oil, gas and 
pipelines), the formula factors are sales, property (including intangible 
drilling and development costs), and the extraction factor. If  the taxpayer 
142 
is not involved in the production of  oil and gas or of  gas only, the 
formula factors are property and sales. If  the taxpayer is not involved in 
the pipeline transport of  oil or gas, the formula factors are property and 
extraction. Thus, for a taxpayer engaged in all three subsectors – oil, gas 
and pipelines – Alaska taxable income equals the total worldwide income 
multiplied by the ratio of  Alaska economic activity in proportion to 
economic activity elsewhere.
Alaska taxable income
Although Alaska adopted the Uniform Division of  Income for Tax 
Purposes Act (UDITPA) in 1959, and has used the three-factor property, 
payroll and sales formula since that time, it was not until 1978 that the 
legislature found that the standard formula did not fairly reflect Alaska 
income for oil and gas corporations. In response, the legislature adopted 
a law requiring oil and gas companies to calculate Alaska taxable income 
using separate accounting. This change was met with such a high level of  
litigation from taxpayers that three years later the legislature modified the 
apportionment formula for the oil, gas and pipelines sector to include an 
extraction factor. In 1991 the legislature allowed companies to use water’s 
edge apportionment; however, the oil, gas and pipelines sector was 
allowed to continue to report on a worldwide basis (Alaska Tax Division 
2012: 26-7).
Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision in Tesoro Corp. 
v. Alaska solidifying the application of  worldwide combination of  a 
unitary business and formula apportionment with respect to oil and gas 
companies. Tesoro Corporation is a petroleum company, headquartered 
in Texas and comprising 33 subsidiaries organised into five business 
segments – one is based in Alaska, the remaining segments in Bolivia, 
Louisiana and Texas. When the exploration and production business 
segment (located in Bolivia and Texas) realised profits of  approximately 
$200 million from the sale of  an interest in a gas field, and sums from a 
successful breach of  contract claim (that were far greater than those of  
the Alaska retail and marketing segment), Tesoro sought to isolate this 
profitable segment from the Alaska unitary business in order to avoid 
bringing this income into the combined tax base. Upon examination of  
the unitary nature of  the business, the Court ruled that the exploration 
and production segment belonged to the Alaska unitary business, and, 
as a result, all the income from the business segment was correctly 
included in the unitary tax base and apportioned to arrive at the Alaska 
taxable income. 
Comparative revenue is detailed in Table 9.1, and a comparison of  the 
PPT and CIT is below in Table 9.2. Although both taxes incorporate 
Alaska sales
worldwide sales
1
3
Alaska property
worldwide property
1
3
Alaska prod’n
worldwide prod’n
Worldwide net 
income
1
3
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costs at some level, the bases and scope of  consolidation are very 
different. The base of  the PPT is the net value of  in-state production 
only, while the base of  CIT is the global profit/loss of  the entire unitary 
business. Thus, the PPT operates from the bottom-up, and requires 
attribution of  costs to in-state operations, while CIT operates from the 
top-down, by removing all intra-group transactions to determine the 
overall profitability of  the consolidated corporate group. Applying both 
perspectives, the tax administration has more information to ensure 
consistency in costs reporting. In addition, the understanding of  in-state 
costs in relation to overall profits can inform the design of  more efficient 
production taxes.
Table 9.1 Tax revenue from EI sector in Alaska
Revenue source Revenue collection ($ million – FY 2012)
Petroleum Production Tax 6,146.1
State oil and gas rents, royalties, bonuses and interest 2,031.7
Oil and gas CIT (state-level only) 568.8
Oil and gas Property Tax 111.2
Source: Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources, Spring 2013
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Table 9.2 Alaska oil and gas CIT and PPT comparison
Tax type Base Rate Consolidation scope Deductions Excluded deductions
PPT net value of 
production = 
gross value 
at point of 
production less 
deductions 
(for lease 
expenditure less 
adjustments)
35% in-state production 
only
gross value deductions 
= lower of the actual 
or reasonable costs of 
transportation
lease expenditure = ordinary 
and necessary upstream 
costs as well as direct costs 
and overhead expenses for 
exploring, development and 
production in the state
lease adjustments = subtract 
payments or credits received 
by the producer for other 
leasehold or management 
payments; insurance and 
other production-related 
reimbursements; and amounts 
received from the sale or 
transfer of assets acquired as 
a result of the leasehold and 
oil or gas
depreciation, depletion or 
amortisation; royalty or 
production payments; interest 
or financing charges for 
raising equity or debt capital; 
fines, penalties, arbitration or 
indemnity costs; acquisition 
or organisation costs; 
abandonment or clean-up 
costs; political lobbying costs; 
taxes measured by net income
CIT net income $10,830 
on first 
$222,000; 
remaining 
subject to 
9.4%
worldwide 
net income of 
consolidated 
business 
apportioned by 
in-state sales and 
tariffs, property + 
intangible drilling 
and exploration 
costs and extraction
same as federal taxable income 
expenses and deductions 
except those in the next 
column 
taxes based on or measured by 
net income; intangible drilling 
and development costs should 
be capitalised and depreciated 
(not expensed); depletion 
deducted on a cost basis only 
(not percentage); accelerated 
or bonus depreciation not 
allowed
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Assessing the unitary approach for the EI sector 
This chapter has described EI tax structure variations at the US and 
Canadian subnational levels, to explore whether a unitary approach 
could enhance tax and royalty policies from the sector. On the one 
hand, it has been observed that although the scope of  aggregation 
varies widely, the US and Canadian subnational CIT regimes employ 
a unitary approach by aggregating the tax base across jurisdictional 
borders. However, for other EI levies the base is restricted to the source 
jurisdiction – and sometimes even to the project or well. In this section, 
we assess the suitability a global unitary approach under three aspects: 
revenue composition, aggregation of  the tax base, and apportionment of  
the tax base. We conclude with recommendations in the final section. 
Composition of mineral revenue 
Evaluating the case studies of  US states12 and Canadian provinces in this 
study, the first point is that in the overall mix of  revenue collection from 
the extractives industries, higher revenue is derived through EI levies 
than CIT. Given the right combination and design, EI levies have the 
potential to capture greater economic rents from oil, gas and mining than 
taxes restricted to corporate profits. In some cases, such as the Minnesota 
taconite industry, CIT has been replaced completely by a revenue-based 
(with limited deductions for refinement) EI levy of  2.45 per cent. In 
Alaska, despite the presence of  worldwide combined reporting rules that 
aggregate the CIT tax base for the oil, gas and pipelines sector, revenue 
from CIT constitutes less than 10 per cent of  revenue from the Petroleum 
Production Tax. While information on revenue composition from EIs in 
developing countries is scarce, available evidence from African countries 
indicates that CIT collection often exceeds other EI levies.13 There may, 
of  course, be good reasons for this difference – for example, there may be 
more scope for levies such as royalties in more mature industries such as 
those in the US and Canada, if  initial development expenses have been 
recovered. Nevertheless, given the greater potential in capturing rents, it 
could be more advantageous for African countries to place more reliance 
on EI levies than CIT.14
Tax base aggregation
Despite the comparatively smaller contribution to revenue from CIT in 
the US and Canadian subnational tax systems, tax base aggregation and 
combined reporting present the advantage of  providing a clearer picture 
of  global investment, production, revenue and corporate structures, 
which aids in understanding the true income and costs borne by private 
producers. These costs are a factor in all types of  extractives revenue 
collection instruments – even those that are volume-based, as the royalty 
rate per unit of  production will reflect a sharing of  profits that accounts 
for production costs. When governments have a clearer understanding 
of  costs and risks involved in exploiting their natural resources, they 
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are able to design more effective EI levies that reflect these costs and 
risks without deterring investment. Likewise, under rules that aggregate 
the tax base, separate business structures no longer offer a tax benefit, 
either because of  the redefinition of  the tax base or because companies 
now must combine their business operations into a single combined tax 
return. Hence, private producers can also allocate resources in more 
efficient ways. 
It is important to consider carefully the level at which accounts are 
aggregated to define the tax base. A worldwide system of  combined 
reporting may involve an increase in the information and reporting 
requirements for firms, but the revenue gains to governments from 
disabling income shifting and inflated costs reporting would likely 
compensate for the additional administrative resources required. Another 
potential problem for worldwide combined reporting, especially for small 
economies largely dependent on local extractive revenue, is the global 
offsetting of  profits and losses, which is exacerbated by large upfront 
costs involved in the extractives industry. As the Tesoro case from Alaska 
illustrates, tax claims on profits earned by related companies in foreign 
jurisdictions can result in conflict. Conversely, sharing global losses may 
be politically unpopular in host countries, especially where there are 
acute demands for extractives revenue to finance development priorities.
At the other end of  the aggregation spectrum, a rent/profit-related EI 
levy could be completely ring-fenced, and all sales of  extracted minerals 
taxed at the source. This system would satisfy source entitlement 
concerns, and perhaps involve a simpler reporting scheme. However, 
ring fencing may introduce more complexity since costs (which are 
usually incurred at higher levels of  a vertically-integrated firm) must 
be segregated, and an appropriate proportion attributed to a specific 
project. This complexity would incur increased compliance costs 
for private producers, as well as increased administration for the 
government. Moreover, without the expertise and information to be 
able to understand the overall costs and revenue generated by the firm 
as a whole, the government may not be able to accurately establish 
appropriate prices and costs.
Additionally, since other losses cannot be used to offset ring-fenced 
projects, the balance of  ex ante risk between the firm and the state is 
altered, which may have important effects on investment decisions. 
Given the volatility of  world prices, variability of  mineral quality, and 
high potential of  profit, a profits/rent-based tax restricted to in-state 
production, complemented by a global combined reporting unitary 
approach for a CIT, could provide an optimal mix for EI levies.
Tax base apportionment
When a government adopts a global unitary approach to taxation of  
the EI sector, another important consideration is the apportionment of  
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the tax base. The unitary approach used in Canada allocates corporate 
income through a formula of  two factors: sales by destination and 
payroll. Although there are special formula rules for certain industries, 
the EI sector falls under the general allocation formula. This results in 
lower revenue for resource-rich provinces: sales by destination attributes 
the revenue to other consuming provinces, and, due to its capital-
intensive nature, the EI sector requires comparatively fewer jobs than 
most other industries. The single sales by destination formula, now 
adopted by 16 US states, attributes all revenue of  minerals sold to 
out-of-state consumers outside of  the state. The Massachusetts three-
factor formula, once dominant in the US states but now only used by 
12 states, incorporates a factor for tangible assets, which would include 
tangible assets used in the EI sector, but would continue to attribute sales 
of  the minerals away from the state of  production when the mineral 
is sold to out-of-state consumers. This is often the case in integrated 
economies, where minerals may be extracted from the source state and 
shipped out-of-state for processing, refinement and manufacturing. It 
is also the case in some developing countries, where minerals extracted 
from the source state are generally shipped abroad for processing.
In response, some US states have used more aggressive means to capture 
their mineral revenue for taxation. For the past three decades, Alaska 
has used a special formula for the oil, gas and pipelines sector that 
includes sales and tariffs, property, and an extraction factor, consisting of  
total production of  barrels of  oil plus 1/6 Mcf  of  natural gas. Another 
way for source states to capture mineral revenue under a formulary 
apportionment scheme would be to adopt an origin-based sales factor, 
as used in the apportionment formulas in the Swiss cantons (see Chapter 
10). Due to the prominent source entitlement concerns in the EI sector, 
alterations to a general apportionment formula may be necessary, 
especially the sales factor. This can be justified by the fact that countries 
of  consumption can also apply often high taxes on the sector, especially 
on petroleum products.
Conclusion
Given the advantages and limitations of  a unitary approach as applied 
to the EI sector, use of  a CIT under global tax base aggregation, 
in combination with other rent/profit-related levies assessed on a 
more restricted base, such as the source jurisdiction, could enable 
more effective administration of  all taxes on the EI sector in the 
following ways: 
 l The information from the worldwide combined report, which is 
top-down, can serve as backstop to costs reporting under other EI 
levies that require separate accounting, which is bottom-up
 l Worldwide combined reporting under a global unitary approach aligns 
with current reform initiatives, such as the EITI and CbCR
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 l A unitary approach to CIT enables more effective design of  other 
rent/profit-related EI levies that require a clearer picture of  costs and 
risks borne by the industry
 l A unitary approach to CIT can be more favourable for investment 
because it allows global offsetting of  corporate losses
 l Finally, in apportioning the aggregated tax base, source-based factors, 
such as special extraction factors or origin-based sales factors for the 
EI, can be used to satisfy source entitlement concerns.
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Notes
1. e.g. the widespread practice described as ‘galamsey’ in Ghana.
2. Lundstøl, Raballand and Nyirongo (2013); Curtis, Ngowi and Waris 
(2012). There have also been inquiries and reports by governments, 
e.g. in Tanzania the Bomani Report (2008), and an active public debate, 
notably involving the then opposition shadow finance minister, Zitto 
Kabwe, see http://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/?s=mining. For the legal 
framework of mining taxation in Tanzania, see Muganyizi (2012). 
3. The EITI Principles were agreed at a conference in London in 2003, 
and the EITI Standard, extending to implementation, governance and 
management, was adopted in 2013: see http://eiti.org/. 
4. Wall St Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, s.1504; although 
the rulemaking process has been lengthy and subject to legal challenges.
5. Directive 2013/34/EU, to be implemented by member states within 
two years.
6. See OECD (2015a Action 13).
7. Government revenue may also be derived by other means, e.g. 
production-sharing agreements, especially in petroleum; these are not 
considered here. However, similar issues may arise in that context – 
notably, transfer pricing. 
8. See OECD (2015a Action 8-10: 51-54) on Commodity Transactions, 
and for a critique see BEPS Monitoring Group (2015).
9. Allocation reduces taxes if the weights allocate more income to low-
tax rate jurisdictions. e.g. Quebec had a much lower CIT rate than other 
provinces in the 1980s – companies with sales and payroll primarily in 
Quebec would prefer allocation rather than setting up separate affiliates 
in each province.
10. The federal government owns over two-thirds of the area in the state; 
state-owned lands comprise almost one-third; and privately-owned land 
other than native lands comprises less than 1%.
11. Lease expenditure does not include depreciation, depletion or 
amortisation; royalty or production payments; taxes measured by net 
income; interest or financing charges for raising equity or debt capital; 
fines, penalties, arbitration or indemnity costs; acquisition or organisation 
costs; abandonment or clean-up costs; or political lobbying costs. Any 
other expense incurred through internal transfer must be demonstrated 
by the producer as not exceeding fair market value.
12. In this chapter we have discussed in detail only the state of Alaska; 
however, we draw conclusions from the wider analyses in the longer 
paper (Siu, Picciotto, Mintz and Sawyerr 2015).
13. e.g. in the oil sector in Chad (2010), CIT revenue comprised 69% of the 
revenue share while royalties comprised only 28% (IMF 2012: 23, fig. 3). 
Further, EITI reports from the mining sector in Ghana indicate that CIT 
receipts comprised 65% of total levies in 2011. 
14. For evidence that a price-based royalty may effectively track profitability 
while avoiding many of the problems of a CIT, see Clausing and Durst 
(2015).
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Lessons from Existing Subnational 
Unitary and Formulary Apportionment 
Approaches for a Regional Transition 
to Unitary Taxation
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Pereira Valadão
Introduction
In the last century, the federal states of  the United States, Canada 
and Switzerland created subnational corporate tax systems to enable 
economic integration and growth through greater tax coordination. 
In this century, regional economic integration has become the trend in 
today’s global economy. The European Union (EU) has been a front-
runner in regional economic integration, and has developed a proposal 
for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) that would 
harmonise, consolidate and apportion the EU tax base on a regional 
level. Other regional economic communities in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa, which have also embarked on a path of  economic integration, 
including tax harmonisation, are watching the EU experiment closely. 
However, there are lessons to be learned from existing subnational tax 
base aggregation and apportionment systems that would be helpful 
in a regional transition to unitary tax systems. This work analyses 
these systems, and then outlines possibilities and trends towards the 
implementation of  unitary taxation approaches in four regional 
economic communities.
Existing models of subnational formulary apportionment
Formulary apportionment systems share the corporate income tax 
base among the tax jurisdictions in which the corporation conducts 
business activity. This section describes subnational systems of  formulary 
apportionment in the US, Canada and Switzerland. 
Subnational formulary apportionment in the US
After the 16th Amendment authorised Congress to assess federal income 
taxes in 1913, many states followed this trend by adopting corporate 
income taxes at the state level. However, US states had been taxing 
commerce since the early 1800s. In an open federal market, such 
commerce increasingly took on an interstate character: express courier, 
railroads and telegraph companies flourished by the mid-1800s, and 
quickly became subjects of  state taxation. In this context, the ‘unit rule’ 
Chapter 10
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became accepted for tax assessment of  property and company gross 
receipts. Notably, in State Railroad Tax Cases (1875) the US Supreme 
Court upheld an assessment on company property apportioned by track 
mileage located within the state.1 Under this principle, the property 
or gross receipts of  a company are first valued as a whole, and then 
apportioned among tax jurisdictions according to a factor reflecting 
its presence in the state, such as track or telegraph miles (Isaacs 1926). 
When the states also began to adopt corporate income tax, the unit rule 
was applied to the net income from multistate business activities. Thus 
this early concept, which evolved into the unitary business principle, 
constitutes the US subnational approach to unitary taxation. 
A state’s taxing power is circumscribed by the US Constitution. State 
taxes can apply to out-of-state corporations, but an economic nexus 
must be shown between the profits from the business activity and the 
taxing state. The Due Process Clause requires ‘some definite link, some 
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or 
transaction it seeks to tax’,2 while under the Commerce Clause there 
must be a ‘substantial nexus’.3 A few states have enacted statutes to define 
economic nexus, based either on qualitative factors or quantitative levels 
of  revenue, such as a minimum of  $1 million in sales receipts in the case 
of  New York. In other cases the issue is left to the courts to decide, and 
some state courts have accepted that the nexus requirement does not 
necessarily require physical presence. They have developed a concept 
of  significant economic presence, which involves an examination of  the 
‘quality and quantity of  economic contacts’ as well as ‘the frequency, 
quantity and systematic nature of  a taxpayer’s economic contacts with 
a state’. For example, in MBNA America Bank, MBNA had no physical 
presence in the state, but because it ‘systematically and continuously 
engaged in direct mail and telephone and solicitation and promotion 
in the state’ and had ‘significant gross receipts attributable to customers 
in the state’ (from financial services), the state court upheld the state’s 
exercise of  tax jurisdiction over the income earned from the activity in 
the state.4
In 1957, the Uniform Law Commission developed the Uniform Division 
of  Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), to provide a common 
template for state apportionment of  the tax base, and by 1967 the 
states developed a Multistate Tax Compact (MTC), which incorporated 
UDITPA in its Article IV. To date, there is no federal law requiring 
uniformity or harmonisation of  state taxation. Although all the US states 
with a corporate income tax follow the basic principles of  the MTC 
to aggregate and apportion the income tax base for corporations with 
multistate business activities, there are significant variations, especially on 
the apportionment formula. State corporate income tax bases generally 
begin with federal taxable income as a starting point, and the tax base is 
comprised of  gross income less allowable deductions (Duncan 2005). Tax 
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incentives offered by states for economic development or social purposes 
create the greatest source of  divergence of  tax base definitions among 
the states. Schedules for depreciation of  capital assets may also differ 
from federal allowances. 
The constitutional requirements for fair apportionment developed by the 
US Supreme Court have also led to the unitary business principle, on the 
grounds that when ‘factors of  profitability arise from the operation of  
the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterise the income 
of  the business as having a single identifiable “source”’.5 Court decisions 
have specified characteristics of  a unitary business, including functional 
integration, centralisation of  management and economies of  scale. 
The MTC provides: ‘A unitary business is a single economic enterprise 
that is made up either of  separate parts of  a single business entity or of  
a commonly controlled group of  business entities that are sufficiently 
interdependent, integrated and interrelated through their activities so 
as to provide a synergy and mutual benefit that produces a sharing or 
exchange of  value among them and a significant flow of  value to the 
separate parts’ (MTC Regulation IV.1(b)).
However, the dual requirements of  common control and a unitary 
business have resulted in considerable litigation, especially over which 
activities of  a corporate group are sufficiently integrated to be considered 
part of  a unitary business.
The tax base for a multinational corporation may be consolidated to 
include only its business activities within the US under a water’s edge 
approach. Under this approach, only US domestic net income is pooled 
together for apportionment among the subnational taxing jurisdictions 
that have some economic connection to the income. Alternatively, the 
tax base for a multinational may be consolidated through a worldwide 
approach, often referred to in the US as worldwide combined reporting. 
This means that all its profits (and losses), both US and foreign, are 
pooled together for apportionment. A number of  US states that 
required worldwide combined reporting, particularly California, were 
put under strong pressure in the 1980s, which eventually led to them 
offering multinationals the option of  filing only on a water’s edge basis 
(McIntyre and Pomp 1995; Pomp 2009 vol. 2 at 10-49-50). This led 
a group of  states (approximately ten) to adopt water’s edge election 
rules, which nevertheless require the reporting of  income from related 
companies in some foreign jurisdictions, defined as low-tax jurisdictions 
(Siu et al. 2014).
Once all taxable income is aggregated, most states characterise income as 
either business or non-business and only apportion the business income, 
while allocating the non-business income to a specific jurisdiction. State 
apportionment formulas have evolved over the past century: a three-
factor formula, using sales, payroll and property, equally-weighted, called 
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the ‘Massachusetts Formula’, was predominant by the 1950s but is now 
used by only 9 states; the same formula, with double or greater weighted 
sales (or the choice thereof), is used by 15 states; and a single destination-
based sales formula is used by 25 states (FTA 2016). 
As early as 1920, the US Supreme Court upheld an apportionment 
formula based on a single asset factor.6 In the 1990s adoption of  the 
single sales formula increased, as states sought to attract economic 
investment (see Chapter 6). All states using a sales factor apply a 
destination basis for sales. Importantly, to ensure that income is not 
untaxed, states have adopted throwback or throw-out rules. These 
provide that when the destination basis attributes the income to a state 
where it is not taxable (e.g. if  there is insufficient nexus), sales income is 
attributed to the last state of  production, or sales are thrown out from the 
formula entirely. All but a few states have such rules, and approximately 
half  the states using a single-sales factor have them.
In regard to reporting, most states require or permit a combined report, 
which includes reporting of  taxable income in all jurisdictions from all 
business activities, either on a water’s edge or worldwide basis. Under 
federal law taxpayers have the option of  filing a consolidated return, 
provided every member of  the affiliated group consents. A consolidated 
return differs from a combined return in that consolidated taxable 
income is computed by calculating the separate taxable incomes of  the 
members, aggregating them, and increasing or decreasing the result by 
items that are computed on a consolidated basis, such as ordinary and 
capital gains and losses. Thus, with consolidated returns, the intragroup 
transactions (and associated transfer prices) remain. However, with 
combined reporting, all intragroup transactions are eliminated in arriving 
at a total combined profit/loss for the group. 
The absence of  comprehensive federal legislation requiring tax 
harmonisation reflects a broader struggle between states and the federal 
government to protect their taxing powers and revenue, and to maintain 
a balance between promotion of  economic development and funding 
public services. However, within this context some states have devised 
effective solutions to extend their corporate tax base by expanding the 
scope of  tax jurisdiction, including the use of  significant economic nexus 
concepts, as well as by extending the scope of  tax base consolidation and 
reporting. Indeed, despite the political uproar in the 1980s, worldwide 
combined reporting is now applied (either allowed, required or required 
under limited circumstances) in 17 of  the US states. 
Subnational corporate income allocation in Canada
Canada is a federal state, and since the British North America Act of  
1867 provinces have had the power to levy direct taxes within their 
borders, while the federal government has had access to all objects of  
taxation. In 1917 the federal government began to assess an income tax. 
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In 1941, the provinces agreed to give up their income and estate taxes 
in return for rental payments. These tax rental agreements continued 
until 1962, when the federal and provincial governments (except Ontario 
and Quebec) entered into tax collection agreements, which restored 
the provincial income tax. Today, all provinces have tax collection 
agreements with the government of  Canada, apart from Alberta and 
Quebec. Under the Federal Constitution, the federal and provincial 
governments have concurrent powers in the field of  direct taxation. 
The Federal Income Tax Act and Part IV of  the Regulations under the 
Income Tax Act provide rules for administering direct taxes on income, 
and allocating the corporate income tax base among provinces. At the 
subnational level, the provinces have legislation and regulations, which 
align with federal law and provide for varying tax credits against the base.
Under the tax collection agreements, provinces are required to use the 
same taxable income base as the federal government, the same rules 
for determining residency, and the same methods of  allocating the tax 
base among the provinces. For companies not resident in the province, 
tax jurisdiction is based on permanent establishment (PE) rules, as used 
in international tax, which generally require a physical presence. All 
provinces, including non-signatories to the tax collection agreements, 
have adopted a harmonised tax base, as well as a common formula 
for allocating the tax base. Nevertheless, the federal and provincial 
calculation of  total tax liability can differ due to varying tax credits 
against the base. Each province and territory has its own tax incentive 
structure. Higher tax rates among the provinces range from 10 per 
cent to 16 per cent, with lower rates ranging from 0 per cent to 8 per 
cent. Provincial tax incentives are typically given to encourage political 
contributions, research and development, energy efficiency, job training 
and multimedia industry sectors.
Canada does not allow consolidation of  income from separate 
legal entities. However, income from interprovincial PEs of  a single 
corporation is consolidated. With the exception of  specific rules for 
special industries, a two-factor formula is used for allocation: gross 
revenue (i.e. sales), and salaries and wages. Where there is only one 
factor present in the province, the formula should only contain that 
factor. Gross revenue from the sale of  goods is generally allocated on 
a destination basis. Gross revenue from services is attributed to the 
province in which they are rendered. Wages and salaries also include 
fees for services that would normally be performed by employees of  
the corporation, and they are attributed to the particular PE where the 
services are rendered. Along with the general two-factor formula, which 
is used uniformly throughout the provinces, there are nine different 
formulas applied to ten specific industries. These include insurance (net 
premiums only), banks (loans and deposits instead of  gross revenue), trust 
and loan companies (gross revenue only), railway companies (equated 
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track kilometres and gross ton kilometres), airlines (capital cost of  fixed 
assets and revenue plane kilometres), grain elevators (bushels of  grain 
instead of  gross revenue), bus and truck operators (kilometres driven 
instead of  gross revenue), ships (port-call-tonnage instead of  gross 
revenue), and pipelines (kilometres of  pipe instead of  gross revenue). By 
agreement with the provincial tax authority, corporations with multiple 
business lines may also divide taxable income according to the applicable 
formulas for each type of  business.
On the annual return, taxpayers with PEs in more than one province or 
territory must report on the same income tax return amounts for each 
province or territory in which they had a PE in the tax year. Where a 
corporation has a PE in a province in a year, 10 per cent of  its taxable 
income earned in the year in that province may be deducted from its 
federal taxable income.
The Canadian provincial corporate income tax system is distinctive 
in its uniformity relative to other jurisdictions following a unitary/
formulary apportionment approach. Although provinces can apply 
different tax rates and credits to the tax base, the tax base itself  is 
harmonised: it is determined from the federal definition of  income, and 
the same set of  general and special allocation formulas are used by all 
provinces. The weakness of  the system, however, is that income from 
corporate affiliates is not included in the consolidation, and therefore 
it is not unitary in the strict sense. Because firms are not consolidated 
beyond the legal corporate entity, each corporation, which may be part 
of  a larger corporate group, operates a separate accounting system for 
determining corporate taxable income. Consequently, a study has found 
that this separation provides an incentive for multijurisdictional firms to 
shift income, primarily through borrowing and lending among affiliates 
incorporated in different provinces (Mintz and Smart 2004). In federal 
government consultations on the introduction of  a broader consolidation 
of  profits and losses, corporations have favoured consolidation only 
after separate entity accounting, while provinces fear the potentially 
significant erosion of  the provincial tax base, and have requested further 
research on revenue impacts (Richardson and Smart 2013; PwC 2011; 
Ontario 2011).
Subnational formulary apportionment in Switzerland
When the Swiss Confederation was established in 1848, Switzerland 
became a single judicial and economic union – foreign policy, defence, 
customs, postage and coinage were centralised, and no longer 
administered separately by the cantons. Although the levying of  customs 
duties was given to the confederation, income and wealth taxation 
remained with the cantons. Toward the end of  World War I, however, 
the confederation introduced stamp taxes and a National Defence Tax 
(Federal Direct Tax) on income and wealth. Today, this tax, along with 
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Value Added Tax (VAT), is the most significant tax assessed at the federal 
level. While the confederation and the cantons currently have concurrent 
powers of  direct taxation, this right for the confederation expires in 
2020 and must be renewed by popular vote under Article 196(13) of  the 
Federal Constitution. Under Article 128, the confederation is limited to 
a maximum rate of  tax on corporate income of  8.5 per cent. This tax 
is assessed and collected by the cantons, and a minimum of  17 per cent 
of  the gross revenue is allocated to the cantons. Thus, the cantons derive 
much more revenue from corporate income tax than the confederation.
Intercantonal double taxation is prohibited by Article 127(3) of  the Swiss 
Constitution. Article 127 also provides that the main features of  any 
tax, in particular those liable to pay the tax, the object of  the tax and its 
assessment, must be regulated by law, and gives authority to the federal 
government to legislate measures to avoid double taxation among the 
cantons. The federal Supreme Court of  Justice has developed case law 
regarding implementation of  this prohibition against double taxation. 
The Federal Constitution (Article 129) also allows the confederation to 
harmonise the direct taxes imposed by the confederation, the cantons 
and the communes. 
Like the Canadian provinces, the income of  intercantonal business 
activities of  a corporation is consolidated at the individual corporation 
level only, and not at the corporate group level. Transactions between 
affiliates must be reported according to the arm’s length principle. The 
consolidated income includes all income derived from the business, 
including investment property, income from main and secondary 
tax domiciles,7 as well as income of  foreign PEs8 and properties plus 
dividends or capital gains on foreign participations. Income not deriving 
from the business of  the enterprise, such as passive investments, is subject 
to allocation. This income is first allocated to special tax domiciles, and 
the remainder is apportioned between the primary tax domicile and the 
secondary tax domiciles. Income from holdings in other companies is 
apportioned (with the exception of  banks). 
Jurisdiction to tax the income from intercantonal business activities of  a 
corporation is based on tax domicile. A corporation’s business activities 
or presence may give rise to a primary tax domicile, a secondary 
tax domicile, or a specific tax domicile. The only exception to this 
categorisation is for corporations with no link other than registration, 
so called ‘letter-box’ tax domicile. In this case, the actual place of  
management is deemed to establish the primary tax domicile, while 
the canton exercising this taxing jurisdiction bears the burden of  proof. 
Income of  intercantonal enterprises is apportioned among the primary tax 
domicile and the secondary tax domiciles, while income from a specific 
tax domicile is allocated to that specific domiciliary jurisdiction.
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Although the Federal Tax Harmonisation Law establishes uniform 
substantive and procedural taxation rules, the cantons retain different 
tax brackets, rates and allowances. The most significant divergence 
arises through competing tax exemptions. Cantons, in consultation 
with the communes within their borders, have the discretion to grant 
tax exemptions or holidays, either partial or full, to newly-established 
businesses for up to ten years to further economic development 
objectives, such as inward investment of  capital and local employment 
targets.
In Switzerland, there are three different methods of  apportionment: 
direct, indirect and a hybrid of  the two. Direct apportionment applies 
only if  a company has a PE managed as a separate enterprise with 
its own accounting books, in which case the separate profit or loss 
is determined through separate accounting, and then aggregated. 
These aggregate profits/losses are apportioned to the relevant cantons 
through industry-specific formulas. Under indirect apportionment, the 
income and expenses of  intercantonal business activities of  all PEs of  a 
corporation are consolidated, and this tax base is apportioned to cantons 
according to the respective ratio of  factors of  production present within 
its borders. These factors include turnover or gross receipts, payroll and 
assets. In principle, the indirect method is only acceptable when the 
direct method is insufficient, but in practice the predominant method 
is the indirect. Mixed apportionment allows application of  different 
apportionment formulas to divergent business lines. 
No general standard formula for apportionment exists in Switzerland. 
Instead, different formulas have been developed over time through 
practice, and confirmed on occasion by the Swiss Supreme Court for 
different industry sectors. For example, for the retail commercial sector 
income is apportioned by a single factor, turnover or gross receipts, and 
is attributed to the PE making the sales regardless of  the destination. 
Each formula may also apply a corrective mechanism (Präzipuum), 
which attributes a certain percentage of  the profits to the primary 
place of  central management if  it is perceived that too little profits are 
apportioned to the central management of  the enterprise.
The cantonal tax administration of  the corporation’s main tax domicile 
conducts a review/audit of  all tax assessments. Accounting methods 
are laid down by Swiss civil law, and there are rarely any differences 
between tax and accounting reporting standards. For taxpayers, there is 
an administrative appeal procedure, followed by two levels of  cantonal 
court review, with the final authority given to the Swiss Supreme Court. 
Intercantonal disputes first involve bilateral negotiation (and conflicts are 
usually resolved this way), but may be brought before the Swiss Supreme 
Court. 
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In order for any shared taxation approach to be successful among 
cooperating jurisdictions, there must be a unifying principle as well as 
procedures in place that help the system run smoothly. For Switzerland, 
this principle can be found in the constitutional prohibition against 
double taxation. This requirement is interpreted very stringently by 
the Swiss Supreme Court, even prohibiting virtual double taxation 
– taxing income that is allocated to another canton, but which is not 
taxed there. Procedurally, although the tax bases of  the cantons are not 
completely harmonised, there is a uniform tax accounting period, with 
the same taxable subjects and objects, filing requirements, including 
standard tax forms, and uniform enforcement and appeal procedures. 
Importantly, there is a close proximity of  accounting records to taxable 
income: taxable income is determined from the corporate profit and 
loss statements as determined by the Swiss Code of  Obligations. Also, 
because each canton requires a reporting of  worldwide income and 
capital, the information for accurate assessment is available to tax 
authorities.
Regional applications of unitary taxation: proposals 
and prospects
European Union – the proposed Common Corporate 
Consolidated Tax Base (CCCTB)
The EU is a political and economic community, now comprising 27 
member states. Since the Treaty of  Rome was signed in 1958 (now 
the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU)), direct 
taxation has always remained a matter for national states. In the first 
30 years, therefore, tax harmonisation unsurprisingly was confined to 
sales taxes, instituting a common VAT. From 1997 a new approach 
was adopted, focusing on company taxation and emphasising in 
particular: (i) tax diversity as an obstacle to the Single Market, and (ii) 
unfair tax competition, with the Commission working more closely in 
conjunction with the Council. To deal with harmful tax competition, 
an intergovernmental group was set up in 1997, operating within the 
framework of  the Council, chaired by the Commission, working on a 
confidential basis, the main task of  which has been the application of  a 
Code of  Conduct for Business Taxation. It issued a substantial report 
in 1999, listing the measures identified as potentially harmful under the 
Code, and its decisions on them. Measures found harmful were expected 
to be modified or withdrawn, and no similar ones should be introduced. 
Although the Code is non-binding, the Commission launched in parallel 
a review of  tax measures that could be considered state aid, prohibited 
under the TFEU (Art. 107). In general terms, state aid is prohibited if  
it is selective – either to a specific group or type of  firms or to a sector, 
and to a geographical area unless it has fiscal autonomy, except for aid to 
underdeveloped regions approved by the Commission (Wishlade 2012).9 
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This has put pressure on some measures by member states – for example, 
leading to the phasing out by Ireland of  its ten-year tax holidays for 
inward investors, in favour of  a general corporate tax rate (initially 10 
per cent, revised to 12.5 per cent). At the same time, the European Court 
of  Justice (ECJ) became more active in applying other treaty provisions, 
notably the right of  establishment, to strike down some national tax 
measures, such as controlled foreign corporation (CFC) provisions, even 
if  they are regarded as compatible with international tax rules. The 
combined pressures of  the Code, application of  state aid rules, and 
greater ECJ activism, opened up some space for exploration of  closer 
EU coordination of  corporate taxation, despite the resistance of  many 
member states.
In 2001 the Commission began a study for one set of  rules on the 
corporate tax base (European Commission 2001: 15), and in 2004 set 
up a Working Group to developed the technical details. In the context 
of  the Euro crisis and calls for closer fiscal coordination, in March 2011 
the Commission adopted a proposal for a CCCTB, which harmonises, 
consolidates and apportions the taxable income of  corporate groups 
operating within the EU (European Commission 2011). The CCCTB 
was approved, with some proposed amendments, by a large majority in 
the European Parliament. Under technical examination by the Council, 
subsequent presidencies produced compromise proposals with significant 
revisions focusing on the common tax base. The adoption of  the 
CCCTB Directive requires unanimous approval of  the member states, 
but it is possible for a smaller group of  member states to proceed on 
their own through an exceptional procedure for enhanced cooperation. 
Upon adoption, the Directive must be implemented into the national 
tax systems of  each member state; however, adoption by the member 
states in the short term appears unlikely. Nevertheless, public concern 
about corporate tax avoidance has greatly changed the political climate 
in Europe, fed also by revelations such as the Luxembourg Leaks and 
the Panama Papers. In June 2015 the Commission issued an Action Plan 
on a Fairer Corporate Tax System in the EU. This reiterated the merits 
of  the CCCTB as a holistic solution, and announced that it would be 
relaunched, this time as compulsory for companies, but in a two-stage 
process – first a common tax base, to be followed by a shift towards 
consolidation and apportionment. 
The 2011 proposal was optional for eligible companies. Generally, 
eligible companies must be either: (i) incorporated in a member state 
and subject to company taxation in one or more member states; or (ii) 
subject to company taxation in one or more member states through a PE 
there. It provided for a high degree of  tax base harmonisation, including 
definitions of  profit, loss, revenue, expenses and other deductible items, 
along with a framework for depreciation. The tax base under the 
160 
CCCTB is defined as revenue less exempt revenue, deductible expenses 
and other deductible items (see Chapter 5). Losses may be carried 
forward indefinitely and deducted against taxable income in subsequent 
tax years on a first in, first out basis. 
Firms opting for the CCCTB must adjust the accounts of  all eligible 
members of  the group according to the rules of  the CCCTB, and 
then aggregate them to produce consolidated accounts (Art. 57).10 The 
CCCTB would apply to the corporate group, consisting of  qualifying 
companies, including subsidiaries of  a foreign parent company resident 
in an EU member state, and their PEs in an EU member state. A 
qualifying subsidiary includes first-tier and lower-tier subsidiaries in 
which the parent has a right to exercise more that 50 per cent of  the 
voting rights; and an ownership right to more than 75 per cent of  
the company’s capital or more than 75 per cent of  the rights giving 
entitlement to profit (Art. 54). All intra-group transactions are ignored for 
tax purposes, and no withholding or other taxation at the source is to be 
assessed on intra-group transactions (Art. 59, 60). 
After aggregation, the tax base is apportioned between group members 
(and hence to the member state) on the basis of  a formula of  three 
factors: capital, labour and sales (Art. 86).11 The labour factor counts 
total compensation costs and number of  employees at equal weights.12 
The asset factor includes the average value of  all fixed tangible assets 
owned, rented or leased. Intangibles, financial assets and current assets, 
such as inventory, are not included in the asset factor. Sales are attributed 
to the destination point, which is defined as ‘where dispatch or transport 
of  the goods to the person acquiring them ends’ (Art. 96). There is a 
throwback rule to the last identifiable location of  the goods or carrying 
out of  service for destination points with no group member registered 
there (either a member state or a third jurisdiction). Services are deemed 
to take place where they are physically carried out; there is no rule for 
electronically-performed services.
There are special rules for selected industries – financial institutions, 
insurance, oil and gas, and ships or aircraft in international traffic or 
inland waterways transport – providing for adjustments to be applied 
to the factors of  the general formula (Arts. 98-101). The proposal has a 
safeguard clause that allows for alternative apportionment methods in 
cases where the outcome of  the apportionment does not fairly reflect 
business activity (Art. 87).
Tax rates are not regulated by the Directive: each member state would 
apply its own tax rate to the share of  the tax base as apportioned under 
the CCCTB (Art. 103).
As for administration, each member state would designate a competent 
authority to administer the Directive, and the principal tax authority 
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would be the competent authority of  the state of  residence of  the 
group’s parent company within the EU. This entity would file a single 
consolidated return on behalf  of  the group to the principal tax authority, 
which would be accessible by all competent authorities in a central 
database. The principal tax authority would be primarily responsible for 
verifying the accounts, but all competent authorities would cooperate 
or exchange information, and there is provision for joint audits. In the 
case of  a disagreement between competent authorities, a decision could 
be challenged before the court of  the member state of  the principal tax 
authority. 
The proposed CCCTB Directive represents the most comprehensive 
existing framework for harmonisation, aggregation and apportionment 
of  multinational company profits. Indeed, it is unique in providing 
a detailed technical proposal for a system of  unitary taxation that 
would operate between sovereign states, although within the regional, 
institutional framework of  the EU. It also provides special rules for 
associated enterprises, and, for transparent entities, a set of  anti-abuse 
rules and a switch-over clause for otherwise exempt income from low- or 
no-tax jurisdictions. The CCCTB would only apply within participating 
states in the EU, and thus follows a strictly water’s edge approach. Hence, 
subject to its own CFC provisions, the overlay of  double tax agreements 
would regulate relations with associated enterprises in third jurisdictions. 
The analysis in the remaining sections will survey the prospects of  
moving towards adoption of  a common tax base in the East African 
Community (EAC), Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN).
East African Community (EAC)
The East African Community (EAC) is a regional economic 
intergovernmental organisation comprised of  six East African nations. 
The Treaty for Establishment of  the East African Community (EAC 
Treaty) was ratified in 2000 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; Rwanda 
and Burundi joined in 2007, and South Sudan in 2016. The EAC 
was established with a vision to set up a prosperous, competitive, 
secure, stable and politically united East Africa, and widen and 
deepen economic, political, social and cultural integration in East 
Africa. To this end, a Customs Union was established in 2005, and a 
Common Market in 2010. The Fourth Strategic Framework set forth 
plans for consolidation of  the Customs Union and Common Market, 
establishment of  the EAC Monetary Union, and foundational work 
for the EAC Political Federation in accordance with Article 5(2) of  the 
EAC Treaty.
Under Article 83 of  the EAC Treaty, the partner states resolved to 
‘harmonise their tax policies with a view to removing tax distortions 
in order to bring about a more efficient allocation of  resources within 
the community’. This tax harmonisation includes aligning investment 
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incentives and avoiding double taxation (Art. 80). This is significantly 
different from the EU treaty, which, as we have seen above, reserves 
taxation to the EU member states, and even leaves the removal of  
double taxation to bilateral tax treaties between the EU member 
states. In sharp contrast, under the EAC the partner states make a 
multilateral commitment in Article 32 of  the Common Market Protocol, 
to ‘progressively harmonise their tax policies and laws to remove tax 
distortions in order to facilitate the free movement of  goods, services and 
capital and to promote investment within the Community’. 
The EAC has committed to harmonise fiscal policies, and has, in fact, 
made initial harmonisation efforts, including a uniform corporate income 
tax rate of  30 per cent across the EAC region. However, up to now 
income from related party transactions is regulated under international 
transfer pricing guidelines in the respective country’s tax laws. Transfer 
pricing rules have been enacted in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda,13 
while Rwanda and Burundi are still in the development stages. The 
EAC Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) was signed in November 2010: 
it was intended to come into force on 1 July 2011 but is still subject 
to ratification by the partner states; thus far, Rwanda has ratified. In 
anticipation of  ratification, regional training on the DTA has been 
undertaken. 
In the context of  this ongoing economic integration and tax 
harmonisation, adoption of  unitary taxation in the EAC would ensure 
that the tax base would be equitably shared among partner states 
based on economic factors of  production and consumption, while also 
preserving the sovereignty of  the states to decide their own levels of  
taxation and public spending. This is an important factor for the EAC, 
where domestic taxation is still viewed as a national issue that should 
not be a subject of  regional policy. The unitary taxation approach 
could further ensure that multinational enterprises (MNEs) would also 
make a fair contribution as corporate citizens toward the costs of  the 
public services provided by the country in which they do business. While 
the creation of  a large common market acts as a powerful attraction 
for inward foreign direct investment, a central problem for regional 
integration is that the benefits of  such investment may be unevenly 
spread. Indeed, this problem was a major reason for the failure of  
previous integration attempts in East Africa. In addition to establishing a 
system for regional corporate taxation that could be easier to administer, 
unitary taxation (UT) could also ensure a balanced apportionment of  
revenue, taking account of  sales as well as production factors.
However, implementation of  UT would present practical challenges, 
especially with determining the apportionment formula. A UT approach 
may also require a relatively uniform economic situation across countries 
to arrive at a reasonable result, and may not work well where the costs 
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of  labour, property or sales vary significantly. Moreover, the possible 
economic impacts from a regional application of  UT are unclear. 
Further research in this area is therefore necessary. 
Under a UT system, EAC countries might wish to retain different 
degrees of  freedom to try to adapt their tax system to attract investment 
from multinationals. This could extend to allowing variations on the 
apportionment formula, which would likely result in a shift towards a 
sales basis for apportionment as has occurred in the US (discussed above). 
Alternatively, the EAC could try to define a common tax base and 
apportionment formula, while allowing partner states to decide their own 
tax rate, as with the CCCTB. Under either option, states would have 
to consider the impact on investment, but this would have to be on the 
basis of  favouring value-creating economic factors such as labour, assets 
and sales. This is very different from the avoidance incentives the current 
separate entity system gives countries to undermine other countries’ tax 
systems. As the EU experience has shown, it is difficult to restrain such 
harmful tax practices effectively without corporate tax harmonisation.
Adoption of  UT could be facilitated by the regional coordination that is 
currently in place through the East African Revenue Authority Technical 
Committee, and ultimately through the East African Revenue Authority 
Commissioners General Forum. This could raise awareness and create 
political momentum for the governments to transition to a UT approach. 
The evolving mechanism to enable exchange of  information on tax 
matters in the region through a Memorandum of  Understanding can 
also be a facilitator. 
In the past decade, there has been an acceleration in the growth of  
private sector regional investments in sectors such as banking, retail 
distribution, hotels, manufacturing and construction, and at the same 
time coordinated budgetary expenditure for regional infrastructure 
development. This convergence will highlight the need in the EAC 
region for a more cohesive and functional system of  corporate taxation. 
UT may be a viable option, but more research is needed.
Latin America – Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN)
Mercosur
The economic integration process in Latin America was initiated by the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which was established 
in 1960 by 11 country members – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
However, LAFTA was an inflexible integration treaty, and would not 
allow for bilateral or other type of  internal arrangements, and for this 
reason it did not work properly. The same 11 LAFTA countries then 
established the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) in its 
place. LAIA provides a flexible framework, allowing a wide range of  
agreements between country members, and between members and non-
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members in the region, and easy access for other countries to join the 
bloc. There are few restrictions to third-party agreements with country 
members, except for trade treaties negotiated with developed countries.
Under the LAIA framework, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
negotiated the Asunción Treaty of  1991, which established the Mercado 
Común de la Sur – Mercosur, headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay. 
Since its establishment, other treaties have been negotiated between the 
four countries to establish a more stable framework, including a dispute 
resolution mechanism.14 Venezuela joined Mercosur as a full member in 
2012; in the same year Paraguay was suspended, while Bolivia joined. 
Currently Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador enjoy the status 
of  associated countries.
The Asunción Treaty contains a national treatment principle (Art. 7), 
and a very broad provision for harmonisation of  legislation that may 
strengthen the integration process (Art. 1, par. 6). In its first decade, 
the country members created a customs union by applying a Common 
External Tariff to all non-member countries (from 1995). Mercosur 
treaties include many provisions regarding tariffs and other commercial 
barriers, and a call for harmonisation of  economic policy, but do not 
include any provision relating to other types of  taxes. In addition, several 
Mercosur institutions have been developed in order to build a formal 
structure and to solve problems that are typical to common markets, such 
as rules of  origin and the most-favoured nation principle (Valadão 2009: 
212). Mercosur experienced a big expansion in the 1990s, averaging 19 
per cent growth a year in regional trade, almost three times higher than 
the rate of  growth of  their world trade (Pastor 2001). Despite economic 
and political changes in the region, in 2007 the Mercosur Parliament was 
inaugurated, and in 2010 a Common Customs Code was approved by 
the member states.
All five Mercosur countries have adopted a VAT (it is worth noting 
that the Brazilian VAT system is very complex), and all countries of  
the bloc assess an income tax on individuals and enterprises. However, 
because the harmonisation of  income and capital taxes is the last step 
of  tax system harmonisation in a process of  economic integration, 
harmonisation of  direct taxes is not a current priority in the region. 
Although there has been academic work dealing with tax harmonisation 
in the region, there has been no political initiative for such process 
(Barreix and Villela 2003: 77-99). Indeed, tax harmonisation is not 
among the current concerns of  the Mercosur countries, despite the fact 
that investment protection measures were adopted by the bloc. However, 
for some aspects of  corporate income tax, such as transfer pricing 
rules, similar regulations have been recommended (Barreix and Villela 
2003: 76).
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In the first decade of  this century, the Mercosur integration process has 
been challenged by world transformations and global trends, such as the 
Free Trade Area of  the Americas and US bilateral trade agreements, 
and, more recently, the global economic crisis. However, it has been 
noted that: ‘there are economic and non-economic factors that are 
pushing the region to a position where economic and trade integration 
will be easier in the future. When economic and trade integration will 
be accomplished, however, is a question yet to be answered’ (Valadão 
2009: 220). 
The application of  a unitary approach for Mercosur would be a 
methodology to replace the arm’s length principle in regard to transfer 
pricing for corporate income taxation. Thus, if  a member country 
has not adopted a corporate income tax, or does not apply transfer 
pricing rules, in principle there is no common ground for reform. The 
five Mercosur countries have a corporate income tax, but, as Paraguay 
adopted it only in 2005, entering into force in 2009, and does not have 
transfer pricing rules, the Paraguayan approach to transfer pricing would 
necessarily need to be modified. Uruguay taxes corporate income under 
the territorial principle.
Moreover, information exchange is also necessary in the move toward 
unitary taxation. Additionally, accounting standards may be a problem 
regarding the use of  unitary taxation with formulary apportionment 
(Yussof  2014; Chapter 5 in this collection). Although tax accounting 
must be consistent among the countries, financial accounting is always 
a reference, because the two systems use the same accounting basic 
information. Thus, it is desirable that countries involved share the same 
accounting methodologies (both for tax and financial purposes). Four 
countries of  the bloc have adopted a common standard, which is the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), though they are in 
different stages; Paraguay has made a commitment to do so, although it 
has not adopted IFRS.
On the other hand, one can say that, considering a country-by-country 
analysis, if  Paraguay adopts consistent changes in legislation to adopt 
transfer pricing adjustments and in accounting standards (towards the 
international standard), a unitary approach would be feasible for the 
bloc. However, in terms of  common legislation within the bloc, due to 
the lack of  any provision in the constituent treaties, and also considering 
the current stage of  the integration process, a unitary approach for 
Mercosur is not possible in the short term. Of  course, any move towards 
unitary taxation would require changes in internal legislation of  all 
countries of  the bloc to allow for the system to be implemented.
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The Andean Community (CAN)
In 1969, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru signed the Andean 
Pact, and in 1996 the name of  the organisation was changed to the 
Andean Community of  Nations (Comunidad Andina – CAN). In 1973, 
Venezuela was incorporated into the bloc. In 1976, Chile withdrew 
from CAN, followed by Venezuela in 2006. The Cartagena Agreement, 
which is the primary CAN treaty, declares that the aim of  the bloc is the 
gradual formation of  a Latin American Common Market. It includes the 
national treatment principle in Article 75, and calls for the adoption of  a 
common external tariff, but does not address tax harmonisation of  direct 
or indirect taxes. Articles 3, 54 and 57 of  the Cartagena Agreement do, 
however, contain provisions for integration of  economic policy of  the 
country members, and harmonisation of  national legislation similar 
to those in the Asuncion Treaty. Commission Decision 388 established 
rules for harmonisation of  indirect taxes as well as of  incentives for the 
exportation of  goods. In addition, Decisions 599, 600, and 635 of  the 
Commission of  the Andean Community address harmonisation of  VAT 
and excise taxes.
Decision 40/1971 of  the Commission of  the Cartagena Agreement 
established a multilateral treaty to avoid double taxation, and also a 
model tax convention for the CAN member states, which must be used 
by country members when negotiating double taxation agreements 
(DTAs) with non-member countries. This Decision was updated 
by Decision 578 of  the Andean Community Commission in 2004, 
approving a new version of  the multilateral DTA, now renamed 
‘Scheme for the Avoidance of  Double Taxation and Prevention of  Fiscal 
Evasion’, in force since 1 January 2005 for the current members of  the 
bloc (Venezuela being no longer a member).15 The countries of  the 
bloc have been negotiating trade treaties separately, which may weaken 
the cohesion of  the bloc. For example, Colombia and Peru signed 
trade treaties with the EU in 2012. In addition, CAN has also formed 
a customs union, with free circulation of  goods and a common tariff 
schedule.
This level of  agreement puts CAN ahead of  Mercosur in terms of  
income tax integration. Along with Mercosur, the Andean Community 
also has been negotiating trade agreements with the EU. These inter-
regional negotiations could lead to increased integration, and could 
possibly strengthen the LAIA community. However, the countries of  the 
region, as a reaction to regional integration of  northern markets (North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU), have formed 
the Union of  South American Nations (Unasur).16 The future of  this 
process remains to be seen, but it will likely involve the whole western 
hemisphere, and possibly align the NAFTA countries with Mercosur, 
CAN and Unasur. However, at present Unasur is more focused on 
political rather than economic integration.
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The lack of  a provision in the existing treaties, protocols and resolutions 
envisaging harmonisation of  corporate income taxation presents a 
formidable challenge for the adoption of  a regional unitary taxation 
approach. Furthermore, the fact that Paraguay and Uruguay of  
Mercosur, and Bolivia from CAN, have adopted systems of  territorial 
taxation, presents an additional obstacle in adopting a unitary approach. 
For countries applying a territorial base that exempts income and gains 
from overseas operations and participations, the only international 
taxation problems they face are transfer pricing manipulation and thin 
capitalisation, as there is no need for controlled foreign corporation 
(CFC) rules. Additionally, none of  the countries of  either bloc allows 
consolidation for income tax purposes.
Another difficulty may be found in the different accounting 
methodologies and different stages regarding adoption of  the IFRS. 
Paraguay in Mercosur, and Peru in CAN, have not yet adopted 
international standards for accounting (Colombia and Bolivia are 
in a transition phase towards IFRS). On the other hand, Chapter 5 
suggests that IFRS standards themselves are unsuitable for tax purposes. 
Moreover, tax administrations of  the countries of  the region are at 
different stages of  development, especially regarding information access 
and publicly-available information. In the short term, it seems that it is 
not feasible for either bloc to adopt a unitary approach. Such a transition 
would involve changes in internal tax legislation, and for some countries 
(especially Paraguay and Bolivia) much more than that. Such a transition 
would also require a multilateral tax treaty dealing specifically with the 
issue of  unitary taxation to replace internal legislation. Because CAN 
has adopted a double tax treaty that is in force, one can say that CAN is 
closer than Mercosur to moving towards unitary taxation within the bloc, 
despite the political divergences that this move may trigger.
Lessons from existing subnational formulary 
apportionment models
In the last century, the federations of  the US, Canada and Switzerland 
created tax systems that enabled economic integration through greater 
tax coordination. In this century, regional economic integration has 
become the trend in today’s global economy. In adapting to a global 
economy, the EU CCCTB proposal is a front-runner in responding 
to regional economic integration through tax base harmonisation, 
consolidation and apportionment on a regional level. This chapter has 
sought to analyse these tax systems, and explore the advantages and 
challenges in a unitary approach for regional economic communities 
in the global South. The discussion below outlines the challenges and 
lessons learned based on analysis of  existing models of  unitary taxation 
and formulary apportionment.
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Uniformity
Each unitary taxation approach has developed in a particular political 
and economic context with varying attributes that enable each system 
to function properly. There is no one-size-fits-all unitary taxation 
framework, and each system should be tailored to the circumstances of  
its respective political and economic union. Given this caveat, uniformity 
seems to be a key factor for the success of  any unitary taxation approach, 
whether in the definition or apportionment of  the tax base. Uniform 
rules for accounting of  income and expenses, as well as tax credits 
and allowances such as depreciation, eliminate differences in tax base 
determinations across jurisdictions. Moreover, a high degree of  variance 
increases the likelihood of  exploitation of  arbitrage opportunities, and 
also results in higher compliance costs for taxpaying businesses, both 
big and small. Uniform rules promote vertical equity by levelling the 
playing field among taxpayers with varying levels of  resources for tax 
planning. Moreover, uniform rules promote efficiency and tax neutrality 
goals, because location decisions are based on available market resources 
and potential return on investment, rather than divergent rules for 
determining, consolidating and sharing the tax base. Finally, a lack of  
uniformity strains the audit capacity of  tax authorities, and impedes 
effective enforcement of  the tax system, which would be particularly 
acute in developing countries. 
Tax base aggregation
For taxpayers, clear and understandable rules increase certainty and 
decrease costs of  compliance. As applied to unitary taxation systems, 
simplicity in rules of  consolidation should be balanced with flexibility, 
which allows for rules that accurately consolidate and apportion the tax 
base to reflect the economic substance of  the income-producing activity. 
For example, entity-level consolidation defines the tax base of  a single 
legal corporate entity including its branches (PEs) across jurisdictions. 
Although this approach serves goals of  simplicity by staying within the 
boundaries of  the legal entity, it may not reflect the economic reality of  
the shared value creation inherent in a multinational corporate group. 
Aggregation on the basis of  a unitary business principle, required in 
the US for constitutional reasons, can lead to disagreements and hence 
lack of  clarity. On the other hand, consolidation of  income based on 
a control test such as corporate voting stock ownership may provide a 
definitive threshold, but may also consolidate unrelated business lines, 
allowing groups to game the formula. Perhaps the best approach would 
be a control test, but with power to exclude unrelated business activities 
as an anti-avoidance rule.
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Tax base apportionment
The factors of  the apportionment formula operate as proxies for 
economic activity to split the tax base among jurisdictions, on the basis of  
the actual presence of  the firm in each country. Thus, an apportionment 
formula should balance the supply side (either in the form of  human 
or physical capital or both), and demand side (in the form of  gross 
receipts of  revenue). This balancing of  production and consumption 
factors in the apportionment formula also increases cross-country equity. 
Although many jurisdictions may have large consumer markets as well 
as manufacturing or service sectors, and would benefit equally from both 
types of  factors in an apportionment formula, less developed economies 
with smaller consumer markets (in relation to their level of  production) 
or lower wage levels (in relation to global wage levels) would capture 
less revenue under a balance weighted toward consumption or a payroll 
factor only determined by remuneration amounts. The labour factor in 
the EU CCCTB, which balances remuneration costs and headcount, 
promotes cross-country equity because it takes into account different 
wage levels across EU member states. Importantly, the destination-based 
sales factor should be complemented with a throwback rule, which 
assigns sales that take place in a non-taxable state back to the state of  
shipment. 
Transparency
For governments, the most critical factor in ensuring the administrability 
of  any system of  unitary taxation is having enough information to 
accurately assess a tax on income. In this regard, a combined report 
including all income-producing activities under consolidation is essential. 
If  consolidation is water’s edge, the report should include income-
producing activities of  the firm in all jurisdictions within the water’s 
edge territory. If  consolidation is worldwide, the report should include 
income-producing activities of  the unitary business in all jurisdictions 
worldwide. Moreover, a worldwide combined report may be necessary 
for jurisdictions that incorporate part of  worldwide income under 
water’s edge election rules, or anti-abuse provisions that include income 
from low-tax jurisdictions. In any case, worldwide combined reporting, 
regardless of  the level of  tax base aggregation, gives tax administrations 
a better picture of  the taxpayer’s income-producing activities and 
removes informational barriers that would impede assessment and audit 
procedures. It should also be noted that a region that applies formulary 
apportionment internally could combine this with full-inclusion CFC 
rules with a foreign tax credit (residence-based worldwide taxation, 
discussed in Chapter 1). This would be most relevant for regions such 
as the EU, which include the home countries of  many MNEs. If  this 
occurred in conjunction with the reassertion by the US of  effective CFC 
rules (though with a lower tax rate than at present), there could be a 
significant shift towards worldwide unitary taxation.
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Conclusions
As the case studies elaborated above demonstrate, the development of  
the tax base definition, the method of  aggregation or consolidation, 
and the apportionment formula, are all areas that require political 
agreement. And even with political agreement on these issues, unitary 
taxation does not offer or require complete tax harmonisation. Only the 
full uniformity of  tax rates, base and incentives/subsidies would provide 
full tax neutrality. Thus, in balancing state sovereignty with market 
integration, unitary taxation presents a solution in the middle ground. 
Allowing participating states to choose their own tax rates, incentives 
and/or formula factors, would still allow space to exercise national 
priorities for revenue generation. Although economists have shown 
the ability of  aggregation and apportionment systems to satisfy both 
efficiency and inter-nation equity demands (Sörensen 1990: 16-19), it has 
recently been argued that formulary apportionment carries a ‘significant 
risk of  distortion’ and that tax competition would be more intense than 
under the current separate entity-arm’s length transfer pricing system as 
‘countries have an incentive to attract factors of  production represented 
in the apportionment formula’ (IMF 2014: 41). The purpose of  a unitary 
approach, however, is not to completely eliminate tax competition – only 
full tax harmonisation could accomplish that. Agreement on minimum 
effective corporate tax rates would be a significant step in that direction. 
The aim of  a unitary approach is tax cooperation between countries. As 
a mechanism to aggregate and share out the inter-jurisdictional tax base 
of  taxable profits, a unitary approach provides simple, administrable 
and transparent rules to minimise disputes, increase taxpayer certainty, 
provide profit and loss transfer for multinational corporations, and lower 
compliance costs. Empirical work to date demonstrates that there would 
be distinctive winners and losers in a global unitary approach, and the 
losers would be jurisdictions that lack substantial economic activities, 
or so-called conduit countries (IMF 2014: 40; see also Chapter 7 in 
this volume). If  aligning taxation with economic value creation is the 
desired outcome, continuing to rely on increasingly complex guidelines 
for internal price-setting between artificially-segmented entities is not 
likely to get us there. Extrapolating from the federal models of  company 
income taxation from this study, however, global adoption of  unitary 
taxation will require a big leap for international tax cooperation.
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Notes
1. 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
2. Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
3. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
4. Tax Comm’r of the State of West Virginia v. MBNA America Bank, 650 
SE 2d 226(2006), cert denied sub nom, FIA Card Services N.A. v. Tax 
Comm’r of West Virginia, 551 US 1141 (2007).
5. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes State of Vermont, 445 US 425. 438 
(1980).
6. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
7. Taxation of the income from intercantonal business activities of a 
corporation is based on tax domicile. Primary tax domiciles are, in most 
cases, the place of corporate registration, while secondary tax domiciles 
are classified as PEs of the corporation. Specific tax domicile arises 
through ownership of real property in a jurisdiction that is not the 
primary tax domicile.
8. A PE has been defined in Swiss Supreme Court case law as a lasting 
physical installation or facility in which a qualitative and quantitative 
material part of the commercial or technical activities of an enterprise 
is exercised. Intellectual property or accounts receivable by themselves 
cannot create a PE; physical presence is required.
9. If a measure is challenged under state aid rules, its evaluation under 
the Code is suspended. State aid rules do not apply to dependencies of 
member states, such as the Netherlands Antilles, the Channel Islands 
and Isle of Man, but they have been applied to Gibraltar.
10. The Directive uses the word ‘consolidation’, though the starting point is 
the financial accounts of each member; the procedure is the same in the 
US, as stated above. For further discussion, see Chapter 5.
11. The factor weighting was modified by the European Parliament, which 
assigned a 45% weighting to both the labour and asset factors and 10% 
to the sales factor.
12. Payroll is comprised of salaries, wages, bonuses and all other employee 
compensation, including related pension and social security costs borne 
by the employer, and should be equal to amounts deducted by the 
taxpayer within the year.
13. Kenya Income Tax Act 2006 s.18; Tanzania Income Tax Act, s. 33; 
Uganda Income Tax Act, §90-91, cap 340. There are also Transfer 
Pricing Regulations 2011 and Transfer Pricing Practice Note 2012.
14. See Valadão (2009: 211). The Olivos Protocol on Dispute Settlement, 
which created a Permanent Tribunal (arbitral), as well as a post-
decision control mechanism for Mercosur, was approved in 2002. For 
other constituent Mercosur treaties, see www.mercosur.int/t_generic.
jsp?contentid=4002&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=3.
15. It is worth mentioning that among the changes in the new version 
of the CAN DTA is the introduction of a provision similar to Art. 9 of 
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the UN and OECD Model Conventions (Art. 7. Empresas Asociadas o 
Relacionadas [Associated Enterprises]). It allows for the application of 
transfer pricing adjustments (by applying the arm´s length principle 
embodied in this article) in operations between associated enterprises in 
the context of the DTA. 
16. The Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations 
entered into force on 11 March 2011; negotiations began in 2004, and 
the treaty was concluded in 2008. All 12 countries of South America 
joined the Association (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela).
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